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Oriental Philosophies

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Oriental Philosophies

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181
G.A.M.

7284

Russell F. Moore Company New York

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THIRD EDITION

(Revised)

First Printing, September, 1950

Second Printing, December, 1950

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"That which exists is one; sages
call it variously."

—*Rig Veda*, I. 164. 46.

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY, NEW DELHI.

Vol. No. 7284.
Date. 30. 7. 56
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Preface

It may be of some benefit to the reader to come to the study of Oriental Philosophy with a bird's-eye view of the general subject matter to be presented. In this preface, the writer aims at giving a quick review of such relationships, chronological and otherwise, as may be of material assistance in providing such an orientation.

Because of its great antiquity, the philosophy of India is presented in the first part of the book. The Vedic hymns, which contain the seeds of later Indian philosophy, are some of the very oldest recorded thoughts of the human mind. The Brāhmaṇas and Upanishads are commentaries on the Vedic hymns. The Upanishads, in particular, are significant, for they were concerned with knowledge, and they refined and developed the more primitive philosophical expressions to be found in the Vedas. Following the Upanishads came the law books and then the two great epics of Indian literature. These contained a further treatment of philosophical principles. Later historical records reveal the teachings of great thinkers like Śaṅkara, Kaṇāda, Rāmānuja, Kapila and others. They expounded various interpretations of the basic doctrines. These men, and their followers, founded the six major schools of Hindu philosophy. With the coming of Western thought into India, new attitudes have been adopted, and the reader will find a separate chapter on contemporary Indian philosophy. In addition to these orthodox schools, there were two important heterodox systems. In late Upanishadic times, through the teaching of Mahāvīra, Jainism took form and came to constitute a separate Indian philosophy.

A second great heterodox system was founded at about the same time by Gautama—Buddhism. Although originally Indian, this great body of teaching has spread to China and Japan and elsewhere in the Asiatic world to become the most international of all Eastern philosophies.

India has truly been the mother of philosophy, and the belief that speculative thought began with the ancient Greeks is as lamentable as it is untrue.

That Oriental philosophy has received scant notice in the formal study of philosophy, as we find it in our schools and universities, is natural enough. After all, the roots of our intellectual and cultural traditions lie with the beginnings of Greek and Near Eastern thought, in large measure. If we were to discover the probable earlier inter-relations of those ancient times, however, and gain in our own day the broadest possible basis for an international and planet-wide philosophy, the East cannot be ignored.

Philosophers from East and West, meeting together last year in Hawaii, found that the people of the two hemispheres have a great deal more in common than may be ordinarily realized. It is only by our study of Eastern thought, to discover its meaning for us, that a world synthesis of ideas and ideals may be finally found. That there are differences of metaphysical viewpoint is scarcely deniable, but the most recent deliberations indicate that these viewpoints are by no means irreconcilable. Again there are differences in methodological assumptions between East and West, but these by being made the object of study and investigation will be recognized for their respective values in formulating a world philosophy.

In later chapters, two great schools of Chinese philosophy—Taoism and Confucianism—are considered, and mention is given to a number of other important systems. Chinese philosophy is easily divisible into three great periods. The first extended from the 6th century B. C. to the 2nd century B. C. This great movement saw the development of Confucianism, Taoism, and a number of minor schools including Sophism, Neo-Mohism, Legalism and Yin-Yang Interactionism. The second great period in Chinese philosophy was encompassed by the years from the 2nd century B. C. to the 11th century A. D., and there was a general mingling of the teachings of the various existent philosophies. During the third period, from the 11th century until the present, Confucianism gradually gave way to what is termed Neo-Confucianism.

Japanese philosophy is not accorded very detailed treatment here because much of it is foreign in origin and is consequently better treated on its native ground. There are the ancient beliefs of Shintō (the way of the spirits) and of Bushidō (the way of the Bushi' or warrior), both uniquely Japanese. Early Chinese Interactionism (the *yin-yang* principles), Confucianism, and Buddhism, as well as the native thought patterns, have all exerted an influence in shaping the philosophic thought of Japan. It is in Japan, too, that we find Buddhism in its purest form as it exists today.

The Near East schools of thought have been regarded here primarily as religions rather than as philosophies (and consequently they are treated very briefly), although it cannot be said that Persian Sufism is without philosophical significance.

As compared with Western modes of thought, the reader will find much that is different in his study of Oriental Philosophy. It is only by approaching the subject with an open mind, and in a spirit of inquiry, that the best fruits of study are to be attained.

Above all as one gains a knowledge of Eastern thought, he is able to draw bits of wisdom from many sources as building stones for his own philosophical outlook. Until one has explored for himself the majestic realms of Oriental thought and sensed something of the vast and mysterious sway of philosophy and religion on that great continent, he can have but a partial view of the totality of philosophical thought.

A word of appreciation should go to those teachers of philosophy who have used this volume in earlier editions in their classes and who have so kindly made available their criticisms and comments. The authors are indebted to them for many of the improvements in the present revision.

Perhaps a word should be said here relative to the forms of transliteration employed. In cases of such words as have found a place in standard English dictionaries, e. g. Nirvana, Mahayana, Hinayana, diacritical markings have not been employed. In the case of the readings, the same system of transliteration is used as was used by the particular author or editor from whose writing the selections here were taken. It will thus be noted, for example, that the Legge system of transcription has been used in such readings as have been taken from that author while elsewhere, in the text, the Wade-Giles system has been utilized because of its wide acceptance.

New York City
August 1950

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Introduction

The Light From the East¹

"Nothing that is eternal can be gained by what is not eternal."

—Muṇḍaka Upanishad

Today, as it did in the days of Pythagoras, of Plato, of Plotinus, of Appolonius of Tyana, and of other truth-seekers who have been the shapers of the culture and faiths of the Occident, "From the Orient cometh the Light."

Increasingly, as the old barrier-walls, built of misunderstandings and prejudices, are overthrown, which too long have been allowed to separate culturally the continent of Europe and the Americas from Asia, will with mutual respect and understanding bind East and West together. Then, in transcendent love, such as overleaps every impediment of creed and caste and race, humanity for the first time in known history will come to realize that it is in reality One Family, that as St. Paul enunciated, we are truly members of One Body. It is only when the West understands the East and the East the West that a social order worthy to be called civilized will be evolved; and by no other means can there come forth a New Age.

¹by Dr. W. Y. Evans-Wentz.

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Mechanization and atomic power may ameliorate man's life on Earth, but they cannot create culture or emancipate man. Nor can the Occident alone direct the future of human evolution.

Ever since the time of Europe's pioneer thinkers and trained seers, especially Pythagoras and Plotinus and Appolonius of Tyana, each of whom travelled to India to attain guidance in Right Knowledge, the West unceasingly has found its social salvation in oriental culture. When the folk of Western Europe and of the British Isles were barbarians and painted their bodies and wore crude skins of wild beasts, India and China were more culturally advanced than any part of Europe, not excepting Greece and Rome, ever had been prior to our own epoch. Then, with the coming of the Renaissance, which was inspired by the classical culture born of the East, Europe for the first time awakened from its primitiveness and began to understand the significance of culture.

The corpus of teachings which came to be called Christian was itself, as St. Augustine frankly acknowledged, orientally derived; nor were these teachings, as he well knew, something unique or new. Originating from many sources, they transmitted, in large measure, the quintessence of salvation doctrines which, long before the rise of Christianity in the West, were common both to India and to China and in lesser degree to the Mystery Schools of the ancient Egyptian and Grecian and Mediterranean civilizations. Thus, likewise for Christendom, it was through oriental assistance that the Occident was delivered from barbarism.

Almost imperceptibly during a century and more now, or since European scholars began to recognize the importance of the Sacred Books of the East, to which the chapters following bear such eloquent witness, the thought of Europe and of the Americas has been profoundly modified by that of the Orient. The *Bhagavad-gītā*, the *Upanishads*, the *Diamond Sūtra*, the discourses of Confucius and Mencius and Lao Tzū, and the *Dharma* of the Buddha, together with many more of the supreme teachings flowing in from Asia, have become more or less familiar to the peoples of the West. The Oxford *New English Dictionary* incorporates in its pages, as being already anglicized, Sanskrit derived words which a generation ago were popularly quite unknown, such, for example, as *karma*, *guru*, *Nirvana*, and others. We are, indeed, living in the time of a Renaissance far mightier in its cultural influence than that of fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe; for, at that epoch, the Light from the East could but faintly shine

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through the accumulated gloom inherited from Europe's Dark Ages. Today the sky is less obscured; when, at last, the New Age of at-onement of East and West shall dawn, the mists and clouds and darkness will have been dissipated, and the Sun of Right Understanding will rise and illuminate a united world.

It is of more than ordinary significance to have received only a few days ago, from a young American returned from the War and now stationed in one of the United States Naval Personnel Separation Centers, these thoughtful observations:

"The importance of scholars' work touching things Asiatic grows with each day. I note an increasing interest in Asia, perhaps in China in particular, due to the fact that many service men have had, during their term of service in the Pacific campaigns, more or less contact with Orientals. That is good, for only by such a growth of brotherly feeling for the peoples of the East can future misunderstanding and possible disaster be avoided."

As this aptly suggests, a scholarly presentation in easily comprehended and compact form of the very quintessence of what is best in the cultural heredity of Asia, is of inestimable importance, not only culturally and politically, but in world-wide commercial relationships as well. The very issuance of such publications as *Oriental Philosophies* is an omen of far reaching signification, for it heralds the coming of an age which truly shall be new and great and divinely-guided. There can be no greater social service than that of helping to prepare the way for a civilization which shall be really humanitarian, not merely Eastern or Western, but international.

The whole world faces the most stupendous crisis in all the millenniums. Shall our social order disintegrate as did that of Babylon and Memphis and Rome? Shall all the sacrifices, all the struggles, all the hopes of our forefathers, who with such painful effort built up our Western civilization and made us its heirs, be frustrated? Shall Ignorance continue to shape the policy of so many of our statesmen and religious leaders? Shall we attain a united world and a federation of religions or shall we suffer social disintegration and defeat?

The East has ever extended fraternal greetings to the West. India's and China's culture has gone on unbrokenly for many thousands of years. India has witnessed the fall of the ancient empires of the Occident and of the Near East. Shall its fraternal greetings not be reciprocated by us of this generation? Shall we be faithless custodians of the trust which our ancestors reposed in us? Shall the West,

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glamorously and hypnotically fettered to its wondrous machines and its utilitarianism, not welcome emancipation; shall it not strive for a new model man more than for a new model car?

The fate of the West will be of its own making. If the Light from the East will be allowed to shine unimpededly, its saving power will emancipate the West, for this Light is none other than that of which the Gnostic Christos spoke; it is "the Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the World", be he Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jew, Moslem, Taoist, or of any other faith. If, alas, the West rejects the Light, or prevents it from shining clearly, then, once again, chaos will claim Western society. Shall the East once again witness the decline and fall of the West, or shall Western man become sufficiently awakened to avert the cyclic crisis now impending?

If the West is to attain right and everlasting greatness, it will not be because of its technology. It must come to realize, as India's Rishis did ages ago, that "Nothing that is eternal can be gained by what is not eternal", that fondness for the transitory and non-eternal leads only to bitter disillusionment. The worldly path was the path which the ancient Romans trod.

Not acquisition of the things which pass away, but their renunciation gives man true power and social stability. Had the Christ chosen worldly dominion as the Tempter proposed that He should, or had the Buddha preferred the throne of His father's kingdom rather than the Seat of Buddhahood beneath the Bo-tree in the solitude of the Indian jungle, neither of these conquerors would have attained the status of Teacher of Gods and Men.

Whereas in the West eager covetousness for and ambitious accumulating and holding fast to the things of this world are inculcated by national systems of education, and are, in fact, the popular practice, in the East the ideal still is, as it was of yore, renunciation. One of my Hindu gurus, the late Sj. Atal Bihari Ghosh, has very succinctly set forth this contrasting difference between East and West as follows:

"The East, even in the days of her material prosperity, never forgot the supremacy of things spiritual. Kings renounced their kingdoms to end their days in meditation, in jungle or mountain solitudes. 'To die in harness' was then, as it still is, an evil to be avoided. Herein lies the secret of the imperishable vitality of the Orient."

As the epitomized treatises which herein follow emphasize, it is not by the conquest of this world, but by the conquest of the animal

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self that the Great Ones throughout the ages have been empowered to direct the course of human culture and of spiritual enlightenment. And they alone are the world's Heros, not the captains and their hosts who have ravaged the nations with fire and sword and bloodshed and filled the world with weeping and wailing and dire ruin.

In reading these excellent epitomes of some of the East's most glorious philosophical gifts to the West, I recognize how faithfully they convey that message from the East to the West which is most essential for the West to receive. Having consecrated many of the best years of this incarnation to research in oriental philosophies and religions, I am glad to have the privilege of here setting forth my own appreciation of this supreme message which this little book presents to its readers and through them to the whole Western World, especially America.

May the message be heeded. May the New Age be allowed to come forth in our day from the womb of time. May the spirituality of the East guide the science of the West; may the science of the West assist the East. And may there be throughout the world, encompassing all nations, all continents, all seas and oceans, one nation, one federation, one humanity.

Indian Philosophy

Indian philosophy has been a powerful determinant of Asiatic thought. Through the long centuries, its rich spiritual import has trickled into the West by word of mouth, through the writings of scholars, through the translation of books and even by means of the trader's caravans. These heavily laden transports, coming from the mysterious depths of India, brought more than jewels and spices to the early Western world; they brought a philosophy older than that of the ancient Greeks! We recognize in the philosophy of India a sensitive and deep appreciation of the eternal problem of man's relation to his universe.

By even the briefest perusal of Indian philosophy, one may detect gems of wisdom as bright as any of those to be found in the thought of ancient Greece. Indeed, even in the most cursory survey, it is at once evident that the thought stemming from the Vedas and Upanishads composes some of the oldest and most profound of all speculative philosophy.

Let the reader be aware, however, that to understand the full significance of this philosophy is sometimes a difficult task for the Western mind. There is much that seems strange to those of us whose acquaintance with philosophy is limited to the teaching of the Western schools. He who refuses to come to Indian thought with an open mind is likely to find confusion and even contradiction.

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Throughout Asia, philosophy and religion overlap, and it is at times difficult to define where the one begins and the other ends. Let it only be remarked that this is a logical result in a land where philosophy has become a deep preoccupation—a mode of life as well as a body of wisdom—for centuries. Too, in its theological garments, philosophy has supplied the vital personalism and spiritualistic metaphysics required for the nourishment of men's Souls.

In the opinion of the writer, it is nowhere more important to have a knowledge of the people and the land as a prerequisite of a true understanding of the philosophy, than it is in the case of India. From the writing of the *Rig Veda* in the dim and remote past (it is one of the oldest works of the human mind), to the thought of India in our own day, there is always present the spirit of the land, the "Dharma", and a peculiar emphasis upon things spiritual that is uniquely Indian.

In this vast land of some million and a half square miles, there are about 400,000,000 people: Aborigines, Dravidians, Aryans, Parsees, Arabs, Anglo-Indians, Turks, Europeans, Afghans, Moguls and a host of other races and nations. They speak 150 different languages. Most of the population profess the Hindu religion (about 260,000,000). Islam has 90,000,000 adherents for the most part concentrated in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the peninsula in the recently constituted state of Pakistan. The rest are Christians, Buddhists, and of many other faiths. Traditionally, and even while a part of the British Empire, the nation was composed of hundreds of separate principalities and political divisions which have, for the most part, now become a part of the synthesis from which has come the modern independent Indian state and Pakistan.

The Dravidians composed the original race in India and were later replaced in the north by the Aryan and Turanian immigration. Particularly significant for us, as students of Indian philosophy, are the early Aryan settlers. It was they who formulated the early philosophical teaching and wisdom of India. They were one branch of an earlier race, which also sent forth an offshoot into Europe. Not as much as we might wish is known of this common ancestry, but contemporary authority agrees that there was an undivided nomadic people indigenous to the plateau of the Pamirs some 50,000 or more years ago.

The evidence of the common origin of the Indo-Aryan and Indo-European races is clear-cut in the many similarities of mythology, of language, and of thought pattern.

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The Aryans were a fair skinned race, already possessing a culture when they came into contact with the indigenous aboriginals and Dravidians some 4000 years ago. The early Vedas reflect the culture of the original Aryans. In the later Vedas, we are able to detect the influence of the native peoples on their Aryan conquerors.

Perhaps the idea of *caste*, so fundamental to an understanding of Indian life and spirit, was originally little more than a color distinction between the "noble" Aryans, and their darker contemporaries. At any rate, in the Vedas and with the later sanction of the Upanishads and the teachings of the Brahmans, a complex and unyielding system of caste has grown up. Actually there are hundreds of mutually exclusive caste groups, but in general we may assign these four divisions to the major castes: the *Brahmans* (earlier composed solely of priests, but now members of this caste may be found as educators, administrators, clerks, and in various other callings); the *Kshatriya* (warriors and rulers); the *Vaishya* (merchants and agricultural workers); the *Shūdra* (menial laborers), from highest to lowest position. Caste is by no means analogous to our so-called social classes. It is, in its most favorable aspects, a brotherhood of different but essentially cooperative groups. Each group has its own peculiar function and is necessary to the maintenance of each of the others. Economic standing is not a determining factor in deciding caste. Thus it is entirely possible for a junior office clerk to be of much higher caste than his rich merchant employer. There are occupational lines, language considerations, color lines, and many other factors involved. The fundamental idea is that of a rather elementary social organization in which the Shūdra bears the productive burden, the Vaishya fulfills the function of distribution, the Kshatriya fulfills the function of government and security, while the Brahman, at the apex of the pyramid, has the responsibility of the intellectual and spiritual well-being of the people.

Basic, too, in the Indian concept of social structure, are the four *āshramas*, or stages of life, set forth in the ancient Laws of Manu and still respected in modern India. These are the order of the pupil, the householder, the anchorite, and the *sannyasi*. This peculiar view permitted to every man an education, family and the opportunity of a religious career. In a sense, the order of the householder is the most important, since the others are in great measure dependent thereupon for their physical sustenance.

For her religious life, India looks to *Hinduism*. This national

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faith has its beginnings in the Vedas and has grown strong by virtue of the ages-long teachings of the Brahmins. The word "hindu" comes from "sindu", the Indo-European word for river. And indeed, India, with the Indus, Jumna, Ganges and many others, is a land of rivers. Not all Hindus recognize the Brahmins as the true ministers of the faith. They provide their own non-Brahmanic interpretations. Generally we may define the Hindu as one who draws his basic beliefs from the great mass of tradition and practice which has stemmed from the Vedas.

Foremost of the theological precepts of the Hindu faith are the belief in one all-inclusive supreme being, *Brahma*,¹ and the belief in the transmigration of souls. The caste system is recognized by the orthodox Hindus as are the orders or *āshramas* of living. There are, of course, many variations in the interpretations of the faith.

Chief of the deities, and composing the Hindu trinity of the personal Creator, are *Brahmā*, *Shiva* and *Vishnu*. *Brahmā* (masculine) the Creator, is less significant as an object of popular worship than are the other two. *Shiva* (or *Maha-deva*, the "great-god" and Destroyer) receives the adoration of the masses and his worship lays great stress upon the importance of works or activity in attaining salvation. The great sect of *Shivism*, or *Shiva-worship*, has its center at Benares, the holy city of the Hindus. Tradition has it that if the pilgrim dies in Benares, he will ascend directly to heaven, and so win release from the cycle of recurrent birth into the world. Two of the deiform consorts of *Shiva*, *Durga* and *Kali*, are central figures in *Shaktism*, one of the many Hindu sects and one which concentrates upon the destructive qualities of this god. *Shiva* is also the great ascetic, and the ascetic sect centers about his worship.

Vishnu, unlike *Shiva*, is most often worshipped in one of his *avatārs*, or earthly embodiments. The *Vishnu* deity concept probably had an early Aryan beginning since it is mentioned in the early Vedas where *Vishnu* is a solar deity. It was not until some centuries later, during the Brahmanic era, that *Vishnu* became a major deity. In the epic period, during the time when the two great epics in Indian literature were being composed, *Vishnu* embodied goodness, and the epics relate stories of his coming to earth in the form of a man (or

¹In philosophic Hinduism, *Brahma*, (neuter) is the impersonal Supreme Being, the primal source and ultimate Goal of all being; in late Hinduism *Brahmā* (masculine) is a trinity of the personal Creator along with *Vishnu* and *Shiva*.

animal) and for the time being living as a god in human form. The two great epics, the *Mahābhārata*, and the *Rāmāyana*, relate the stories of his earthly existence as *Krishna* (in the first) and *Rāma* (in the second epic). It should be noted that Hinduism claims *Mahāvīra*, the founder of *Jainism*, and *Buddha*, both heretics, as among the later *avatārs*. Vishnuism stresses *bhakti*, or devotion as the way to salvation.

The influence of the Brahmins has been potent not only in formulating the prescribed religious views, but also as a natural adjunct to this function, it has been of signal importance in the education of youth. The groundwork for the educational system is to be found in the Laws of Manu. These laws were written at about the same time as the great epics, and this period of the history of Indian literature is sometimes referred to as the legal-epic era. The instruction of the student was based upon the mission he was eventually to undertake. Thus the boy who was to fulfill the duties of a Brahmin received a different education from that offered to a boy of the warrior caste. Education of the Brahmin started earlier than that of the warrior.

There was great emphasis on the formation of character. The belief was that the receptacle should be prepared for the reception of wisdom before its acquisition was actually begun. The student became a part of the household of the teacher, and it was the usual practice for the pupil to procure food from the householders for both himself and his Brahmin preceptor. The curriculum, as we would call it today, included the teaching of manners, integrity, the restriction of hunger and desire (consider that the limitation of these two human motivations was virtually required if the student were to make spiritual progress in life), classics, phonetics, grammar, philology, physiology, rhetoric, logic and reasoning. For warrior caste students, appropriate physical exercises, horse management, rhythm development, and like activities, were substituted for those portions of the studies already enumerated which would less well suit the ends to be attained.

With this brief background, we may now proceed to an examination of the literary heritage of India. These writings are of the utmost importance, for in them we find the foundations of Indian philosophical thought.

Chronologically the writings of ancient India are grouped thus: the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, Upanishads, Law Books, the Great Epics and the Purāṇas. There are beauty and majesty in these writings, and any description of them at second hand can but reflect the least of their true form and significance.

The early Vedic period extended from about 1200 B. C. to 850 B. C. It is likely that the oldest Vedas date from the period 6000 B. C. to 1400 B. C. The Vedas were passed orally from one generation to the next for centuries before they were finally written down. Literary writing, as such, is no older than the seventh century before the Christian era.

There are four Vedas: the *Rig*, *Yajur*, *Sāma*, and *Atharva*. The first of these, the *Rig Veda*, reflects the religious ideas brought by the early Aryans to their new land. They portray the life, customs and beliefs of that day. Polytheists, these early Indians worshipped the *Devas*, or heavenly ones. The sky (*dyu*) was their chief god, and the sky father was *asura* (lord). Among others were the god of rain (*Indra*), and horsemen (*Nasatya*), the god of the dead (*Yama*), of order (*Varuna*), of fire (*Agni*), a god symbolized by the plant (*Soma*), and the goddess of the dawn (*Ushas*). The rain god, *Indra*¹, is inspiration and object of a fourth of the 1028 verses in this Veda. It is incomplete, many verses having been lost.

The *Yajur Veda* consists of the sacrificial rituals and is an extract from the earlier *Rig Veda*. The *Sāma Veda* contains the liturgies and is also a collection of extracts. The *Atharva Veda* contains an exposition of supernatural rites and is largely concerned with the worship of *Agni*, the fire god. Of inferior literary merit, it is of later origin and shows the influence on the Aryans of the more primitive beliefs of the people they conquered.

These Vedic hymns, or *Mantra*, are the earliest records of Aryan thought and are among the earliest that survive of the human mind. They are not as old as the records of the earliest Egyptian dynasties, but are older by centuries than the beginnings of Greek civilization. In Indian philosophy and religion, the term *śruti* is applied to these Vedas to signify that they are truth divinely revealed. As we read them we are able to detect the basic thought patterns which were later developed in the *Upanishads*—the implication, for example, that there is a "one" (monotheism) we see later developed as a monistic metaphysical system (monism).

The *Brāhmaṇas*² are ritual commentaries on the Vedas and were written by the priests in the general period from 850 B. C. to 600

¹Strictly translated as "the rainer".

²Note that *Brāhmaṇas* signifies the ritual commentaries on the earlier Vedas. *Brahman* (neuter) or *Brahma* (neuter) means the holy power in the universe

B. C. By this time, the priestly class had assumed leadership in society and religion, and in the Brāhmaṇas we see a reflection of their power. The popular attitude held these learned men in great respect. Each Veda is the subject of comment in the Brāhmaṇas in the form of a ritual of worship. A few of the Brāhmaṇas speculate about reality and the function of religion, but for the most part they represent purely a manual of ritual and contain lengthy explanations of the origin and meaning of sacrifices.

The Upanishads¹ grew from the Vedic hymns and contain the mature wisdom of India's intellectual and spiritual attainment. Schopenhauer once remarked of the value of these writings: "In the whole world there is no study so beneficial and elevated as that of the Upanishads." The authors are unknown. They were composed sometime during the period from 3000 B. C. to 1000 B. C. While their authorship is without a doubt from many hands and extends over a great number of years, they are united in their fundamental teaching. They were written down around 850 B. C., near the close of the Vedic era.

Of the hundred Upanishads, about one-tenth are of particular significance in a philosophical sense. They have to do with knowledge, and were the product of the mind of the sage and thinker as contrasted to the Brāhmaṇas which were a production of the thoughts of the priests. They are not organized into a formal system, but rather represent a leisurely series of speculations elaborating upon earlier Vedic knowledge concerning the primal entity and the manifestation of the supreme, impersonal Brahma, or World Soul, in all things and in particular in the individual soul. The six main Hindu

as it is used in the earliest Vedas, mind as it is used later; all or the absolute, the *impersonal* Supreme Being, primal source and ultimate Goal of all being. *Brahmā* (masculine) is a trinity of the *personal* Brahman along with Vishnu and Shiva. *Brahman* is also used as the name of one of the four main castes, and designates the members of that caste, i. e. the Brahmins. *Brahma* is a metaphysical term; *Brahmā* is a mythological term.

¹Linguistically, "Upanishad" signifies *sitting near*. It may be visualized how this term came to be applied to the body of learning dispensed by the teacher, or *guru*, to the pupils who were seated about him. The Vedas were the unsystematic expressions of the beliefs and religious doctrines of an early people, while the Brāhmaṇas were the interpretations and systemizations of these same subjects by the priests. The Upanishads, on the other hand, went beyond these two, although still based on the Vedic truths, to give expression to the intellectual viewpoint.

philosophies, of which the subject matter of the next chapter is comprised, are all based upon the teachings of the Upanishads.

The Upanishads do not argue against the existence of many different gods, but regard all of these as manifestations of a single *One*. This *One*, by the time the Upanishads were being composed, was Brahman or Ātman. The Upanishadic philosophers, looking within, conceived the universal principle within themselves. Thus ātman (the individual self) was a part of Ātman (the universal, impersonal Self, or Brahman) and finally became identical with it.

The Upanishads have little regard for the ritual and formal religion cited in the Brāhmaṇas, and some of the Upanishads are in contradiction to these Brahmanic teachings. The Brahmins were none the less respected for their ideals, and the distinction between the two bodies of writing is fundamentally one of emphasis rather than one of kind. The Upanishads acknowledged caste, but the supreme Brahman looking at and beyond self transcends even this basic teaching of the Vedas. These latter were of course regarded as *śruti* by the composers of the Upanishadic books.

The Upanishads are unified in their object, namely, to indicate to man his part in and relationship to the universe. They teach the belief in rebirth and pre-existence. The basic problem, then, resolves itself into the discovery through self-realization of the causes and realities of existence and knowledge. The Upanishadic thinkers aimed at finding the way of understanding infinite truth. Knowledge begins, they said, with understanding the self of man, and here we see that it is truly philosophy, rather than revelation, that holds the center of their thought.

Two kinds of knowledge are described: a lower knowledge or that given by certain Vedas, and a higher knowledge which goes beyond the Vedas and by which the absolute is comprehended.

While the Upanishads provide an indirect basis for an ethical system, ethics as such is not regarded as essential to the main message since self-realization is the goal sought, and ethics is simply a condition met on the way leading to this realization.

We may summarize the basic teaching of the Upanishadic philosophy in the following general terms: (1) Knowledge is exalted above works as the means of realizing truth. (2) The theory of *karma*, of cause and effect, operates in the universe. (3) *Samāra* is also operative. This is the theory of transmigration, or rebirth of the soul into the world where, by its activity, it becomes continuously entangled.

(4) The soul, both individual and Supreme, is eternal; it is unborn and immortal, timeless and all-pervading. (5) Matter is likewise eternal. It exists whether viewed as real (as in the Sāṅkhya philosophy) or ideally (as in the Uttara-mīmāṃsā). (6) The soul is held in a bondage of misery from which escape is sought. This escape is possible through self-realization. This aspect of the teaching of the Upanishads accounts for the so-called *pessimism* of Indian philosophy. (7) Mind (*mana*) is the only expression of consciousness. Thus thought is the only real expression of the soul's active and volitive consciousness. (8) The ultimate absolute is beyond the present although it is conceivable. The absolute may not be defined; it escapes definition, and requires a flash of true realization in order to be conceived. The intellect, as such, unaided, cannot conceive reality because it is linked to the surface of thought. It is mechanical in that it deals only with the finite universe. But man does possess a quality which because it is in itself a part of reality, enables him to conceive the real absolute. (9) Reality, when conceived simply "is". When one perceives it, he recognizes its existence, without being able to define it, and can only declare, "It is; I am." This intuitive mode of realizing the true absolute does not contradict reason, nor interfere with it, but rather supplements reason and adds to it another form of comprehension. The absolute is both subjective and objective; there is an identity. Seen is also seer. (10) Epistemologically, *true* and *false*, as applied to knowledge, are words made for and used by reason. Since the ultimate realization of truth transcends reason, in this sense these terms become meaningless and therefore inapplicable.

In the chapter following, something is said of the growth of Indian philosophy from the Upanishadic thought and of the teaching of the six schools. It suffices here to mention briefly the teachings common to these six systems and reserve a discussion of their differences for a later point. The Indian philosophies predicate consciousness in animals, although the animal is not conscious of self. Man possesses consciousness of self. Above him there is the level of the super-consciousness being, perceiving the order of the universe before which mere self consciousness is dumb. This supreme thought-potential is in the background of any consideration of the philosophies under discussion. All of the systems visualize a rhythm in the universe consisting of creation, maintenance and dissolution. This universe has no beginning and is without end. The doctrine of rebirth and pre-existence is accepted by each of the schools. Their common aim

is to show the universe to man as it is in order that he may realize his relation to it and so be at peace. Put another way, their common aim is attainment of release from the cycle of rebirth by realization of the true nature of soul and universe.¹ The systems of ethics as developed in the different schools are not considered ends in themselves, but rather, they are looked upon as paving stones on the road to realization. Man in his final state transcends morality. Ultimate realization comes through knowledge of Brahman. Caste and the four stages of life are also acknowledged by the several schools.

Opposed to the traditional Vedic teachings are the two major heresies, those of the Jains and the Buddhists. These do not recognize the authority of the Vedas and go their own way to find an interpretation of the problems of philosophy and life. A lesser school, but one just as divergent in its teachings, is that of the materialistic Chārvākas. The two major schools affected their departure from the Vedic teachings in the sixth century B. C., and their writings form a great portion of the Pali literature.

The Law Books and the two great epics followed the Upanishadic era to give Sanskrit its Golden Age. They originated before the Christian era. The Laws of Manu form the basis for modern Hindu jurisprudence. They deal with a variety of subjects concerning virtually every phase of life and conduct. The Laws may generally be assigned to the period from 1200 B. C. They express the "dharma" of the Indian peoples to this day, by which one understands a sort of national spirit like the *shintō* of Japan, or a composite unifying force arising from custom, belief, tradition and religion. We have already discussed some aspects of the educational system as it is described in the Laws. The reader will find definitions of caste and of the stages of living as well. There is also a political philosophy expressed in these writings. According to it the king is set out as head of the state and chief of the council of learned Brahmins. Where the Vedas established a precedent, it is automatically the law. Where they did not, the Brahmins have the responsibility of declaring the law.

The two great epics, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyana, are at once expressions of legendary history and religion. The first of these dates from 600 to 400 B. C., as history, and from 200 B. C. to 200

¹That is, ultimate realization of the true nature of soul and universe in attaining *Moksha* (release) through *Karmayoga* (the attitude of renouncing worldly attachments in the activities of life).

A. D. as religion. Of composite authorship, and lacking a precise and consistent viewpoint, this great work has no less than 220,000 lines. While the Upanishads obviously are concerned with thought, the two epics portray action. Like the Homeric epics of western civilization, they relate the doings of the early legendary national heroes, some of whom later came to be regarded as gods in human form.

The Bhagavad-gītā, which is a part of the Mahābhārata, does contain much philosophy, however, and it contributed to the development of an ethical system—a phase of philosophical development with which the Upanishads were not unduly concerned. It contains a philosophy of action and teaches above all else the performance of one's duty.

Krishṇa, an avatār of Vishnu, is the central figure in the first of the epics. There is another Krishṇa, a lower form, in the *Vishnu Purāṇa* of about 400 A. D.¹ Here he is deity in the guise of a mischievous and amorous cowherd, certainly a far different characterization from that found in the earlier records.

The story has its historical foundation in the struggle which occurred 3000 years B. C. between two clans for the possession of what is now Sirhind in modern India. In reading the excerpts from this great story, which appear at the end of this chapter, the reader will discover an expression of united religion and philosophy possessing a beauty seldom attained in the literature of other nations.

The Indian Scholar, Swami Bodhananda, has very capably summarized the major action of the Gītā as follows:

"This marvelous Sanskrit poem occurs as an episode in the sixth book, the *Bhisma Parva*, of the Hindu epic—the Mahābhārata—the great store-house of wisdom. The Hindus believe that India attained the very zenith of her power, glory and civilization during the epoch of which the Mahābhārata tells. This epic is called the Hindu Iliad, and was composed by the Hindu Homer, Vyāsa.

"The central story of the Mahābhārata relates to the rivalry between two branches of cousins, entitled to inherit the same ancestral kingdom and its associated rights and privileges. This rivalry reached its culmination in that great war, at the commencement of which Krishṇa is said to have taught the Gītā to his kinsmen, friend and disciple, Arjuna.

¹B. Ch. Chhabra suggests the reconciliation of the two, by the allegorical interpretation of the character of the latter. See p. 470, *The Aryan Path*, Vol. xx, No. 10, October 1949.

"The orthodox Hindus believe that this poem of philosophic wisdom has its origin in a discourse between Arjuna and his charioteer Krishna, at the very beginning of a battle which took place on the holy plain of Kurukshetra, situated between two sacred rivers, the Saraswati and the Jumna, in Northwestern India. They also believe that Krishna and Arjuna were historical beings.

"Before the commencement of this war, a sage of wonderful powers met the blind king Dhritarastra, whose sons made up one of the parties of the war, and wished to know if he would like to have his blind eyes opened so that he might be able to see with his own eyes the events of the coming war. The king declined the offer as he felt that he could not bear the sight of the slaughter of his own kindred, but requested the sage so to arrange that those events might be fully and accurately reported to him from time to time. Accordingly, he bestowed the power of supernatural vision upon Sanjaya, a relative of the king, and directed him to report all the details regarding the progress of the war to the blind king.

"This king Dhritarastra, though the eldest son of his father, was disqualified from succeeding him on account of his physical deformity, and the younger brother, Pandu, became king. After reigning a number of years, Pandu retired, leaving the throne to his eldest son, Yudhisthira. The blind king had a number of vicious children who became jealous of Yudhisthira and conspired together to dethrone him. Through a series of shameful and inhuman frauds, they succeeded in realizing their desires. Yudhisthira and his four brothers, who were famous for such virtues as love, charity and truthfulness, were exiled from the kingdom for a period of twelve years. Taking the opportunity offered by their long absence, the sons of the blind king made their way to the throne and established themselves there. Upon returning from their exile, the five brothers demanded back the kingdom which lawfully belonged to them. They were not only refused, but were bitterly abused by their cousins. Krishna himself went to the court of the sons of Dhritarastra, and proposed an amicable settlement. He advised them to give five small villages to the five Pandava brothers keeping the rest for themselves. They were, however, so much elated with their success and acquisition that they told Krishna they would not consent to part with an acre of land except by force of arms. On hearing from Krishna the intentions of their cousins, the sons of Pandu prepared to fight for the restoration of their rightful kingdom. Hence arose the war called in the Gītā "Dharmya Yudda"—Righteous War.

"Some scholars among the Hindus themselves give an allegorical interpretation of this warfare. They say that the battle between the two contending parties stands for the internal battle in man—between his higher nature, conscience, on the one hand, and his lower nature, the passions, on the other. The mythological wars, between Ahur-mazda and Aharman, are only allegorical expressions of this inner war. The blind king and his children denote respectively, ignorance and ignorance-begotten vices. The other party represents virtues such as truthfulness, justice, courage, heroism, kindness, etc. Krishna is the Supreme Self and is shown as always on the side of virtue. The heart of man, which is in its own nature pure and unpolled, is represented by the sacred plain of the holy war. In the war between virtue and vice, virtue wins the victory—the divine triumphs over the animal.

"But so far as our practical purposes are concerned, it does not matter at all whether we interpret the Gītā literally or symbolically. It is enough for us to know that the teachings contained therein are full of truth and wisdom, and if applied to the details of daily life, can save us from great fear and danger.

"Before the actual war began, fear and weakness, in the guise of love and mercy, overpowered Arjuna, and he became unwilling to engage in it. He advanced some very plausible reasons against the slaughter and carnage of war. But Krishna, with his divine insight, perceived the real feelings of Arjuna's heart, and reproached him for being unsteady, unmanly, and unwise. He endeavored to dispel his distress and delusion by a philosophical argument, and to impress upon his mind that it was a sacred duty of his, as a defender of truth and a leader of men, to fight in the cause of justice and righteousness, and that in killing his enemies he would kill their mortal bodies only, and not the imperishable soul. Those mighty words of wisdom still infuse hope and courage and strength into the dullest and feeblest of hearts. 'O mighty-armed Arjuna, why has this unworthy weakness come upon thee in this trying situation? Yield not to unmanliness, my child. It does not become thee. Cast off this base weakness of heart, arise and be firm and strong. Do thy duty well and unselfishly. Ever indestructible is this Embodied One in the bodies of all. Thou shouldst not therefore grieve for any living being.' The last words of Arjuna, after his delusion was gone, were: 'Destroyed is ignorance, and I have gained wisdom through thy teachings, O Krishna! I am firm with doubts gone. I will do thy biddings. Command me, Sir.'

"The Gītā is a dialogic discourse between Krishna and Arjuna,

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about the philosophy of conduct, held on the field of battle, the plain of Kurukshetra.

"The keynote of this philosophy of conduct is renunciation. It teaches how to abandon all show, selfishness and sensuality, for devotion to unselfish work in the cause of public good; how to keep hearts for God and hands for help; how to live in the world yet not be of it; how to subjugate the animal and manifest the divine in us.

"There are eighteen chapters in the *Gītā*—each of which is called a *Yoga*—a discourse on a certain method of God-realization. The total number of stanzas is about seven hundred; more than six hundred of these are the utterances of Krishna, and the rest of Arjuna, Sanjaya and Dhritarastra. All the most abstruse theories and doctrines regarding religion and philosophy have been discussed and demonstrated between the lines of these chapters. One commentator has remarked that the *Gītā* is such a vast subject that volumes can be written on each single verse of it."

The second great epic, consisting of some 96,000 lines, relates the adventures of Rāma, one of the victorious sons of Pandu in the *Mahābhārata*. It celebrates his love for Sitā, his many exploits of valor, the kidnapping of Sitā by the demon king, Rāma's recovery of her, and the translation of Rāma to heaven.

Daśaratha, in the story, is king of Ayodhyā and has three sons by different wives. Rāma is his favorite son and successor to the throne. The mother of one of the other sons conspires to have Rāma banished for 14 years in the hope of securing the throne for her own offspring. Rāma is in exile, with his bride Sitā, when the aged father dies. His brother is called to assume the royal title but demurs since he realizes that this opportunity to become king is the result of his mother's scheming. Rāma urges his brother to take the throne, since he feels bound to exile by his dead father's decree. The brother finally agrees and rules as Rāma's regent. In their travels the exiles are beset by demons; Sitā is kidnapped and taken to the island stronghold of one of the demon leaders. Hanuman, counselor to the monkey king, discovers her place of captivity and helps Rāma lay siege to the demon's fortress. The demon is slain, and Rāma returns to the throne, his exile ended, with Sitā as his queen. Originally Rāma was regarded as an heroic prince rather than as a god. As the centuries rolled by, people began to look upon the epic stories as more than mere history and accepted the chief protagonists as incarnations of deity. Early in the Christian era, Rāma thus became the incarnation of Vishnu.

The Purāṇas, or religious poems, were written later than the epic period, and possess a diverse subject matter ranging from legends of the gods and the beginnings of the world to the discussions of philosophy and art. They were composed to provide a simplification of the doctrines of the Veda, and although they do not belong to the Vedic age, they do contain the Vedic legends in more modern form.

Of the three selections following, the first has been taken from the *Rig Veda* as representative of perhaps the earliest of all extant philosophical writing. The two hymns are cosmological in nature. The second selection of excerpts is taken from the Upanishads. In reading this material, compare the rich outline of the Upanishadic conception of eternity with the relatively bloodless spectral underworld of early Greek thought. The third selection is taken from the *Bhagavad-gītā*. As reprinted here, it includes but a few verses of that profound composition.

Rig Veda, X, 129

Rig Veda X, 129. Bhava vr̥tta (The Creation Hymn)

1. In the beginning there was neither Non-Being nor Being, neither atmosphere nor sky.
What covered all things, and where, and in whose care? Was there the water, fathomless abyss?
2. Then there was neither death nor life, nor night, nor day.
The only One breathed, without breath, by intrinsic power.
Beyond it nothing was.
3. In the beginning, darkness was hid by darkness. All was as water, indeterminate.
Void by void was overlaid; but One, still covered by the husk, was born by the power of heat.
4. And forth came Will, the primordial seed of Intellect, that was the first born;
Searching, the wise men have found this the link between Non-Being and Being.
5. They threw their plumbline across the cosmos. What was below? and above?

There were seeds; there was striving; intrinsic power below, Purpose above.

6. But who knows, and who can tell from whence came forth creation? The gods came afterward into existence, whence came creation then? who knows?
7. He from whom creation came, whether by him purposed or not; He whose eye watches it from the supreme heights. He knows, or knows not.

Rig Veda, X, 90

Rig Veda X. 90. 'The Purusha Sūkta' (Hymn of Man)

1. A thousand heads hath Purusha,² a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. On every side pervading earth he fills a space ten fingers wide.³
2. This Purusha is all that yet hath been and all that is to be, The lord of immortality which waxes greater still by food.
3. So mighty is his greatness; yea, greater than this is Purusha. All creatures are one-fourth of him, three-fourths eternal life in heaven.
4. With three-fourths Purusha went up: one-fourth of him again was here. Thence he strode out to every side over what eats not and what eats.
5. From him Virāj⁴ was born; again Purusha from Virāj was born.

¹*Hindu Scriptures*, edited by Nicol Macnicol, London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1948.

²Purusha here means the embodied spirit, or the personification of man as origin of the universe. This soul-quality of animate beings is described as having a thousand (innumerable) heads, eyes, and feet to point out its prevalence in and synonymy with all created life.

³The *space ten fingers wide* indicates the approximate area occupied by the heart of man. In the first line the author states the omnipresent quality of this soul in the universe, while the second line, by contrast, shows its individual quality as enclosed in a small space.

⁴*Virāj*, one of the sources of existence.

As soon as he was born he spread eastward and westward o'er the earth.

6. When gods prepared the sacrifice with Purusha as their offering, Its oil was spring; the holy gift was autumn; summer was the wood.
7. They balm'd as victim on the grass Purusha born in earliest time, With him the deities and all Sādyhas¹ and Rishis² sacrificed.
8. From that great general sacrifice the dripping fat was gathered up. He formed the creatures of the air, and animals both wild and tame.
9. From that great general sacrifice Richas and Sāma-hymns were born:
Therefrom were spells and charms produced; the Yajus had its birth from it.
10. From it were horses born, from it all cattle with two rows of teeth:
From it were generated kine, from it the goats and sheep were born.
11. When they divided Purusha, how many portions did they make? What do they call his mouth, his arms? What do they call his thighs and feet?
12. The Brāhman was his mouth, of both his arms was the Rājanya made.
His thighs became the Vaiśya, from his feet the Śūdra was produced.
13. The moon was gendered from his mind, and from his eye the sun had birth;
Indra and Agni from his mouth were born, and Vāyu from his breath.
14. Forth from his navel came mid-air; the sky was fashioned from his head;
Earth from his feet, and from his ear the regions. Thus they formed the worlds.
15. Seven fencing-sticks had he, thrice seven layers of fuel were prepared,
When the gods, offering sacrifice, bound, as their victim, Purusha.

¹*Sādhya*s, celestial beings.

²*Rishis*, the seven, the seven stars of the constellation Ursa Major (the big dipper).

KATHA UPANISHAD

16. Gods, sacrificing, sacrificed the victim: these were the earliest holy ordinances.

The mighty ones attained the height of heaven, there where the Sādhyas, gods of old, are dwelling.

The *Kaṭha Upanishad* is reprinted here as translated by Swami Prabhavananda and Frederick Manchester.¹ This particular selection has been made because the *Kaṭha* is especially representative of the philosophic thought in the Upanishads and because it is shorter than the *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* which would have otherwise been chosen. Since limitation of space has prevented the offering of these two Upanishads here, the reader is particularly urged to secure and study them. The thought recorded there is seldom approached in profundity and universality by the sacred writings of other beliefs. The *Chāndogya* is concerned with Brahman from whence comes all appearance, sensation, desires and deeds. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* treats of the Self; indefinable, pure bliss, it is beyond sense and knowledge and determinable only through meditation. The reader will find vast fields for thought with virtually every passage in these remarkable works. Think for a moment of the wide vistas of philosophic thought laid bare by these three simple lines appearing early in the *Chāndogya* and cited by the Seer Sandilya as the subject of meditation upon the approach of death:

*Thou art imperishable,
Thou art the changeless Reality.
Thou art the source of life.*

Kaṭha Upanishad

*Kaṭha Upanishad*¹

On a certain occasion, Vajasrabasa, hoping for divine favor, performed a rite which required that he should give away all his possessions. He was careful, however, to sacrifice only his cattle, and of these only such as were useless—the old, the barren, the blind, and the lame. Observing this niggardliness, Nachiketa, his young son, whose

¹Swami Prabhavananda and Frederick Manchester in *The Upanishads—Breath of the Eternal*, Hollywood: Vedanta Press, 1947.

heart had received the truth taught in the scriptures, thought to himself; "Surely a worshipper who dares bring such worthless gifts is doomed to utter darkness! Thus reflecting, he came to his father and cried:

"Father, I too belong to thee: to whom givest thou *me*?"

His father did not answer; but when Nachiketa asked the question again and yet again, he replied impatiently:

"Thee I give to Death!"

Then Nachiketa thought to himself: "Of my father's many sons and disciples, I am indeed the best, or at least of the middle rank, not the worst; but of what good am I to the King of Death?" Yet being determined to keep his father's word, he said:

"Father, do not repent thy vow! Consider how it has been with those that now live. Like corn, a man ripens and falls to the ground; like corn, he springs up again in his season."

Having thus spoken, the boy journeyed to the house of Death.

But the god was not at home, and for three nights Nachiketa waited. When at length the King of Death returned, he was met by his servants, who said to him:

"A Brahmin, like to a flame of fire, entered thy house as guest, and thou wast not there. Therefore must a peace offering be made to him. With all accustomed rites, O King, thou must receive thy guest, for if a householder show not due hospitality to a Brahmin, he will lose what he most desires—the merits of his good deeds, his righteousness, his sons, and his cattle."

Then the King of Death approached Nachiketa and welcomed him with courteous words.

"O Brahmin," he said, "I salute thee. Thou art indeed a guest worthy of all reverence. Let, I pray thee, no harm befall me! Three nights hast thou passed in my house and hast not received my hospitality; ask of me, therefore, three boons—one for each night."

"O Death," replied Nachiketa, "so let it be. And as the first of these boons I ask that my father be not anxious about me, that his anger be appeased, and that when thou sendest me back to him, he recognize me and welcome me."

"By my will," declared Death, "thy father shall recognize thee and love thee as heretofore; and seeing thee again alive, he shall be tranquil of mind, and he shall sleep in peace."

Then said Nachiketa: "In heaven there is no fear at all. Thou,

O Death, art not there, nor in that place does the thought of growing old make one tremble. There, free from hunger and from thirst, and far from the reach of sorrow, all rejoice and are glad. Thou knowest, O King, the first sacrifice that leads to heaven. Teach me that sacrifice, for I am full of faith. This is my second wish."

Whereupon, consenting, Death taught the boy the first sacrifice, and all the rites and ceremonies attending it. Nachiketa repeated all that he had learned, and Death, well pleased with him, said:

"I grant thee an extra boon. Henceforth shall this sacrifice be called the Nachiketa Sacrifice, after thy name. Choose now thy third boon."

And then Nachiketa considered within himself, and said:

"When a man dies, there is this doubt: Some say, he is; others say, he is not. Taught by thee, I would know the truth. This is my third wish."

"Nay," replied Death, "even the gods were once puzzled by this mystery. Subtle indeed is the truth regarding it, not easy to understand. Choose thou some other boon, O Nachiketa."

But Nachiketa would not be denied.

"Thou sayest, O Death, that even the gods were once puzzled by this mystery, and that it is not easy to understand. Surely there is no teacher better able to explain it than thou—and there is no other boon equal to this."

To which, trying Nachiketa again, the god replied:

"Ask for sons and grandsons who shall live a hundred years. Ask for cattle, elephants, horses, gold. Choose for thyself a mighty kingdom. Or if thou canst imagine aught better, ask for that—not for sweet pleasures only but for the power, beyond all thought, to taste of their sweetness. Yea, verily, the supreme enjoyer will I make thee of every good thing. Celestial maidens, beautiful to behold, such indeed as were not meant for mortals—even these, together with their bright chariots and their musical instruments, will I give unto thee, to serve thee. But for the secret of death, O Nachiketa, do not ask!"

But Nachiketa stood fast, and said: "These things endure only till the morrow, O Destroyer of Life, and the pleasures they give wear out the senses. Keep thou therefore horses and chariots, keep dance and song, for thyself! How shall he desire wealth, O Death, who once has seen thy face? Nay, only the boon that I have chosen—that only do I ask. Having found out the society of the imperishable

and the immortal, as in knowing thee I have done, how shall I, subject to decay and death, and knowing well the vanity of the flesh—how shall I wish for long life?

"Tell me, O King, the supreme secret regarding which men doubt. No other boon will I ask.

Whereupon the King of Death, well pleased at heart, began to teach Nachiketa the secret of immortality.

King of Death

The good is one thing; the pleasant is another. These two, differing in their ends, both prompt to action. Blessed are they that choose the good; they that choose the pleasant miss the goal.

Both the good and the pleasant present themselves to men. The wise having examined both, distinguish the one from the other. The wise prefer the good to the pleasant; the foolish, driven by fleshly desires, prefer the pleasant to the good.

Thou, O Nachiketa, having looked upon fleshly desires, delightful to the senses, has renounced them all. Thou has turned from the miry way wherein many a man wallows.

Far from each other, and leading to different ends, are ignorance and knowledge. Thee, O Nachiketa, I regard as one who aspires after knowledge, for a multitude of pleasant objects were unable to tempt thee.

Living in the abyss of ignorance yet wise in their own conceit, deluded fools go round and round, the blind led by the blind.

To the thoughtless youth, deceived by the vanity of earthly possessions, the path that leads to the eternal abode is not revealed. *This world alone is real; there is no hereafter*—thinking thus he falls again and again, birth after birth, into my jaws.

To many it is not given to hear of the Self. Many, though they hear of it, do not understand it. Wonderful is he who speaks of it. Intelligent is he who learns of it. Blessed is he who, taught by a good teacher, is able to understand it.

The truth of the Self cannot be fully understood when taught by an ignorant man, for opinions regarding it, not founded in knowledge, vary one from another. Subtler than the subtlest is this Self, and beyond all logic. Taught by a teacher who knows the Self and Brahman as one, a man leaves vain theory behind and attains to truth.

The awakening which thou hast known does not come through the intellect, but rather, in fullest measure, from the lips of the wise. Beloved Nachiketa, blessed, blessed art thou, because thou seekest the

Eternal. Would that I had more pupils like thee!

Well I know that earthly treasure lasts but till the morrow. For did not I myself, wishing to be King of Death, make sacrifice with fire? But the sacrifice was a fleeting thing, performed with fleeting objects, and small is my reward, seeing that only for a moment will my reign endure.

The goal of worldly desire, the glittering objects for which all men long, the celestial pleasures they hope to gain by miraculous rites, the most sought after of miraculous powers—all these were within my grasp. But all of these, with firm resolve, thou hast renounced.

The ancient, effulgent being, the indwelling Spirit, subtle, deep-hidden in the lotus of the heart, is hard to know. But the wise man, following the path of meditation, knows him, and is freed alike from pleasure and from pain.

The man who has learned that the Self is separate from the body, the senses, and the mind, and has fully known him, the soul of truth, the subtle principle—such a man verily attains to him, and is exceeding glad, because he has found the source and dwelling place of all felicity. Truly do I believe, O Nachiketa, that for thee the gates of joy stand open.

Nachiketa

Teach me, O King, I beseech thee, whatsoever thou knowest to be beyond right and wrong, beyond cause and effect, beyond past, present and future.

King of Death

Of that goal which all the Vedas declare, which is implicit in all penances, and in pursuit of which men lead lives of continence and service, of that will I briefly speak.

It is OM.

This syllable is Brahman. This syllable is indeed supreme. He who knows it obtains his desire.

It is the strongest support. It is the highest symbol. He who knows it is revered as a knower of Brahman.

The Self, whose symbol is OM, is the omniscient Lord. He is not born. He does not die. He is neither cause nor effect. This Ancient One is unborn, eternal, imperishable; though the body be destroyed, he is not killed.

If the slayer thinks that he slays, if the slain think that he is slain, neither of them knows the truth. The Self slays not, nor is he slain.

Smaller than the smallest, greater than the greatest, this Self for-

ever dwells within the hearts of all. When a man is free from desire, his mind and senses purified, he beholds the glory of the Self and is without sorrow.

Though seated, he travels far; though at rest, he moves all things. Who but the purest of the pure can realize the Effulgent Being, who is joy and who is beyond joy.

Formless is he, though inhabiting form. In the midst of the fleeting he abides forever. All-pervading and supreme is the Self. The wise man, knowing him in his true nature, transcends all grief.

The Self is not known through study of the scriptures, nor through subtlety of the intellect, nor through much learning. But by him who longs for him is he known. Verily unto him does the Self reveal his true being.

By learning a man cannot know him, if he desist not from evil, if he control not his senses, if he quiet not his mind, and practice not meditation.

To him Brahmins and Kshatriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment.

Both the individual self and the Universal Self have entered the cave of the heart, the abode of the Most High, but the knowers of Brahman and the householders who perform the fire sacrifice see a difference between them as between sunshine and shadow.

May we perform the Nachiketa Sacrifice, which bridges the world of suffering. May we know the imperishable Brahman, who is fearless, and who is the end and refuge of those who seek liberation.

Know that the Self is the rider, and the body the chariot; that the intellect is the charioteer, and the mind the reins.

The senses, say the wise, are the horses; the roads thy travel are the mazes of desire. The wise call the Self the enjoyer when he is united with the body, the senses, and the mind.

When a man lacks discrimination and his mind is uncontrolled, his senses are unmanageable, like the restive horses of a charioteer. But when a man has discrimination and his mind is controlled, his senses, like the well-broken horses of a charioteer, lightly obey the rein.

He who lacks discrimination, whose mind is unsteady and whose heart is impure, never reaches the goal, but is born again and again. But he who has discrimination, whose mind is steady and whose heart is pure, reaches the goal, and having reached it is born no more.

The man who has a sound understanding for charioteer, a con-

trolled mind for reigns—he it is that reaches the end of the journey, the supreme abode of Vishnu, the all-pervading.

The senses derive from physical objects, physical objects from mind, mind from intellect, intellect from ego, ego from the unmanifested seed, and the unmanifested seed from Brahman—the Uncaused Cause.

Brahman is the end of the journey. Brahman is the supreme goal.

This Brahman, this Self, deep-hidden in all beings, is not revealed to all; but to the seers, pure in heart, concentrated in mind—to them is he revealed.

The senses of the wise man obey his mind, his mind obeys his intellect, his intellect obeys his ego, and his ego obeys the Self.

Arise! Awake! Approach the feet of the Master and know THAT. Like the sharp edge of a razor, the sages say, is the path. Narrow it is, and difficult to tread!

Soundless, formless, intangible, undying, tasteless, odorless, eternal, without beginning, without end, immutable, beyond nature, is the Self. Knowing him as such, one is freed from death.

The Narrator

The wise man having heard and taught the eternal truth revealed by the King of Death to Nachiketa, is glorified in the heaven of Brahma.

He who sings with devotion this supreme secret in the assembly of the Brahmans, or at the rites in memory of his fathers, is rewarded with rewards immeasurable!

King of Death

The Self-Existent made the sense turn outward. Accordingly, man looks toward what is without, and sees not what is within. Rare is he who, longing for immortality, shuts his eyes to what is without and beholds the Self.

Fools follow the desires of the flesh and fall into the snare of all-encompassing death; but the wise, knowing the Self as eternal, seek not the things that pass away.

He through whom man sees, tastes, smells, hears, feels, and enjoys, is the omniscient Lord.

He, verily, is the immortal Self. Knowing him, one knows all things.

He through whom man experiences the sleeping or waking states is the all-pervading Self. Knowing him, one grieves no more.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

He who knows that the individual soul, enjoyer of the fruits of action, is the Self — ever present within, lord of time, past and future — casts out all fear. For this Self is the immortal Self.

He who sees the First-Born—born of the mind of Brahma, born before the creation of the waters—and sees him inhabiting the lotus of the heart, living among physical elements, sees Brahman indeed. For this First-Born is the immortal Self.

That being who is the power of all powers, and is born as such, who embodies himself in the elements and in them exists, and who has entered the lotus of the heart, is the immortal Self.

Agni, the all-seeing, who lies hidden in fire sticks, like a child well guarded in the womb, who is worshipped day by day by awakened souls, and by those who offer oblations in sacrificial fire—he is the immortal Self.

That in which the sun rises and in which it sets, that which is the source of all the powers of nature and of the senses, that which nothing can transcend—that is the immortal Self.

What is within us is also without. What is without is also within. He who sees difference between what is within and what is without goes evermore from death to death.

By the purified mind alone is the indivisible Brahman to be attained. Brahman alone is—nothing else is. He who sees the manifold universe, and not the one reality, goes evermore from death to death.

That being, of the size of a thumb, dwells deep within the heart. He is the lord of time, past and future. Having attained him, one fears no more. He verily, is the immortal Self.

That being, of the size of a thumb, is like a flame without smoke. He is the Lord of time, past and future, the same today and tomorrow. He, verily, is the immortal Self.

As rain, fallen on a hill, streams down its side, so runs he after many births who sees manifoldness in the Self.

As pure water poured into pure water remains pure, so does the Self remain pure, O Nachiketa, uniting with Brahman.

To the Birthless, the light of whose consciousness forever shines, belongs the city of eleven gates.¹ He who meditates on the ruler of that city knows no more sorrow. He attains liberation and for him

¹The Birthless is the Self. The city of eleven gates is the body with its apertures—eyes, ears, etc.

there can no longer be birth or death. For the ruler of that city is the immortal Self.

The immortal Self is the sun shining in the sky, he is the breeze blowing in space, he is the fire burning on the altar, he is the guest dwelling in the house; he is in all men, he is in the gods, he is in the ether, he is wherever there is truth; he is the fish that is born in the water, he is the plant that grows in the soil, he is the river that gushes from the mountain—he, the changeless reality, the illimitable!

He, the adorable one, seated in the heart, is the power that gives breath. Unto him all the senses do homage.

What can remain when the dweller in this body leaves the out-grown shell, since he is, verily, the immortal Self.

And now, O Nachiketa, will I tell thee of the unseen, the eternal Brahman, and of what befalls the Self after death.

Of those ignorant of the Self, some enter into beings possessed of wombs, others enter into plants — according to their deeds and the growth of their intelligence.

That which is awake in us even while we sleep, shaping in dream the objects of our desire—that indeed is pure, that is Brahman, and that verily is called the Immortal. All the worlds have their being in that, and none can transcend it. That is the Self.

As fire, though one, takes the shape of every object which it consumes, so the Self, though one, takes the shape of every object in which it dwells.

As air, though one, takes the shape of every object which it enters, so the Self, though one, takes the shape of every object in which it dwells.

As the sun, revealer of all objects to the seer, is not harmed by the sinful eye, nor by the impurities of the objects it gazes on, so the one Self, dwelling in all, is not touched by the evils of the world. For he transcends all.

He is one, the Lord and innermost Self of all; of one form, he makes of himself many forms. To him who sees the Self revealed in his own heart belongs eternal bliss — to none else, to none else!

Intelligence of the intelligent, eternal among the transient, he, though one, makes possible the desires of many. To him who sees the Self revealed in his own heart belongs eternal peace—to none else, to none else!

Nachiketa

How, O King, shall I find that blissful Self, supreme, ineffable, who is attained by the wise? Does he shine by himself, or does he reflect another's light?

King of Death

Him the sun does not illumine, nor the moon, nor the stars, nor the lightning — nor, verily, fires kindled upon earth. He is the one light that gives light to all. He shining, everything shines.

This universe is a tree eternally existing, its root aloft, its branches spread below. The pure root of the tree is Brahman, the immortal in whom the three worlds have their being, whom none can transcend, who is verily the Self.¹

The whole universe came forth from Brahman, moves in Brahman. Mighty and awful is he, like to a thunderbolt crashing loud through the heavens. For those who attain him death has no terror.

In fear of him fire burns, the sun shines, the rains fall, the winds blow, and death kills.

If a man fails to attain Brahman before he casts off his body, he must again put on a body in the world of created things.

In one's own soul Brahman is realized clearly, as if seen in a mirror. In the heaven of Brahma also is Brahman realized clearly, as one distinguishes light from darkness. In the world of the fathers he is beheld as in a dream. In the world of angels he appears as if reflected in water.

The senses have separate origin in their several objects. They may be active, as in the waking state, or they may be inactive, as in sleep. He who knows them to be distinct from the changeless Self grieves no more.

Above the senses is the mind. Above the mind is the intellect. Above the intellect is the ego. Above the ego is the unmanifested seed, the Primal Cause.

And verily beyond the unmanifested seed is Brahman, the all-pervading spirit, the unconditioned, knowing whom one attains to freedom and achieves immortality.

None beholds him with the eyes, for he is without visible form. Yet in the heart is he revealed, through self-control and meditation. Those who know him become immortal.

¹The "three worlds" are the sky, the earth, and the netherworld.

KATHA UPANISHAD

When all the senses are stilled, when the mind is at rest, when the intellect wavers not — that, say the wise, is the highest state.

This calm of the senses and the mind has been defined as yoga. He who attains it is freed from delusion.

In one not freed from delusion this calm is uncertain, unreal; it comes and goes. Brahman words cannot reveal, mind cannot reach, eyes cannot see. How then, save through those who know him, can he be known?

There are two selves, the apparent self and the real Self. Of these it is the real Self, and he alone, who must be felt as truly existing. To the man who has felt him as truly existing he reveals his innermost nature.

The mortal in whose heart desire is dead becomes immortal. The mortal in whose heart the knots of ignorance are untied becomes immortal. These are the highest truths taught in the scriptures. Radiating from the lotus of the heart there are a hundred and one nerves. One of these ascends toward the thousand petaled lotus in the brain. If, when a man comes to die, his vital force passes upward and out through this nerve, he attains immortality; but if his vital force passes out through another nerve, he goes to one or another plane of mortal existence, and remains subject to birth and death.

The Supreme Person, of the size of a thumb,¹ the innermost Self, dwells forever in the hearts of all beings. As one draws the pith from a reed, so must the aspirant after truth, with great perseverance, separate the Self from the body. Know the Self to be pure and immortal—yea, pure and immortal!

The Narrator

Nachiketa, having learned from the god this knowledge and the whole process of yoga, was freed from impurities and from death, and was united with Brahman. Thus will it be with another also if he know the innermost Self.

OM . . . Peace — Peace — Peace.²

¹The sages ascribe a definite, minute size to the Self in order to assist the disciple in meditation.

²One hundred and eight Upanishads have been preserved. Their original number is not known. Some are in prose, and some are in verse. Sixteen of the Upanishads were recognized by Shaṅkara as authentic and of first importance philosophically. He wrote commentaries on ten of these and they are the ones most often studied today.

Bhagavad-gita

Arjuna:

O Krishna, seeing these my kinsmen, gathered here desirous to fight, my limbs fail me, my mouth is parched.

My body shivers, my hair stands on end, my Gandiva (bow) slips from my hand, my skin is burning.

O Keshava (Krishna, the slayer of Keshi), I am not able to stand upright, my mind is in a whirl, and I see adverse omens.

O Krishna, neither do I see any good in slaying my own people in this strife. I desire neither victory, nor kingdom, nor pleasures.

Teachers, uncles, sons and grandsons, grandfathers, fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, besides others kinsmen, for whose sake empire, enjoyment and pleasure are desired, they themselves stand here in battle, forsaking life and wealth. What avail, then, is kingdom, enjoyment, or even life, O Govinda (Krishna)?

These warriors I do not wish to kill, even though I am killed by them, not even for the dominion over the three worlds, how much less for the sake of this earth. O slayer of Madhu.

O Janardana (giver of prosperity and salvation, Krishna), what pleasure could there be for us by killing the sons of Dhritarashtra? Sin alone would take possession of us by slaying these evil-doers.

Therefore we ought not to kill the sons of Dhritarashtra, who are our relations; for how can we, O Madhava (Krishna), obtain happiness by destroying our own kinsmen?

Although these (my enemies), their understanding being overpowered by greed, see no evil from extinction of families and no sin in hostility to friends.

But, O Janardana, why should not we turn away from this sin, seeing clearly the evil in destruction of family?

From the destruction of a family the immemorial religious rites of that family perish. Spiritually being destroyed, that whole family is overpowered by unrighteousness.

O Krishna, from the predominance of unrighteousness, the wo-

men of that family become corrupt, and women being corrupted, there arises intermingling of castes.

This intermingling of castes leads the destroyers of the family to hell, as also the family itself; for their ancestors fall, being deprived of the offerings of rice ball and water.

By these misdeeds of the slayers of the family, bringing about confusion of castes, the immemorial religious rites of family and caste are destroyed.

O Janardana, we have heard that for such men, whose household religious rites have been destroyed, the dwelling in hell is inevitable.

Alas! what a great sin we are resolved to incur, being prepared to slay our kinsmen, actuated by greed of kingdom and pleasure.

Verily, it would be better for me if the sons of Dhritarashtra, weapons in hand, should slay me in the battle, unresisting and unarmed.

Sanjaya:

Speaking thus in the midst of the battlefield, Arjuna sank down on the seat of his war chariot, casting aside his bow and arrows, his mind overwhelmed with sorrow.

Krishna:

O Arjuna, whence comes upon thee in this critical moment this depression unworthy of an Aryan, disgraceful, and contrary to the attainment of heaven?

O son of Pritha, yield not to unmanliness; it does not befit thee. Casting off this mean faint-heartedness, arise. O terror of thy foes!

Arjuna:

O destroyer of enemies and slayer of Madhu (Krishna), how can I fight with arrows in battle against Bhishma and Drona who are worthy to be worshipped (by me).

Instead of slaying these great-souled masters, it would be better even to live in this life by begging; but killing them, all our enjoyments of wealth and desires, even in this world, will be stained with blood.

Indeed I know not which of the two is better for us, whether we should conquer them or they should conquer us. For those very sons of Dhritarashtra stand before us, after slaying whom we should not care to live.

With my nature overpowered by pity and depression and my mind confused about duty, I implore Thee (O Krishna) to tell me with

certainly what is good for me. I am Thy disciple; instruct me, who have taken refuge in Thee.

For I see not what can remove this grief which withers my senses, even if I should obtain unrivalled and flourishing dominion over the earth and rulership over the gods.

Sanjaya:

Gudakesha (Arjuna), the conqueror of his foes, having thus spoken to the Lord of the senses (Krishna), said: "I shall not fight, O Govinda!" and became silent.

O descendant of King Bharata, Hrishikesha (Krishna), as if smilingly, spoke these words to him (Arjuna), who was thus grief-stricken in the midst of the two armies.

Krishna:

Thou hast been mourning for those who should not be mourned for and yet thou speakest (apparent) words of wisdom; but the truly wise mourn not either for the dead or for the living.

It is not that I have never existed before, nor thou, nor all these kings. Nor is that all of us shall cease to exist hereafter.

As in this body the embodied soul passes through childhood, youth, and old age, in the same manner it goes from one body to another; therefore the wise are never deluded regarding it (the soul).

O son of Kunti, the feelings of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, are produced from the contact of the senses with sense objects; they are with beginning and end, transitory. Therefore, O Bharata, endure them bravely.

O mighty among men, he is fit to attain immortality who is serene and not afflicted by these sensations, but is the same in pleasure and pain.

There is not existence for the unreal, and the real can never be nonexistent. The Seers of Truth know the nature and final ends of both.

Know That to be indestructible by which all this pervaded. No one is ever able to destroy that Immutable.

These bodies are perishable; but the dwellers in these bodies are eternal, indestructible and impenetrable. Therefore fight, O descendant of Bharata!

He who considers this (Self) as a slayer or he who thinks that this (Self) is slain, neither of these knows the Truth. For It does not slay, nor is It slain.

This (Self) is never born, nor does It die, nor after once having been, does It go into non-being. This (Self) is unborn, eternal, changeless, ancient. It is never destroyed even when the body is destroyed.

A son of Pritha, how can he slay or cause the slaying of another who knows this (Self) to be indestructible, eternal, unborn and immutable?

As man casts off worn-out garments and puts on others which are new, similarly the embodied soul, casting off worn-out bodies, enters into others which are new.

Sword cannot pierce It (Self), fire cannot burn It, water cannot wet It, and air cannot dry It.

It cannot be pierced, nor burned, nor wet, nor dried. It is eternal, all-pervading, unchangeable, immovable, everlasting.

This (Self) is said to be unmanifested, unthinkable, unchangeable; therefore, knowing this to be so, thou shouldst not grieve.

But even if thou thinkest that this (Self) is subject to constant birth and death, even then, O mighty-armed, thou shouldst not grieve.

For that which is born, death is certain, and for the dead, birth is certain. Therefore, grieve not over that which is unavoidable.

O Bharata, all creatures are unmanifested in the beginning, manifested in their middle state, unmanifested again in the end. What is there to grieve about?

Some look upon It (Self) with wonder, some speak about It with wonder, some hear about It with wonder, some and yet others, even after hearing about It, know It not.

The dweller in the body of everyone is ever instructible; therefore, O Bharata, thou shouldst not grieve over any creature. Looking upon it even from this standpoint of thine own Dharma, thou shouldst not waver, for nothing is higher for a Kshatriya (warrior) than a righteous war.

O son of Pritha, fortunate indeed are Kshatriya to whom comes unsought, as an open gate to heaven, such a war.

But if thou shouldst not take part in this righteous war, then forfeiting thine own duty and honor, thou shalt incur sin.

People will ever speak ill of thee; for the esteemed, dishonor is even worse than death.¹

¹Reproduced with the permission of the publishers from Swami Paramananda's translation in *Srimad-Bhagavad-Gita*, Boston: The Vedanta Centre, 1913.

Philosophy of Hinduism

Historically, Indian philosophy falls readily into three periods: the period of the Rig Veda, the Upanishads, and the post-Vedic period.

The philosophy of the Rig Veda contains the oldest interpretation of nature. This first "philosophy" of a people is their religion. In late Rig Veda hymns we see the development of a conception of the unity of the world. The individual powers or deities are interpreted more and more as the expression of a One. From an initial polytheism, the philosophy of this period progressed to a monotheism, and later to monism.

It is interesting to note here how Indian philosophy arrived at its fundamentally monistic doctrine. In Palestine, theism became monistic through the outlawing of other gods and the persecution of their followers in favor of Jehovah. In other ancient civilization there was a mechanical identification of various local deities to bridge the gap between polytheism and monotheism. The Hindus, on the other hand, used a fundamentally philosophical method in that they conceived, by thought, the basic unity underlying the manifold. This perception of oneness in diversity is clear by the time of the writing of both Rig Veda, X, 121 and X, 129. The latter is reproduced at the close of chapter one. An equally plain statement of the essentially monistic nature of the universe appears in the other and perhaps earlier writing. If we may say that in X, 129, the Vedic philosophers assigned

unity as a characteristic of being, then in X, 121, we find their account of the search to discover what this unity was. The typically Indian resolution of the problem came by the assignment of the term *Prajapati* to this unity. *Prajapati* has a mythological connotation and as philosophical thought matured, it was replaced by *Brahma* (or *Brahman*), and finally by *Ātman*, to signify the changeless, inseparable essence of self of which all is. In later times, *Brahman* and *Ātman* were taken to mean the same thing. In the *Rig Veda*, however, before *Brahman* assumed its strictly philosophical connotation, this word signifies simply "prayer." There is a refined distinction between *Brahman* and *Ātman* which should be mentioned. In many late usages, *Brahman* is used when the philosophical principle as realized in the universe is meant, and *Ātman* is employed when realization of this principle within the individual soul is intended.

The Upanishadic period is concerned primarily with the treatment of this doctrine of *Brahman* or *Ātman*. Primitive idealism as expressed in the Upanishads is reflected in the precepts that the only reality is the *Ātman*, that the *Ātman* is the subject of knowledge in us, and that the *Ātman* itself is unknowable. Thus all things exist only as they form a part of our own *Ātman*. There is a definite tendency toward monism in Upanishadic philosophy, but the view expressed in this regard is varied. The *Bṛihadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya* Upanishads are important for the study of this particular period.

The speculations in the Upanishads lead to the systems of the Buddha and the Jains, and finally, in the six "systems" of Hindu philosophy prominent in the post-Vedic period, we see the rethinking of the problems raised in particular by the Buddhists. These six philosophies are not systems in the most strict sense, but they compose the individual bodies of interpretation of which the orthodox views are comprised. They are orthodox in that they are consistent with the earlier Vedic teaching. The major heterodox systems, of course, include the Buddhist and Jain philosophies.

While all six schools have their ultimate foundations in the teachings of various eras in the vast Indian literary heritage which have been briefly outlined in the previous chapter, their basic formulations (upon which their distinction as separate schools depends) are to be found in the *Sūtras*. These are short sentences or phrases (aphorisms) which have been almost lost in the mass of commentary added later by succeeding thinkers. Thus the *Sūtras* with the kernel of teaching of the

Uttara-mīmāṃsā (or Vedānta) were composed probably by Bādāryaṇa. They are of less importance, to us, than the commentary by Gauḍapāda, and later commentaries by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. In the discussion of the schools, to simplify presentation, a single commentary is followed. The reader should realize that various commentators frequently had different interpretations of the original sūtras. Thus Śaṅkara maintained a monistic (non-dualistic) interpretation of ultimate reality, while Rāmānuja's commentary on the same sūtras adopted a qualified monism and taught that ultimate reality was of the nature of oneness, but synthetically so with innate and internal differences. The investigation of such differences, however, is scarcely the proper subject of this brief survey as long as the reader remembers that such differences in interpretation and teaching do exist in this and other instances, whether mentioned or not.

We have already examined, in the chapter preceding, the general foundations and precepts of Hindu philosophy. Our remarks, up to this point, have been largely confined to the similarities of the schools. It now remains to view in more detail the specific tenets of the six particular schools: *Sāṅkhya*, *Yoga*, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*.

The distinctive characteristics of these separate schools follow:

(1) *Sāṅkhya*—a dualistic, atheistic philosophy of synthesis.

(2) *Yoga*—a theistic philosophy, recognizing an all-pervading spirit as well as individual souls, and concerned with the "yoking" of the soul with spirit to bring salvation or realization. It does not regard knowledge, or philosophic speculation, alone, as sufficient for realization of the absolute.

(3) *Nyāya*—the logical school which centers about the logical and analytical means by which conclusions are to be drawn. Relying upon the five senses for the raw material of perception, it regards the external world as substantial reality.

(4) *Vaiśeṣika* (from *viśeṣa*, or distinction, particularity)—supplements the *Nyāya* school. It regards the transient world as real and composed of differentiable aggregates of eternal particles or atoms (pluralistic). Ethically, its goal is release from bondage and misery (rebirth) through knowledge.

(5) *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* (means literally "former inquiry") — an idealistic system, ritualistic, with much the same viewpoint as *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*.

(6) *Uttara-mīmāṃsā*, or Vedānta (literally "latter inquiry")—teaches that relative knowledge ends in the final realization of the unity of individual soul with the ultimate truth of the universe, which is absolute spirit or Brahman (*Ātman*).

Of the six schools, Sāṅkhya and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* are the most significant to the student of modern philosophy. Sāṅkhya is probably the older of the two, but *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* may be said to be more typical of present Hindu philosophy.

The Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies are related, but different in their separate precepts. One complements the other. In their respective present forms, the Sāṅkhya philosophy is older than Yoga. It is likely that these two schools developed originally as different interpretations of a single doctrine.

Both Sāṅkhya and Yoga, like Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as we shall see later, admit of a plurality of selves, called *puruṣas*, and subscribe to realism in that they regard objects as existing independently of the mind that cognizes them. But while Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika trace the universe to a multiplicity of sources, Sāṅkhya and Yoga derive it from a single source, namely *prakṛiti*. Since Sāṅkhya and Yoga, however, regard the universe as partaking of the nature of both *prakṛiti* (the first cause of the universe including contributory aspects of space and time) and *puruṣas* (which may be interpreted as *spirit* as opposed to *prakṛiti* or *nature*), they are really dualistic systems.

The Sāṅkhya teachings go beyond the Upanishads in their emphasis upon the individual soul in the here and now. Upanishadic thought is most concerned with discovery of the absolute. Thus some of the Sāṅkhya teachings do not have their origins in the Upanishads and comprise thought added at some later date to these teachings. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* (or Sāṅkhya verses) of the fifth century A. D. are important sources in this school. The Sūtras are credited to Kapila, and their commentary to Bhikṣu.

The tenets of the Sāṅkhya philosophy do not admit of unity between the two primal ultimates, *prakṛiti* and *puruṣa*, i. e. between nature and spirit (awareness in itself) or absolute and soul (hence its dualism). Nature is unconscious and real. This nature or material principle (*prakṛiti*) is world as we see it. It came from goodness (*satva*), energy (*rajas*) and darkness (*taṃas*) and is exclusive of soul (*puruṣa*). Man's soul is endowed with mind (*manas*), and his stage of activity is the world. The misery of the world is caused by one's

own self by its relationships to external things and beings, and by fate itself. The soul is subject to transmigration, and the misery of worldly existence yields only to knowledge (*jñāna*). The ultimate goal is not so much absorption into, or identity with, the absolute, as it is *isolation* of one's own bit of the universal soul from worldly misery (i. e. *kaivalya*). This goal is to be achieved by the inactive contemplation of nature, with the knowledge that soul and matter are forever different. The necessary discipline is provided by *Yoga*.

Yoga consists of a method of ascending to a higher plane of concentration and intelligence, and it complements the *Sāṅkhya*. It was codified by Patañjali, perhaps the grammarian of that name who lived in the second century. Others feel that the codifier who composed the *Yoga-Sūtras* which constitute the handbook of modern *Yoga* philosophy, did so much later, toward the end of the 5th century A.D.¹ Be that as it may, the codifier put down in a systematic exposition this method of attaining union with the Ātman by means of concentration in oneself.

The second aphorism of Patañjali defines *Yoga* as "restraining the mind-stuff from taking different forms." It asserts the dominance of mind, through control and direction, in reaching the goal of knowledge. It offers the way to knowledge which ends in *kaivalya*. It is the practice of *Yoga*, rather than the gaining of knowledge, that is all-important in winning the goal according to this school.

The word "*yoga*" has different meanings. It may mean the method of freeing the intelligence to a higher perception, or it may mean the "yoking-up" or union of individual self with the supreme self. Sometimes it is used to express "effort" in the sense of an effort to restrain the senses and the mind in order to free the consciousness for higher perception.

There are several systems of *Yoga*, including *Raja Yoga*, *Mantra Yoga*, *Hatha Yoga* and various others. *Raja Yoga*, or Royal *Yoga*, is the most important and is most closely allied in its philosophical precepts with the position of the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy. *Śaṅkara* and *Buddha* were both *yogins* of high attainment, and the beginning of this ancient system of psychology is traceable to the earliest of the Vedic writings.

Both the *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* systems or schools are realistic, and they teach that all knowledge, by its very nature, points to an object beyond it. These objects are independent of knowledge and of one

¹There is an illuminating commentary by Vyāsa.

another (pluralistic realism). The data of knowledge are connected, however, by virtue of our ability to classify them into groups or *dravya* (substances). There are several such substance categories. Some are material, and some, immaterial. They include the space and time classifications. These groups, plus their properties and relationships (by which are meant such things as *guṇa* or quality, *karma* or activity, *sāmānya* or universal, *samavaya* or necessary relation) explain the universe.

While Nyāya is closely allied with Vaiśeṣika in its realistic outlook, it differs widely from that school in the matter of its major emphasis. Nyāya is concerned fundamentally with the discipline of thought, i. e. logic. Nyāya means literally "argumentation" or "going back". Functionally it provides a handbook of logic or disputation.¹ In so providing a technique or canon for use in controversy, it is the leading example in Indian philosophy of an intellectualistic, analytical system. The *Nyāya-Sūtras* were probably composed by Akṣhapāda, and there are various commentaries.

The Vaiśeṣika school was expounded by the tenth century sage Udayana, in his *Kusumāñjali*. Its original sūtras were those of Kaṇāda, and Udayana's work was in the nature of commentary. It derives its name from the word *viśeṣa*, or difference, and is not concerned with methods of knowing, as is its complementary school, but rather with content. The philosophy of this system classifies things into six categories, and proclaims diversity, rather than unity, as the root of the universe.

Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, is based on the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra of Jaimini which was written around 200 A. D., and it is of particular interest to semantic studies. It is a complementary system, in certain aspects, to the uttara-mīmāṃsā. It is concerned with the meaning of words as they reveal the significance of the world. In its simplest form, Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is a handbook of explanation which treats of the various questions arising out of the complicated Vedic ritual. It adheres to the Vedas as the infallible authority in revealing the true nature of the universe, and holds that such revelation comes to us through the medium of words. The interpretation of the meaning of these words provides the subject matter for this school. It seeks to find the idea behind the expressions as they are recorded in the Vedas. The system postulates the self-validity of knowledge. The answer to the epistemological question is simply that all knowledge is valid by its very nature. This

predication holds true fundamentally, and an explanation is required only when particular knowledge fails to be so. We thus act on the supposition that knowledge is true,¹ but if it is not we must then find the cause in either the means or the source of knowledge. Pūrva-mīmāṃsā holds a realistic theory of knowledge. There is no knowledge which does not point to a corresponding external object.

Along with Sāṅkhya, the other metaphysically significant Indian philosophy is uttara-mīmāṃsā, or Vedānta, as it is frequently called. There are two particularly important figures in the historical founding of Vedānta teachings. The earlier founder was Bādarāyaṇa, and after him came Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara was the most noted of all commentators on the Upanishads. A Brahman of Malabar, he was born about 788 A. D. and early became noted for his wisdom and power of yoga. He wandered from place to place, studying and teaching, sometimes in the company of his disciple Padmapada and sometimes alone. At Benares, he wrote his commentary on the Brahman Sūtras, on the Upanishads, and on the Bhagavad-gītā. He died in Kanchi at the age of 32. A profound thinker, his commentaries and teachings based on the Bhagavad Gītā are among the finest ever composed. The genesis of his system is in some ways similar to the Christian reformation. In the reformation, the Protestant creed represented a return to the pure word of the Bible. Similarly, Śaṅkara rejected the changes which had come about in Vedic doctrine, effected in part by Buddhism and in part by Sāṅkhya, and founded his system directly upon the holy word of the Upanishads. His was the advaita (non-dualist) view of reality in which self and Brahman are one.

Vedānta, as we learn of it in Śaṅkara's commentaries on Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras, holds that Brahman created the universe. It is pantheism or monistic idealism. Only the One is real; the many are illusion (or *māyā*). This Brahman, or One, is unknowable through sense perception. Here the concept of Brahman as supreme soul includes the idea of ātman, the individual soul. The two are one. The Vedānta teaches two Brahmanas based on man's life in the world of experience. The higher Brahman, or knowledge, is as Brahman really is. The lower Brahman concept, or the lower form of knowledge, reveals soul as entrapped in

¹George P. Conger in a paper ("Outline of Indian Philosophy" *Philosophy East and West*, edited by Charles A. Moore, Princeton University Press, 1946) points to the justification for comparison between the discussion of logical fallacies in the Nyāya school and Aristotle's *Topica* and *Sophistici Elenchi*.

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worldly attributes and limitations. Two truths, based upon these two separate conceptions of Brahman, are as a result taught: the ultimate or absolute, and the relative. The highest knowledge is beyond sense experience; lower knowledge is based on *māyā* or illusion and *avidyā* or ignorance. The reality of the knowable sense world is relative and impermanent. It is the realm of time and space and personal experience. The Vedānta urges man to attain union with his real self in order, through reason, to know the lost reality.

Ethically, Vedānta attributes to man the responsibility for his actions. By intelligence he may distinguish good from evil.

The goal of Vedānta is attained by *jñāna* (knowledge). This *jñāna* breaks the bonds of karma and rebirth in the lower phenomenal world. It is the eclipse of the idea of separateness of self from supreme soul—the obliteration of duality to allow realization of the unity of all. This goal, *Moksha*, or release, comes to the man who rises above the world of the transient into the truth of Brahman.

Vedānta strives to discover and prove the identity of the objective reality of the universe with the subjective reality of the thing-in-itself, as Kant uses this latter term (*ding-an-sich*). It holds that the absolute is one and not many, but that it has a multiplicity of expression and manifestation. It is thus monistic. It guides one to a point beyond knowable objects of perception and directs soul to the eternal absolute being.

The ethical structure of the Vedānta may be inferred from its metaphysical teaching of the oneness of the universe. If we injure another, we thereby also injure ourselves, since both are a part of the ultimate oneness of the universe. As the path to be followed in attaining the truly ethical life, Vedānta points to the destruction of selfishness and the gaining of spiritual perfection.

One of the chapters following has as its subject contemporary Indian thought. It bridges the span between the traditional and classical schools of Indian philosophy and modern thought, involving as it does the impact of the Western mind on India.

To conclude our brief presentation of the philosophy of Hinduism, excerpts from the commentaries of Shaṅkara and Rāmānuja as examples of the interpretative writings so often required for the full understanding of the various Sūtras.

The first commentary is that composed by Shaṅkara to explain the significance of one of these Vedānta Sūtras. These particular Sūtras are

supposed to have been written by Gaimini and Bādarāyana. They are simple, short aphorisms which compose, within themselves, a complete body of doctrine upon some subject. Certain ones, because of their brevity and the omission of terms, are virtually impossible to understand without the commentary. Thibaut says (in *The Vedānta Sūtras*, Oxford, 1890), in reference to these Sūtras, "The most essential words are habitually dispensed with; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the subject or predicate of a sentence."

Shaṅkara's commentary interprets Brahman, or the highest Self, as something different from and even superior to Vishnu or Shiva which, as we have seen, have more often been the object of popular worship in India than Brahman. Shaṅkara's is the "orthodox" interpretation of the Vedānta, and his commentary is the oldest of those extant. It would be difficult to say just which of the several commentaries actually represents the original intended meaning of the Sūtras, and since the several commentaries are at variance in their respective interpretations, it is obvious that all of them cannot equally represent this original meaning.

To illustrate such differences of interpretation, a second commentary, one written by Rāmānuja follows the excerpts from Shaṅkara. The totality of these differences in interpretation resulted in quite different philosophical views. Thus, in Shaṅkara's opinion the Upanishad's teach, as Thibaut says, "Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Parātman, the highest Self. This being is of an absolutely homogenous nature; it is pure 'Being' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought. Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance; Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it. . . . According to Rāmānuja, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarized as follows. There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not 'intelligence' as Shaṅkara maintains, but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-merciful; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists.

Shankara

Vedānta-Sūtras with Shaṅkara Bhāṣhya¹

(Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i. e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

The term &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage Taitt. Up. III, I, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on a state of existence. The words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by perception and the other means of right knowledge; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words 'from which' denote the cause. The full sense of the Sūtra therefore is: That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of this world—which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot be conceived by the mind,—that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, &c.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sūtra as the six stages of existence . . . (origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction) . . . are possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it might—were they referred to in the Sūtra—be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sūtra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities; not either from a non-intelligent *prādhana* (*prakṛiti*),

¹From *Vedānta-Sūtras with Shaṅkara Bhāṣhya* translated by George Thibaut (Oxford, 1890), *Sacred Books of the East*.

or from atoms, or from non-being, or from a being subject to transmigration; nor again, can it proceed from its own nature (i. e. spontaneously, with the cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and causes have invariably to be employed.

Vedānta-Sūtras with Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya

(Brahman is that) from which the origin &c., of the (world proceed).

The expression 'the origin' &c., means 'creation, subsistence, and reabsorption.' The 'this' (in of this) denotes this entire world with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be fathomed by thought, and comprising within itself the aggregate of living souls down from Brahmā down to blades of grass, all of which experience the fruits (of their former actions) in definite places and at definite times. 'That from which,' i.e. that highest Person who is the ruler of all; whose nature is antagonistic to all evil; whose purposes come true; who possesses infinite auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, blessedness, and so on; who is omniscient, omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of this world proceed—he is Brahman; such is the meaning of the Sūtra.—The definition here given of Brahman is founded on the text Taitt. Up. III, 1, 'Bhrigu Vāruṇi went to his father Varuṇa, saying, Sir, teach me Brahman,' &c., up to 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know, that: that is Brahman.'

A doubt arises here. Is it possible, or not, to gain a knowledge of Brahman from the characteristics marks stated in this passage?—It is not possible, the Pūrva-pakāhin contends. The attributes stated in that passage . . . do not properly indicate Brahman; for as the essence of an attribute lies in its separative or distinctive function, there would result from the plurality or distinctive attributes plurality on the part of Brahman itself.—But when we say 'Devadatta is of a dark complexion, is young, has reddish eyes,' &c., we also make a statement as to several attributes, and yet we are understood to refer to our Devadatta only; similarly we understand in the case under discussion also that there is one Brahman only!—not so, we reply. In Devadatta's case we connect all attributes with one person, because we know his unity through other means of knowledge; otherwise the

distinctive power of several attributes would lead us, in this case also, to the assumption of several substances to which the several attributes belong. In the case under discussion on the other hand, we do not, apart from the statement as to attributes, know anything about the unity of Brahman, and the distinctive power of the attributes thus necessarily urges upon us the idea of several Brahman. —But we maintain that the unity of the term 'Brahman' intimates the unity of the thing 'Brahman'. —By no means, we reply. If a man who knows nothing about them, is told 'a cow is that which has either entire horns, or mutilated horns,' the mutually exclusive ideas of the possession of entire horns, and so on, raise in his mind the ideas of several individual cows, although the term 'cow' is one only and in the same way we are led to the idea of several Brahman. For this reason, even the different attributes combined are incapable of defining the thing, the definition of which is desired. —Nor again are the characteristics enumerated in the Taitt. passage (viz. creation of the word &c.) capable of defining Brahman in the way of secondary marks, because the thing to be defined by them is not previously known in a different aspect. So-called secondary marks are the cause of something already known from a certain point of view, being known in a different aspect—as when it is said 'Where that crane is standing, that is the irrigated field of Devadatta'. —But may we not say that from the text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' we already have an idea of Brahman, and that hence its being the cause of the origin &c., of the world may be taken as collateral indications (pointing to something already known in a certain way)? —Not so, we reply; either of these two defining texts has a meaning only with reference to an aspect of Brahman already known from the other one, and this mutual dependence deprives both of their force. —Brahman cannot therefore be known through the characteristic marks mentioned in the text under discussion.

To this *prima facie* view we make the following reply. Brahman can be known on the basis of the origination, subsistence, and re-absorption of the world—these characteristics occupying the position of collateral marks. No objection can be raised against this view, on the ground that, apart from what these collateral marks point to, no other aspect of Brahman is known; for as a matter of fact they point to that which is known to us as possessing supreme greatness (*brīhattva*) and power of growth (*brīmhava*)—this being the meaning of the root *brimb* (from which 'Brahman' is derived) . . . The text 'from

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whence these beings &c., teaches us that Brahman is the cause of the origination, &c. of the world, and of this Brahman thus known the other text 'The True, knowledge, the Infinite is Brahman,' tells us that its essential nature marks it off from everything else.

The following excerpts have been taken from the writings of Śaṅkara in the *Vivekachūḍāmaṇi*. (Reproduced with the permission of the publishers from "The Crest-Jewel of Wisdom", translated by Charles Johnston, Theosophical University Press, 1946).

* * *

Let the wise one strive after Freedom, giving up all longing for sensual self-indulgence; approaching the good, great Teacher (the Higher Self), with soul intent on the object of the teaching. Let him by the Self raise the Self, sunk in the ocean of the world, following the path of union through complete recognition of oneness. Setting all rites aside, let the wise, learned ones who approach the study of the Self strive for Freedom from the bondage of the world. Rites are to purify the thoughts, but not to gain the reality. The real is gained by Wisdom, not by a myriad of rites. When one steadily examines and clearly sees a rope, the fear that it is a serpent is destroyed. Knowledge is gained by discernment, by examining, by instruction, but not by bathing, nor gifts, nor a hundred holdings of the breath.

* * *

He who through wisdom discerns that there is no division between the Eternal and the manifested world, bears the mark of one who is free even in life.

Whose mind is even, when honored by the good, or persecuted by the wicked, bears the mark of one who is free even in life.

In whom all sensuous objects, put forth by the supreme, melt together like the rivers and streams that enter the ocean's treasure house, making no change at all, since he and they are but the one Being, this sage self-conquered is set free.

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For him who has understood the nature of the Eternal, there is no return to birth and death as of old; if such return there be, then the nature of the Eternal was not known.

If they say he returns to birth and death through the rush of old imaginings, this is not true; for, from the knowledge of oneness, imaginings lose all their power.

As the most lustful man ceases from desire before his mother; so, when the Eternal is known, the wise cease from desire, through fullness of bliss.

* * *

That, whose nature no man can define; where is no pasturage for mind or word; one, verily, without second, is the Eternal; there is no difference at all.

The fullness of Being, self-perfect, pure, awakened, unlike aught here; one, verily, without second, is the Eternal; there is no difference at all!

They who have cast away passion, who have cast away sensual delights, peaceful, well-ruled, the sages, the mighty, knowing reality in the supreme consummation, have gained the highest joy in union with the Self.

* * *

This is the last and final word of the teaching: The Eternal is the individual life and the whole world; rest in the partless One is freedom, in the Eternal, the secondless; and this too the scriptures show.

Indestructible, verily, is the Self — thus says the scripture of the Self, declaring that if it is not destroyed when all its changing vestures are destroyed.

Stones, and trees, grass, and corn, and straw are consumed by fire, but the earth itself remains the same. So the body, powers, life, breath and mind and all things visible, are burned up by the fire of wisdom, leaving the being of the higher Self alone.

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As the darkness, that is its opposite, is melted away in the radiance of the sun, so, indeed, all things visible are melted away in the Eternal.

As, when the jar is broken, the space in it becomes clear space, so, when the disguises melt away, the Eternal stands as the Eternal and the Self.

As milk poured in milk, oil in oil, water in water, becomes perfectly one, so the sage who knows the Self becomes one with the Self.

* * *

Jainism

During the fifth and sixth centuries B. C., there were two major movements of revolt against orthodox Brahmanism. One of these was *Jainism*, and as we shall see later the other was *Buddhism*. Jainism is discussed first because it stayed in India while Buddhist thought flowed over vast areas and eventually came to partake of many other cultural traditions as well as to mould the intellectual life and spirit of several lands outside of India. In a sense, because of its wide geographical dispersion, Buddhism in later centuries lost some of its purely Indian character, while Jainism, for the most part, remained within the land of its origin.

The word Jainism signifies victory. *Jinas*, or *tirthankaras* as they are also called, are the *victors* of the faith, i. e. they are the models who have attained the spiritual victory which is possible through the disciplines taught by Jainist doctrine.

Jainism, then, was founded about 2500 years ago. Mahāvīra, one of the jinas, revolted against traditional authority and instituted an independent school of thought. He adopted certain of the rites of the existing Vedic religion, while in contrast Gautama Buddha did not. There are elements of the Sāṅkhya doctrine in Mahāvīra's teaching, and there are also some portions of the atomism of Vaiśeṣhika. During the early centuries, Buddhism overshadowed Jainism in its importance and influence. It was not until Buddhism receded in India that the beliefs

of the Jains assumed first place in opposition to the older and more firmly intrenched teachings of the Brahmans.

There is some conjecture in outlining the early "history" of Jainism, although there is a fairly definite tradition from which at least the general pattern of its origins may be traced. It is likely that Jainism first became articulate as a system of thought with Parshva and Mahāvīra. It was in the person of Mahāvīra, in particular, that the growing dissatisfaction with the teaching of Brahmanism reached expression in definite form, and he is regarded as the historical founder of modern Jainism.

The predecessor of Mahāvīra who was the last and greatest of the 24 *jina*, was Parshva. According to Jain legend, he was born after nine preexistences to Queen Vamadevi and King Ashvaseba in the 8th century B. C. near Kashi in what is now modern Benares. Just before his birth the Queen saw a serpent by her side and accordingly named her son *parshvatab* (*by the side*). The youth married Prabhavati, the daughter of one of the ruling Kings of the land. Not many years later he is said to have been converted to the Jainist faith by a picture of Neminath, who was the 22nd of the *jinās*. Thereupon he disposed of his worldly possessions and retired to a hermitage. He was still a young man when he attained *Kaivalya*. This *Kaivalya*, or *Kevalin*, which means *isolation*, is the freeing of the soul from its worldly fetters as the prerequisite of attaining perfect knowledge. He died at 776 B.C. on what is now Mount Parasnath.

The next *jina*, as we have already seen was Vardhaman Mahāvīra who was the historical founder of Jainism. He is usually referred to by his title, *Mahāvīra*, which means great hero. Details of his life are vague, but it is likely that he was born around 599 B. C. near Vesali (in modern Bihar). He lived his early years in a period of unrest and spiritual dissatisfaction. The spirit of reformation was in the air and the times favored the rise of divergent religious orders; men denied the sanctity of the Vedas and the power of the Vedic deities. The increasing authority of the Brahmans was resented. It was a time of revolt and reaction against Brahmanism, and it was in the person of Mahāvīra that the heretical teaching of Jainism found support and leadership.

Mahāvīra followed the pattern of many ascetics. He left his home, practiced strict asceticism for many months, and after years of wandering and meditating, and by subduing his senses and bodily desires, he achieved *Kaivalya*. Tradition relates that he was then 42 years old.

His attainment of the Jainist goal was but the beginning of his importance to these teachings, however. He identified himself with the *Nirgranthas*, an existing order, headed them, and by degrees the order became that of the *jīnas*. Jainists are not agreed upon the circumstances of the identification of the two orders, but we do know that Mahāvīra attracted hosts of followers, among them many former disciples of Parshva. He taught for thirty years thereafter and was received with honor and patronage by kings and men alike. In his teaching, he gave expression to the fundamental Jainist precepts, although what is original with Mahāvīra and what was merely transmitted by him is not always easy to determine.

It is in metaphysics that the Jains make their chief contribution to oriental philosophy. The fundamental tenet is that all nature, even the "things" we regard as inanimate, possesses life and the capacity for re-animation. This simple *animism*, common among primitive beliefs, represents the primitive reaction to the environment. Mahāvīra, however, went beyond the primitive belief by advancing the principle of *ahimsā*, or non-injury. In so doing he established a point of departure for Jainist ethics.

This animistic theory has a dualistic basis in the propositions that the universe is composed of eternal souls (*jīvas*) and of eternal non-souls or elements (*ajīvas*). The soul is real; it acts and reacts. The *jīvas* (souls) are without number each possessing consciousness and intelligence. (*Jīva*) is the knowing self, and we may discern our own *jīva* by introspection. The *ajīva* is not-self; it is non-soul, atomic unconscious, sans intelligence. It is without size, is immeasurable, and yet possesses substance and sense qualities of touch, taste, color and smell. In various combinations, these *ajīvas* make up matter (*puṅgāla*). It is the *puṅgāla* that the senses perceive. But note, the material object, the "thing" is a collection of *ajīvas plus* at least one *jīva* inherent in the whole. The Jain position, then, is one of dualistic, or perhaps more exactly, pluralistic, realism.

According to this view, man consists of *jīva* (soul) and *ajīva* (non-soul), both of which are eternal and without beginning or end. The *jīva* is fettered by its own activity (*karma*). That is, by its activity, which brings it into contact with false knowledge and deeds, the *jīva* is restricted and bound. It must become free of these fetters of *karma* by *kaivalya*, i. e. by the isolation of the *jīva* from its restricting containment. This holds true with any *jīva*, human or otherwise, and conse-

quently involves the ascension up the scale of existence of all things. As jīva is freed from the fetters of gross matter, the senses and the restrictions of its own karma, it finally arises above qualities, relationships, motion, time and space, to emerge disembodied and actionless. This is *Nirvana* (cessation) or *Kaivalya* (isolation).¹

The three basic precepts of Jain philosophy are concerned with the classification of being into substances (*dravyas*), the seven methods of predication (*saptabhangi*) and the modes of conception (*nayas*).

The first of these precepts holds that the universe is composed of substance (*dravya*). This universe was not created by one soul, or jīva, since the jīva (any jīva) upon reaching its highest state, becomes Paramatman (the universal soul or God). The *dravya* itself is defined as that which ever exists (uncreate), that which is the subject of qualities and modifications, that which at once possesses origination, destruction and permanence, that which performs special functions. The theory divides substances into six general kinds. *Dharmastikaya*, for example, is one of the kinds of substances, and it is defined as an ether which acts as the fulcrum of motion. It enables beings to move. Another one of the six kinds is *Jīvastikaya*. This is sentient being. Its basic characteristic is knowledge. It knows all things everywhere and always. It is this kind of substance which is obscured by the foreign energies of the *karma*. These karmic influences keep the *jīva* in the mundane world, and prevent it from existing as a free being (which is its natural state).

¹As we have already seen, the attainment of true knowledge, by releasing the soul from its material and sensual restrictions, is summed up by the term *Nirvana* or *Kaivalya*. It is not a difficult idea to comprehend. Its understanding reveals clearly the goal of the philosophy of Jainism, while a defective or incomplete comprehension of its meaning obscures the very core of Jainist thought. Examine briefly, therefore, some aspects of the means employed by the ascetic in striving for *Kaivalya*. He exercises a stringent control on his physical life and upon his mental life. He fasts and bars the entry of sensory perceptions, insofar as possible, to allow a maximum of meditation or introspection. His introspective studies bare new relationships among the data of perception and conception, and suddenly he sees a great inter-relationship which formerly was hidden. This introspective meditation enables him to relate meaningless individual factors in a meaningful pattern, and there is a sudden enlightenment of understanding. There is no revelation of God's will, as we might read, for example, in the Christian Old Testament. Rather it is a revelation coming from within the self. This attainment of true knowledge is the goal of the Jainist, and it is fundamental to his basic philosophical and theological position.

The principles, or *tattvas*, of which there are seven, delineate the

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relations of substance to matter, i.e., *dravya* to *puḍgāla* when *dravya* is considered as sentient being, or *jīva*. These seven *tattvas* follow: (1) *jīvas* (souls); (2) *aḥivas* or *puḍgāla* (matter); (3) *asrava* (inflow of matter into souls); (4) *bandha* (absorption of matter into the soul); (5) *saṃvara* (stopping of inflow of matter into soul); (6) *nirjara* (removal from the soul of matter in combination with it); (7) *nirvana* (complete removal of matter from the soul, upon the complete destruction of karma, with the resultant absolute liberation of the soul).

The *jīva* while it possesses an infinite number of qualities, has eight which are unique. It is these eight qualities which are obscured by the eight corresponding *karmas*. They are *jñāna* (unlimited knowledge), *avyabaddha* (freedom from pain and pleasure), *saṃyaktva* (right faith, right knowledge and right conduct), *akṣhaya-sṭhiti* (eternal life), *arupi* (formlessness), *aguru-laghu* (equality of status), *virya* (infinite capacity for activity).

The *saptabhaṅgi*, or seven-fold method of predication, represents the logical resultant of the seven different relations of matter to soul as expressed by the *tattvas*. The *saptabhaṅgi* is sometimes referred to as the theory of "maybe". It permits one to speak of anything in seven different ways (based upon the relations expressed by the *tattvas*), each implying the other six. Thus we may use in seven different ways the statements of yes and no, severally and jointly, without involving inconsistency, when inquiring separately into the different qualities of a thing. These seven modes of predication may be expressed something like this: (1) in a sense the thing exists (affirmation); (2) in a sense the thing does not exist (negation); (3) in a sense the thing exists and does not exist (maybe); (4) in a sense it is impossible to describe the thing; (5) in a sense the thing does exist and it is impossible to describe; (6) in a sense the thing does not exist and it is impossible to describe it in one moment; (7) in a sense the thing does and does not exist and it is impossible to describe it in one moment. This *anaiḥkanyeyavada*, or theory that contradictory conditions exist in the same substance, may be more easily understood by comparing the *saptabhaṅgi*, severally with the corresponding *tattvas*.

The third of the three basic Jain doctrines is expressed best by the term *nayas*, or the methods of comprehending things from particular standpoints. The *naya* is the standpoint of the knower. It predicts but one of the innumerable qualities of a thing, while at the same time it does not deny the rest. *Nayas* refer to parts, while *saptabhaṅgi* refers

to things in their entirety. *Nayavada* represents the analytical method of knowledge, and *saptabhangi* represents the synthetic method. The *nayas* are divided into aspects relating to substance, or the permanent nature of the thing, and aspects relating to the condition, or changing nature, of the thing.

In summary then, as to the problem of knowledge Jainism answers with the theory of *maybe*. This theory is expressed: *syad asti; syan asti*, (maybe it is; maybe it isn't). By its affirmation of a proposition is possible and justified only in a partial sense. Since all things possess an infinite number of qualities, each of these can be confirmed only in a particular sense. It is obvious that if one must answer a proposition with both yes and no, then only an uncertain knowledge is attainable.

This may, of course, be the ultimate solution to the epistemological problem. Certain of the western philosophical schools, for example, deny the possibility of absolute truth and affirm that all truth must necessarily be relative.

According to Jainist theory, knowledge is valid, i. e. true knowledge, if it helps man attain his goal. And, as we have noted, Jainism sets out the manner in which true knowledge may be attained. Such knowledge, when attained, reveals the *jīva* as knowing self; it reveals the *ajivas*; it finds the ultimate permanence involved in change. This perfect knowledge comprehends totality rather than relationships. The lesser knowledge, the knowledge of *maybe*, cannot go beyond parts and relations. The gap between this lesser, or *maybe*, knowledge and true knowledge is bridged when Kaivalya is attained. It is thus possible to go beyond the uncertainty of *maybe* knowledge and find the ultimate, perfect, true, certain knowledge.

As we have seen, the asceticism of the Jainist is the avenue by which the *jīva* is freed and the true knowledge reached. It is a practical tool of action. Through it, we can gain a concise view of the ethics of Jainism. There are three bases: right conduct, right faith and right knowledge. Right conduct is the most important of these for, as the Jainists ask, what is faith in the *jīna's* teachings if there is no knowledge of reality, and how comes this knowledge except through the conduct of living. Right conduct is guided by the discipline of the vows. There is a set for the layman and a set for the ascetic. They are not taken to a personal God (for the Jainists have no such God, excepting Mahāvīra and others of the *jīnas* deified by the modern southern sect of Jainism—

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and these are not *personal deities* in the usual sense of that term), but to himself.

For the layman the twelve vows involve *abimsā* (non-injury and the prohibition of taking any life intentionally); truth-telling; honesty; chastity, including fidelity to spouse as well as purity of thought; curbing desire for worldly goods; limitation of motives for sin; limiting the number of things used; guarding against unnecessary evils; keeping periods of meditation; observing special times of limitation; giving alms; and serving certain days as a monk. The ascetic takes but five vows, by which he swears non-injury; truth; honesty; chastity; and the renunciation of attachment for any thing or person. Perhaps somewhat strenuous for the western world, one can nevertheless scarcely deny the noble conception of such a code of conduct.

As a religion, Jainism is practiced in thousands of temples in present day India. Some of these are very costly and of great architectural beauty. Among the most important are Mount Parasnath, the burial place of Parshva, and Satrunjaya, a holy mount associated with the history of Rishabha, the first *jina*, and upon which many *jinās* attained *Kaivalya*. Some of the most ancient temples are on Mount Girnar. And, there are temples of great beauty on Mount Abu, perhaps the most holy of all Jain sacred places. The temples contain images of the *jinās* to which they are dedicated, or of one of the saints, and there are priests in attendance who practice the ritual of worship and hear confession of sin.

The founding of the two most important sects occurred two centuries after the death of Mahāvīra. At that time, a duality of leadership developed, and one of the leaders migrated with his monks and many followers to the south. When these prodigals returned, many years later, a division in the tenets of belief was apparent, and by the first century A. D. there were two definite groups: the "white-clad" Jains (Shvetambaras) in the north, and the "sky-clad" Jains (Digambaras) in the south. There is a difference in scripture and dress; the sky-clad sect departs from the teaching of the northern Jains in denying women candidacy for *Nirvana* (*Moksha*), in their deification of Mahāvīra, and in their insistence upon nudity as a true teaching of the faith.

Throughout the centuries, the Jains have been torn by internal strife and by persecution from without. Founded originally in the eastern Ganges valley, Brahmanism drove the heretics to the west, so that by the 12th century, A. D., the center of Jainism had moved to the

western part of India where it remains today. In the 13th century, the Moslem persecution of Jainism began, and the Jains have exercised little temporal power since. In the south, the Jains were opposed by Shaṅkara and the Vedantists. Nonetheless, the Jains have survived, and with them, their teachings.

As to Jainist writings, the *Canon* adopted under the influence of the "white-clad" sect is the most authentic, although Jainism has little inclination to lean on scripture for the teaching of its precepts, preferring, as it does, the more rigorous method of knowing truth through action. The excerpts which follow were taken from *Niyamsara*, one of the sacred books of the Jains written by Shri Kund Kunda Acharya.¹

Niyamsara (the perfect law) deals with the path of liberation through right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. *Niyama* means "rule" or "law", and *sara* means "the right". The object of the treatise is to show that the completely pure and completely conscious soul is a perfect soul, and that if it has any connection with the non-soul, it is imperfect and under delusion. Parenthetical remarks are not in the original, but they have been added to facilitate understanding difficult passages.

Niyamsara

1. Bowing to Vira Jina (Mahavira), who, by nature is the possessor of infinite and supreme knowledge and conation; I shall compose Niyama-Sara (the perfect law), preached by Kevalis (embodied supreme souls) and Shruta Kevalis (saints who have a perfect knowledge of the Jain scriptures).

2. In the Jain Scriptures, the Path and the Fruit of the Path are described as the two parts. The means of liberation constitute the Path, and liberation is the Fruit.

3. What is in reality worth doing is *Niyama*, and that is belief, knowledge, conduct. In order to avoid deflection, the word *Sara* has been particularly affixed to it.

4. *Niyama* is the way to liberation; its fruit is supreme *Nirvana*. Each of these three is again described.

¹*The Sacred Books of the Jainas*, Volume IX, *Niyamsara*, by Shri Kund Kunda Acharya. Translated by Uggar Sain. Prāsada: The Central Jain Publishing House, Lucknow, 1931.

5. Belief in the Perfect Souls, the Scriptures, and the Principles, is Right Belief. He who is free from all defects and is possessed of all pure attributes is the supreme source.

6. The defects are hunger, thirst, fear, anger, attachment, delusion, anxiety, old age, disease, death, perspiration, fatigue, pride, indulgence, surprise, sleep, birth, and restlessness.

7. One free from all defects and possessed of sublime grandeur such as Omniscience is called Parmatma (the highest soul) or the Perfect One. One who is not such is not Parmatma.

8. Words proceeding from his mouth, pure and free from the flow of inconsistency, are called Agama (scripture). In that Agama, the principles (*tattvartha*) are enunciated.

9. Soul, matter, medium of motion, medium of rest, space, (substances) having dimensions, and time, together with their various attributes and modifications are said to be the principles (the kinds of substances).

10. Soul is characterized by Upayoga (an inclination to perception or knowledge as a resultant of consciousness). Upayoga is towards (i. e. the inclination to) Darsana (perception) or Jnana (knowledge). Jnana-Upayoga is of two kinds: Swabhava-Jnana (natural knowledge) or Vibhava-Jnana (non-natural knowledge).

11-12. Natural knowledge is perfect, unassisted by sense and independent. Non-natural knowledge is of two kinds: right knowledge (of four kinds, including sensitive knowledge, scripture knowledge, visual knowledge and mental knowledge) and wrong knowledge (of three kinds, beginning with sensitive knowledge.)

18. From the practical point of view, a mundane soul causes (the bondage of) material Karmas and experiences (their results); but from the (impure) point of view, the soul creates (and) experiences thought-activities arising through the (effect) Karmas.

19. From the substance point of view (all) souls are free from the modifications mentioned before; but from the modification point of view, souls are possessed of both (the natural and non-natural modifications).

CHAPTER II—Ajiṃva—

20. The substance matter is of two kinds; in the form of an atom, and in the form of molecules. And the molecules are of six kinds, and the atom, of two kinds.

21-24. Gross-gross, gross, gross-fine, fine-gross, fine, and fine-fine, are the six kinds.

Solids like earth, stone, consist of gross-gross molecules. (Liquids) like ghee, water, oil, are gross. Shade, sunshine, etc. consist of gross-fine molecules.

Objects of the four senses (of touch, taste, smell and hearing) are of fine-gross molecules. Karmic molecules, in the condition of being bound up with soul, are fine. Those which are unlike these are of fine-fine molecules.

25. That which is the cause of the four root matters (earth, water, fire and air) should be known as cause atom. The smallest possible part of a molecule should be known as effect atom.

26. That substance which (is) the beginning, the middle, and the end, by itself, inapprehensible, should be known as an atom.

27. That which possesses one taste, color, smell, and two touches, is of natural attributes. Those tangible to all (senses) are, in Jain philosophy, said to be of non-natural attributes.

28. The modification which is independent of other objects is the natural modification, and modification in the molecular form is the non-natural modification.

29. From the *real* point of view, an atom is said to be "matter substance"; but, from the other (i. e. practical point of view), the term "matter substance" has been applied to a molecule. (The distinction between looking at a thing from the *real* point of view and the *practical* point of view will be employed repeatedly. Real point of view regards a substance in its true or pure essence, irrespective of its relation to other substances. Conversely, practical point of view regards a substance in its relation to other substances. *Editor*).

30. The auxiliary causes of motion and rest to soul and matter (are called) the medium of motion, and medium of rest (respectively). (That which is the auxiliary cause of) giving space to all the substances, soul, etc., is space.

31. Practical time is either of two kinds, instant and wink (*ávali*); or of three kinds (past, present and future). Past (time) is equal to the number (of the liberated souls) who have destroyed their bodily forms, multiplied by numerable winks.

32. The instants of the practical time are infinite times (the number of) atoms, which again are infinite (the number of) souls. Time

points, which are packed full in the universe, are (called) the real "time".

33. That by the help of which, all substances, soul, etc., are altered by their own modifications, is "time". The four substances (the medium of motion, rest, space and time) have (only) their own natural attributes and modifications.

34. Excepting time, the other five of these six substances, are known as "extensive substances." Extensive substances occupy many spatial units, as mentioned in Jaina scriptures.

35-36. The atoms of matter are numerable, innumerable and infinite. Verily there are innumerable points of space in "medium of motion", "medium of rest", and in each individual soul.

The same innumerable number of spatial units are in the universe; and in the other, i. e. (non-universe there are) infinite (number of spatial units). There is no extensiveness in time; therefore, it has one spatial unit (only).

37. The matter substance is material; all the rest are immaterial. Soul has consciousness in its nature; all the rest are devoid of the attribute of consciousness.

CHAPTER III—Shudda Bhāva (Pure Thought Activity)

38. The external principles, soul, etc., should be renounced. One's own soul, absolutely free from all the attributes and modifications, caused by the impurity of Karmas, should be realized.

39. (From the real point of view) there are in the soul, no stages of (impure) thought and activities; neither are there degrees of regard and disregard, nor grades of feelings of pleasure, nor degrees of feelings of pain.

40. In soul, there are no stages of duration bondage; neither are there the stages of Karmic nature . . .

41. (In the soul there are) neither the stages of destructive thought-activities, nor the degree of destructive subsidential thought activities . . .

42. In soul (there is) neither wandering in the four conditions of life (*gati*), nor (are there) birth, old age, death, disease, and sorrow.

43. Soul (is) turmoil-less, bodyless, fearless, independent and faultless, without attachment, free from the activities (of mind, body and speech), devoid of delusion, and free of ignorance.

44. Soul (is) possessionless, free from attachment, without blemish,

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devoid of all defects, without desire, without anger, without pride, and without lust.

45. Color, taste, smell, touch, conditions of female, male, and common-sex inclinations, etc. (six kinds of bodily) figures, (and six kinds of) skeletons; all of these are not found in the soul.

46. Know the soul to be devoid of taste, color and smell, not cognizable (by the senses), possessed of the attribute of consciousness, soundless, incomprehensible by any outward sign and one having no describable form.

47. Just as liberated souls (are) free from oldness, death and birth, and are crowned with the eight attributes; so (are) mundane souls (from the pure real point of view).

48. Just as liberated souls, residing at the top-most of the universe are bodiless, indestructible, independent of senses, free from (karmic) filth, and pure; so the mundane souls (also) should be considered (from the pure, real point of view).

49. From the practical point of view, all mundane souls have been described as possessing all the aforesaid conditions; but from the pure, real point of view they also (are) of the same nature as liberated souls.

50. All the aforesaid conditions relate either to foreign substances or foreign modifications; hence (they) should be renounced. Internal principle is one's own substance, i. e. soul. (It only) should be realized.

51. Conviction (in this ascertained as they are) alone without (any) perverse motive (is) right belief. (Knowledge) free from doubt, perversity and vacillation, is right knowledge.

53. The external causes of right belief are the Jain scriptures and the persons who know them; while the destruction, etc., of right-belief-deluding Karma are said to be the internal causes.

54. Listen, just as right belief and right knowledge are the causes of liberation, so is right conduct. Therefore I shall describe right conduct from (both) the real and the practical points of view.

55. Right conduct, from the practical point of view, is to practice austerities from the practical standpoint, while right conduct from the real point of view is to observe austerities from the real standpoint.¹

¹There are in all 186 verses arranged in 12 chapters in *Niyamsara*. The major portions of the first three chapters have been given here. The other chapters in the treatise deal with practical right conduct, repentance, renunciation, confession, expiation, supreme equanimity, real independence and, finally, pure consciousness. *Editor*.

Contemporary Indian Philosophy

India has made a profound impression on the modern world as symbolic of the power of an idea or person rather than of the power of material things. The personality of Gandhi is a striking illustration of such spiritual force. Much of modern Indian thought relates to political and social problems, in particular to the long and recently won battle for political independence. There has been a widespread tendency to borrow Christian ideals, so as to relieve the degradation of the outcaste, reduce caste barriers, improve the status of woman, and find relief for the pressing economic problems. But India has just as persistently rejected Christian ideas as it has seemed to welcome Christian ideals. Materialism and communism have likewise been viewed by many Indians as means of reform and of overcoming the divisions and inequalities which have been supported by Hinduism. The chief philosophic task of Indian philosophy in recent times has been to reconcile Christian moral ideals with the traditional theoretical idealism of India which usually expresses itself religiously in pantheism, or a pantheistic polytheism.

Gandhi himself is typical of this synthesis in his personal devotion to Christ, even while remaining a Hindu. The great poet Tagore likewise blends Christian theism and the Christian moods of joy and love with a Hindu sense of the illusory character of nature, Hindu monism, and a denial of personal individuality which he views as a false opinion resulting from ignorance.

Among the professional philosophers the most common point of view is that of absolute idealism. However, we find diverse forms of thought, such as logical empiricism, which rejects all metaphysical terms like Absolute, God, or substance on the ground that these can not be defined and do not predict any actual experience. More commonly a speculative tendency of a theosophical nature puts in appearance, sometimes with unchecked imagination. But in the great minds we find an interesting combination of the precision of western philosophy with the idealistic perspective which roots in the Upanishads and in such classical systems as the Vedantist school of philosophy.

One of the best known of recent philosophers is Dasgupta, well known in the West as well as in India. He has developed a very interesting theory of emergent evolution which is somewhat comparable to that of Samuel Alexander. Dasgupta views the original level of reality as unknown, or even unknowable; it cannot be mass or energy since these can be reduced to space-time. Space-time is the first level known to man, and it is obviously not original but a product since it is not composed of unrelated elements but constitutes a relational whole. Matter, which is the next level above, has features in common with space-time but is emergent in that it has new relational characteristics, and reveals principles of physical order and structure. An increasing complexity appears in complex organic bodies.

Life is the next emergent in Dasgupta's system. It has individuality as its distinctive quality. Thus even an earthworm seeks to be and to maintain itself. The living being strives to restore itself, to repair damage done to it, and to maintain individuality, all of which a molecule does not do when it is altered. Body is another emergent, simultaneous with life, rather than emergent from it. A cell has life, but a *body* of cells has such relational functions that each cell lives for all the cells in a kind of co-operative community. Mind gradually emerges from body-and-life, so that behavior (selective choice) becomes its distinctive quality. Memory makes it possible for mind to form purposes and to determine the future. Next, value emerges from life as personality. Mind not only integrates its past, present and future, but it also integrates its integrations. Thus by moving toward remote goals an integrated historical person becomes possible. Love is not merely one of the values. Instead, love emerges from value as the cement which alone can link together separate minds. In love, a mind actually transcends its own body, even though still being dependent upon it. Finally, God

is conceivable as the apex of values, not however a God who built the universe as its creator, but an emergent Deity who becomes real through man and through valuational life. In love man is raised to Godhood and God becomes man.

The best known, most voluminously and forcefully presented system of Indian philosophy today is that of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, a distinguished historian of Indian philosophy. Radhakrishnan is a creative thinker, equally versed in western and oriental philosophy, a bitter critic of Christianity who nevertheless has been profoundly influenced by Christianity. The problem of religion has dominated his thinking, the issue being whether the universe has any spiritual meaning, not which of the religions gives the correct meaning. His final view is the Hindu assumption that a divine logos leads man into spiritual truth. He rejects materialism and emergent evolution on the ground that matter could never develop life nor mind unless it possessed them originally in a potential or germinal fashion. No kind of shock or organization could extract life out of the non-living.

Radhakrishnan's idea of reality reminds one of F. H. Bradley and of Hegel. He stresses the validity of the God-idea, yet insists that "God" is a finite idea, marked by time, struggle, growth, and progress. The God idea is therefore not complete. It stands for improvement rather than perfection. A more ultimate way in which to conceive reality is to think of it as the Absolute, for while the religious feeling of love meets human need it nevertheless lacks the sense of rest, eternity, completeness, and passionlessness represented by the Absolute.

This does not make God unreal however. This universe is only one possibility for the infinite Absolute, yet this universe is a fact, and for us the only expression of the Absolute. And in this actual universe God is indispensable, quite as necessary to the world as the world is to Him, being soul to its body. Therefore God is the Absolute from the standpoint of the actual universe, even though God is not reality in itself. The Absolute is the "pre-cosmic nature" of God, or perhaps more objectively God is the Absolute from the standpoint of the cosmos.

For Radhakrishnan, as for all absolute idealists, the problem of evil is a difficult and urgent one. Unlike some idealists, he excludes evil from the nature of God. Yet evil and pain are very real in the universe. From this it follows that God is never completely real, since for God to be fully real (as the soul of the world) would mean for God

to completely destroy evil, to destroy all contradictions in the universe, and to eliminate the finite.

It not only follows that God is unreal to the extent that the universe in this contradiction, pain, evil and finiteness is real. It also is implied that when God is fully real then there will be no universe, nothing finite or partial remaining. The end of the world will come in just that moment when the last man becomes divine. Therefore Radhakrishnan holds with Schelling that the final goal of the world is its own annihilation in order that the infinite God can be all-in-all.

Nevertheless the universe is not simply evil, nor simply illusion, although it is always evil, finite, i. e. is always universe. The universe is also a revelation of the Absolute. It is the very unity which it seeks to become. It would be erroneous, however, in Radhakrishnan's view, to think of this relation of the universe and the Absolute as one of temporal succession. There was not first God, then creation of the universe, to be followed finally by God's overcoming of the universe so that all will return to God. There was never an infinite or absolute which was later transformed into the finite. Radhakrishnan rejects the thought of a temporal creation and replaces it with a process of continual emanation and return. It might be phrased this way: The Absolute is not what reality originally was composed of and shall again be. Instead, the Absolute is the meaning of the universe. God is pure unity, yet God is not unity of nothing but unity of something (i. e. of our universe), and therefore the Absolute is the world, is identical with it, not identical with its multiplicity, but identical with it as its unity.

S. Radhakrishnan

IDEALISM OF RADHAKRISHNAN

GOD¹

The inadequacy of naturalism shows that the world process with its order and creativity requires for its explanation a creative power. For however far we may travel backwards in space or time, we cannot jump

¹Reprinted from *An Idealist View of Life* by S. Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937), pp. 331-342.

out of space or time, and we cannot account for space-time structure. The rationality of the universe suggests that the creative power is mind or spirit. There is no reason why we should identify it with vital force or life, as Bergson suggests, and not with spirit, for spirit is the highest we know. Descartes' argument is well known. Since we do not owe our existence either originally or from moment to moment to ourselves or other beings like ourselves, there must be a primary and fundamental cause, God. God is not the cause in the ordinary sense, for that would be to make him an event within the series of events. The cause of the world creation lies in a sense outside itself. God is prior to the world, but not in any temporal sense. He is the logical *prins* of the world. . . .

The immanent purposiveness of the world is not inconsistent with the presence of evil, ugliness and error. They are not, as McTaggart says, "too bad to be true" or actual. Possibly they are necessary for the greater good of the reign of law in the universe. The overwhelming goodness of the universe requires its orderedness, and that may mean acute suffering and such other facts of experience which are seemingly irreconcilable with the purposiveness of the universe. If what we see of man's life is all there is to see, if there is no life before the cradle or beyond the grave, possibly we may not be able to establish the preponderant goodness of the world achieved at the cost of intense suffering and intolerable evil. The principles of Karma and rebirth suggest to us that the value of the world is not in any way affected by the actuality of evil, error and ugliness. The universe is one where these elements are transmitted into their opposites through a gradual process. . . .

God as the universal mind working with a conscious design, who is at once the beginning of the world, the author of its order, the principle of its progress and the goal of its evolution, is not the God of religion unless we take into account the facts of religious consciousness. Our moral life tells us that God is not only the goal but the spring and sustainer of moral effort. Our spiritual experience reveals to us the fact of the supreme all-comprehensive one. There is an affinity between the structure of the world and the mind of man. Our sense perceptions, our logical concepts, our intuitive apprehensions are not forms superinduced on reality, but are determinate forms of reality itself. From the beginning we are in the presence of givenness, something experienced. Because the objects are perceived only when our minds are trained, it does not follow that the objects are subjective. To see a rose we must turn our eyes in that direction. To realize the supreme

spirit, a certain purifying of the mind is necessary. The reality of spirit is not invalidated simply because it is seen only by those who are pure in heart. . . .

The conception of God as wisdom, love and goodness is not a mere abstract demand of thought but is the concrete reality which satisfies the religious demand. If we combine the ideas we are led to posit from the different directions of metaphysics, morals and religion, we obtain the character of God as the primordial mind, the loving redeemer and the holy judge of the universe. The Hindu conception of God as *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva* illustrates the triple character. *Brahmā* is the primordial nature of God. He is the "home" of the conditions of the possibility of the world, or of the "eternal objects" in Whitehead's phrase. If the rational order of the universe reflects the mind of God, that mind is prior to the world. But the thoughts of *Brahmā*, or of the primordial mind, should become the things of the world. This process of transformation of ideas into the plane of space-time is a gradual one which God assists by his power of productive and self-communicating life. In the world process all things yearn towards their ideal forms. They struggle to throw off their imperfections and reflect the patterns in the divine mind. As immanent in the process, God becomes the guide and the ground of the progress. He is not a mere spectator, but a sharer in the travail of the world. God as *Viṣṇu* is sacrifice. He is continuously engaged in opposing every tendency in the universe which makes for error, ugliness and evil, which are not mere abstract possibilities, but concrete forces giving reality to the cosmic strife. God pours forth the whole wealth of his love to actualise his intentions for us. He takes up the burden of helping us to resist the forces of evil, error and ugliness, and transmute them unto truth, beauty and goodness. The *RgVeda* says: "All that is bare he covers; all that is sick he cures; By his grace the blind man sees and the lame walks." "God is the refuge and friend of all." . . .

While there is no risk that the world will tumble off into ruin so long as God's love is operative, yet the realization of the end of the world depends on our co-operation. As we are free beings, our co-operation is a free gift which we may withhold. This possibility introduces an element of contingency to the universe. The creative process, though orderly and progressive, is unpredictable. There is real indetermination, and God himself is in the make. If we say that God has a fixed plan which is being copied into matter, we are bound to

cosmological determinism. Human co-operation is an essential condition of the progress of the world, and the freedom of man introduces an element of uncertainty. The struggle is not a parade, nor is history a mere pageant. Though God is ever ready to help us, our stupidity and selfishness erect barriers against the persistent operation of his love.

The view that God as love will see to it that the plan succeeds is not to be confused with the doctrine of absolute predestination, which may be interpreted as overthrowing human freedom and paralysing moral effort. After all, it is the fight that gives life its value and not the ultimate result, and even the consummation of the result is contingent on the passion with which human individuals work for the cause. The hope is there, that even the most wilful will respond to the long-suffering love of God. Though he is ever working in the hearts of men and drawing them towards himself, there are occasions when we withhold the response and make the situation serious. When the hold of God on the world becomes precarious, his love, which is constant, manifests itself in a striking way. According to the Christian religion, when the situations became desperate it is said that God once sent a deluge which very nearly destroyed all mankind and on another occasion sent his only-begotten Son. It does not mean that the love of God is an accidental quality brought into manifestation by the "fall" of man. We need not think that God comes to our rescue simply because creation has gone off the rails. Love belongs to the very core of God's being. Utter and complete self-giving is the nature of divine activity, though the power to benefit by it depends on the capacity of the recipients.

The redemptive function of God is an incessant activity, though it becomes emphasized when the moral order is sharply disturbed. God manifests Himself in striking forms whenever new adjustments have to be brought about. These special revelations are called in Hindu mythology *avatārs*, or descents of God. The popular view holds that, when darkness gathers, the waters deepen and things threaten to collapse into chaos, God Himself becomes personally incarnate in a unique way. But the continuous urge of spiritual life, the growing revelation of ends in which the divine life comes to its own, the immanent law which constitutes the unity of the world and conditions the intersection of its several elements, are not consistent with the conception of unique revelations of complete Godhead on earth. The whole movement

directed towards the realisation of potentialities is a continuous incarnation of God. It is, however, true that the manifestation of spiritual values may be viewed either as the revelation of God, or the realisation of the capacities of man. The two, God's revelation and man's realisation, though distinguishable, are inseparable from one another. They are two aspects of one process. Lives like those of Buddha and Jesus by revealing to us the great fact of God and the nature of the world as a temple of God point out how we can overcome sin and selfishness. They achieve for human life what human life has done for nature below. The great story of life on earth is in a sense the "martyrdom of God."

Simply because there is the security that God's love will succeed, the struggle does not become unreal. God is not simply truth and love, but also justice. He is the perfection which rejects all evil. The sovereignty of God is indicated in the character of Śiva. God acts according to fixed laws. He does not break or suspend his own laws. The liberty to change one's mind is not true liberty. God cannot forgive the criminal, even when he repents, for the moral order which is conceived in love and not in hatred requires that wrongdoing should have its natural consequences. Plato, in words that seem to be in echo of Hindu texts, tells us that "you shall assuredly never be passed over by God's judgment, not though you make yourself never so small and hide in the bowels of the earth, or exalt yourself to heaven. You must pay the penalty due, either while you are still with us, or after your departure hence, in the house of Hades, or it may be, by removal to some still more desolate region." The one God creates as Brahmā, redeems as Viṣṇu and judges as Śiva. These represent the three stages of the plan, the process, and the perfection. . . .

So far as the world is concerned, God is organic with it. It is impossible to detach God from the world. The Hindu theologian Rāmaṇuja regards the relation of God to the world as one of soul to body. He brings out the organic and complete dependence of the world on God. God is the sustainer of the body as well as its inner guide. Struggle and growth are real in the life of God. Time is the essential form of the cosmic process, including the moral life, and it has a meaning to God also. Life eternal which carries us beyond the limits of temporal growth may take us to the Absolute, but God is essentially bound up with the life in time. Progress may be derogatory to the Absolute, but not to God, who is intensely interested in it. The

process of the world is an emergence, but not of the type suggested by Alexander. It is an emergence under the guidance of God, who is immanent in the process, though the goal is transcendent to it. The process of the world is not a mere unfolding of what is contained in the beginning. It is not a question of mere preformation. The end of the world is not contained in the beginning, such that God might retire from the process altogether. Those who have any appreciation of this fact of evolution cannot adopt the view of preformation, though even a writer like Bergson, who emphasises the creativity of evolution, seems to think that the whole evolution of life with its progressive manifestation of structure is latent in life. He says: "Life does not proceed by the assimilation and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division." Such a view is inconsistent with the main intention of Bergson's teaching. The world is in the making, and is being created constantly, and the reality of change means a plastic world and not a block universe. The creative impulse is present from the beginning, but the forms created are due to the cosmic stress. That alone can account for the ordered character of the world of varied tendencies. If matter, life, consciousness and value had each its own independent evolution, the fact of their unity calls for an explanation, and we may be obliged to use a principal somewhat like Leibniz's pre-established harmony. Reality is a whole and acts and advances as a whole. The control of the whole is present in the growth of the parts, whether they are chemical compounds or cultural movements. The process of the world is creative synthesis, where the formative energy, local situation and cosmic control are all efficient factors. The final end is not contained in the beginning. The interest and attractiveness of the end cannot be divorced from the process which leads up to it. A God who has arranged everything at the beginning of the world and can change nothing, create nothing new is not a God at all. If the universe is truly creative, God works as a creative genius does. The end grows with the process and assumes a definite shape through the characteristics of the parts of the process. There is thus an element of indetermination throughout the process, though it diminishes in degree as the amount of actuality increases. God the planner acts with real genius when confronted by actual situations.

God, though immanent, is not identical with the world until the very end. Throughout the process there is an unrealised residuum in God, but it vanishes when we reach the end; when the reign is absolute

the kingdom comes. God who is organic with it recedes into the background of the Absolute. The beginning and the end are limiting conceptions, and the great interest of the world centers in the intermediate process from the beginning to the end. God is more the saviour and redeemer than creator and judge. As an essentially human phenomenon, religion insists on the "otherness" of God. Without it, worship, love and repentance have no meaning. We seek union with God, a union of will and fellowship. God is a real living one who inspires trust and love, reverence and self-surrender. Salvation comes from the grace of God through *bhakti*, or trust in God, and surrender to him. In all true religion we have faith in and experience of a living God who saves and redeems us from our sins. The love of God is more central than either his wisdom or his sovereignty. These later may lead to predestination theories which reduce the world process to a sham, where the freedom of man and the love of God are both illusory. If predestination is true, then the creation of novelties, the loving trust and surrender of man to God and the grace of God are illusions. . . .

There are certain vital values of religion which are met by the character of God as wisdom, love and goodness. Values acquire a cosmic importance and ethical life becomes meaningful. Till the completion of the cosmic process, the individual retains his centre as individual, and the completion is always transcendent to him, and so God is an "other" over against him, evoking in him the sense of need. God is conceived as a personal being, towards whom the individual stands in a relation of co-operation and dependence. God is the final satisfaction, and in him man finds self-completion. He wants to grow into the image of God, perfect in power and wisdom.

THE ABSOLUTE¹

While the character of God as personal love meets certain religious needs, there are others which are not fulfilled by it. In the highest spiritual experience we have the sense of rest and fulfilment, of eternity and completeness. These needs provoked from the beginning of human reflection conceptions of the Absolute as pure and passionless being which transcends the restless turmoil of the cosmic life. If God is bound up with the world, subject to the category of time, if his work is limited by the freedom of man and the conditions of existence, how-

¹Reprinted from *An Idealist View of Life* by S. Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937), pp. 342-345.

ever infinite he may be in the quality of his life, in power, knowledge and righteousness, he is but an expression of the Absolute. But man wants to know the truth of things in itself, in the beginning—nay, before time and before plurality, the one "breathing breathless," as the *RgVeda* has it, the pure, alone and unmanifest, nothing and all things, that which transcends any definite form of expression, and yet is the basis of all expression, the one in whom all is found and yet all is lost. The great problem of the philosophy of religion has been the reconciliation of the character of the Absolute as in a sense eternally complete with the character of God as a self-determining principle manifested in a temporal development which includes nature and man. The identification of the absolute life with the course of human history suggested by the Italian idealists may be true of the supreme as God of the world, but not of the Absolute, the lord of all worlds. Creation neither adds to nor takes away from the reality of the Absolute. Evolution may be a part of our cosmic process, but the Absolute is not subject to it. The Absolute is incapable of increase.

While the Absolute is pure consciousness and pure freedom and infinite possibility, it appears to be God from the point of view of the one specific possibility which has become actualised. While God is organically bound up with the universe, the Absolute is not. The world of pure being is not exhausted by the cosmic process which is only one of the ways in which the Absolute reality which transcends the series reveals itself. The Absolute is the foundation and *prius* of all actuality and possibility. Its existence is an act of free creation. Out of the infinite possibilities open to it, this one is chosen. When we analyse our sense of freedom we find that it consists in accepting or rejecting any one of a number of possibilities presented to us. The Absolute has an infinite number of possibilities to choose from, which are all determined by its nature. It has the power of saying yes or no to any of them. While the possible is determined by the nature of the Absolute, the actual is selected from out of the total amount of the possible, by the free activity of the Absolute without any determination whatsoever. It could have created a world different in every detail from that which is actual. If one drama is enacted and other possible ones postponed, it is due to the freedom of the Absolute.

It is not necessary for this universe to be an infinite and endless process. The character of a finite universe is not incompatible with an infinite Absolute. We can have an infinite series of terms which are

finite. The Absolute has so much more in it than is brought out by this world.

As to why there is realisation of this possibility, we can only say that it is much too difficult for us in the pit to know what is happening behind the screens. It is *māyā*, or a mystery which we have to accept reverently.

Sometimes it is argued that it is of the very nature of the Absolute to overflow and realise possibilities. The great symbol of the sun which is used in Hindu thought, Plato's system and Persian mythology signifies the generous self-giving and ecstasy of the Absolute, which overflows, and gives itself freely and generously to all. Timaeus says in Plato that the created world is there because the All-good wants his goodness to flow out upon it. The Indian figure of *līlā* makes the creation of the universe an act of playfulness. Play is generally the expression of ideal possibilities. It is its own end and its own continuous reward. The Absolute mind has a perfect realm of ideal being, and is free creativity as well. Though the creation of the world is an incident in the never-ending activity of the Absolute, it satisfies a deep want in God. The world is as indispensable to God as God is to the world.

God, who is the creator, sustainer and judge of this world, is not totally unrelated to the Absolute. God is the Absolute from the human end. When we limit down the Absolute to its relation with the actual possibility, the Absolute appears as supreme Wisdom, Love and Goodness. The eternal becomes the first and the last. The abiding "I am," the changeless centre and the cause of all change is envisaged as the first term and the last in the sequence of nature. He is the creative mind of the world, with a consciousness of the general plan and direction of the cosmos, even before it is actualised in space and time. He holds the successive details in proper perspective and draws all things together in bonds of love and harmony. He is the loving saviour of the world. As creator and saviour, God is transcendent to the true process, even as realisation is transcendent to progress. This internal transcendence of God to the true process gives meaning to the distinctions of value, and makes struggle and effort real. We call the supreme the Absolute, when we view it apart from the cosmos, God in relation to the cosmos. The Absolute is the pre-cosmic nature of God, and God is the Absolute from the cosmic point of view.

¹Reprinted from *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* by S. Radhakrishnan (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), pp. 446-451.

PROBLEM OF EVIL¹

We will conclude this discussion with a few remarks on the place of imperfection and evil in the Vedanta philosophy. The whole universe has in it the impulse toward union with the Absolute. The pulse of the Absolute beats through the whole world, self and not-self. The world is an imperfect revelation of the Absolute striving to become perfect, or to reach harmony. The universe is the Absolute dynamically viewed. If eternity is a circle, then the process of the universe may be viewed as a straight line. The universe of finite objects gives us, in the words of Plato, a moving image of eternity. The eternal is viewed as a growth or a becoming or a working out. In the universe we have the self-evolution of the Absolute. The lower stages, which are imperfect as compared with the higher, strive to become perfect. The whole universe is a vast struggle to realise the unity which is the ideal. This tension of the universe is mirrored in man, reflected in his individuality. The *Taittiriya Upanishad* declares that man is a microcosm in which all parts of reality are represented on a reduced scale. Man is the mirror of creation. His nature reaches up to the Absolute and down to the plant and the animal. While confined to a material organism, the individual self has the capacity to rise beyond intelligence into immediate contact with the divine. To bring about the unity between the higher and the lower is the aim of the individual self as it is the aim of the universe. The individual self is the theatre in which is enacted the drama of the universe, namely, the realisation of a central identity in and by means of the differences of mechanism and life, consciousness and intellect. The impulse toward union and harmony is present in all finite objects. The finite strives to pass out of itself. All objects of the universe are thus double-natured. "Whatever being is born, the unmoving or the moving, know thou, O best of the Bharatas, that to be owing to the union of Kshetra and Kshetragna (matter and spirit, finite and infinite) (Bhagavad Gita, xiii. 26). They are finite—infinite. The finiteness *qua* finiteness is a standing contradiction to the infiniteness. The presence of the infinite enables the individual to break the finite and proceed higher up. It is by such a breaking of the shell of finiteness that the infinite self finds itself and develops. To gain the higher, we must give up the lower. Unless our little self is sacrificed, progress is not possible. Every step on the upward path of realisation means sacrifice of something else. This sacrifice, which means friction, opposition and pain, is the penalty we have to undergo in rising to ourselves on account of our finiteness.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Throughout we have these incidents in the growth of a soul. Pain and suffering are phases of all progress. The process of the life of self is also a process of death. To have the fruit we must sacrifice the flower, though it is hard and painful to sacrifice it. Evolutionary hedonism which makes the life-promoting process pleasant, is wrong, for all progressive processes from birth and teething onwards are frequently painful. The destructive ones like disease and vice, for example drinking and opium-eating, are pleasant. It is through suffering that man has to rise both physically and spiritually. Sorrow is the birthplace of the life of spirit. . . .

The Absolute is never in history completely revealed. The end of the world will come when the last man becomes divine. Then there will be no universe and no finiteness. As Schelling says, "God never is, if *is* means exhibition in the objective world, if God were, we should not be." Again, "The ultimate goal of the finite ego, and not only of it but of the non-ego—the final goal, therefore, of the world—is its annihilation as a world." As Bradley puts it: "Fully to realise the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible. In order thus to know we should have to be and then we should not exist." When we see Brahman we become Brahman. That is the verdict of the Vedanta philosophy. As finite, we cannot see, when we see, we become infinite. In the finite universe there will ever be approximation to the goal of reaching the infinite and never realisation. The absolute in this world is half dream, half reality. The universe is only a partial revelation of the Absolute. Knowledge is an infinite progress; morality, a ceaseless growth. That is why the Vedanta philosophy considers this finite world to be a beginningless and endless *Samsara*. . . . If the soul does not gain this height of spiritual splendour when it loses itself in the all, it will find itself again and again taking births in the finite universe, as a separate self with all the results of the past Karma entering into its nature. It will revolve in the wheel of births and deaths until it reaches the highest, when it gives up all subjection to time.

Pain and suffering then are necessary incidents in the development of a human soul, which, as given, is a discord. Man is at a parting of the ways. There is a conflict between the different elements, the higher and the lower. Man is the completion or fulfillment of the lower and the anticipation of the higher. But growth means the death of the lower and the birth of the higher self, and so it will be accompanied by the agony of death and the travail of birth. We have moral evil and sin

if the finite self assumes a false sufficiency and independence, and adopts a more or less indifferent, if not a hostile attitude to the universe at large. He is a sinner who, owing to imperfect understanding takes up a false defiant attitude to the not-self. He is an ignorant man who fails to recognize the incompleteness of the finite mind, and sets himself up as an independent and self-contained individual. . . . Evil is the separation of the soul from the source of life. Evil is as necessary as any other element in the universe. A universe without it will be a universe where the finite is swallowed up in the infinite. A mere infinite without finite is an impossible conception. Therefore evil is a permanent factor in the universe, challenging the fighter to come out, though it has no immortal life in the transcendent spirit.

The *Upanishads* present us with the elements of a philosophic system and thus try to satisfy a permanent want of human life. They give us the formulas by which we represent the nature of the one great Fact of Life, God. Perhaps they may not explain everything, but there is no question that later philosophy has only been a series of attempts to give a fuller form of expression to the suggestions of the *Upanishads*. We do not mean to say that the philosophy subsequent to the *Upanishads* made a conscious attempt to start with the Upanishadic ideal and develop it. What we urge is, the *Upanishads* being the earliest form of speculative idealism in the world, all that is good and great in subsequent philosophy looks like an unconscious commentary on the Upanishadic ideal, showing how free and expansive and how capable of accommodating within itself all forms of truth that ideal is.

Buddhism

Siddhārtha Gautama, the Buddha, was born about 560 B. C. near Kapilavastu, about a hundred miles north of Benares, and just within the border of modern Nepal. His father was a member of the Kshatriya caste and a petty chieftain of the Sākya tribe. The young "prince" was given the education that befitted his station, with special emphasis upon horsemanship and the arts of war. At the age of nineteen he was married to his cousin, "Princess" Yasodharā. Their son, Rāhula, later became a member of the Order.

As time went on Gautama became dissatisfied with his life of pleasure. He spent much time in meditation and brooded over the mystery of life's sorrows. Four experiences led immediately to his "great renunciation:" the sight of an old man, an ill man, a corpse, and a wandering monk. The first three exemplified the miseries of existence, the fourth suggested a possible way of escape. So at the age of twenty-nine Gautama turned his back on chieftainship, wife, and infant son, and set out in search of salvation.

Six years were spent in the pursuit of peace. He first sought help from various religious teachers who instructed him in the *Vedas* and *Upanishads*. Next, he tried ascetic practices and attracted five disciples who admired his perseverance. After practicing asceticism to the point of a complete physical breakdown, he turned to a "middle way;" that is, a simple life that would avoid the extremes of both luxury and asceti-

cism. This alienated his disciples, who left him and went to Benares. It was near Gaya, under the famous Bo-tree, that Gautama became the Buddha, or "Enlightened One." He here found the meaning of the world's sorrow and the way to cure it.

Following the Bo-tree experience Gautama resisted the temptation to enjoy his new-found wisdom in retirement and dedicated his remaining years to a life of service. His first journey was to Benares, where he won back the five disciples who had left him. The discourse which he held with them is known as his first sermon and contains the fundamentals of his doctrine in the form of Four Noble Truths. These include (1) *Dukkha*, the universality of suffering, (2) *Tanhā*, desire, thirst, or craving as the cause of suffering, (3) release from suffering through the crushing of desire, and (4) the Noble Eightfold Path, or effective "middle way" of crushing desire. The eight stages of the Path are "Right Belief, Right Aspirations, Right Speech, Right Conduct, Right Means of Livelihood, Right Endeavour, Right Memory, Right Meditation."¹ He who traverses this Path to the end becomes an Arhat and gains Nirvana. It will be noted that the Path to Nirvana is more ethical than the equivalent path presented in the Upanishads.

Closely connected with the teachings of *Dukkha* are the doctrines of *Anicca* and *Anattā*. *Anicca* is the teaching that all things are impermanent. Nothing abides, for everything is in a state of becoming. There is no First Cause or underlying substance. The never-ceasing life flux of *Samsāra* has only a momentary existence. According to *Anattā*, there is no such thing as a self or soul. An individual is merely a temporary combination of five skandhas, or "aggregates of existence:" the physical body, the feelings, ideas based on perception, volition, and consciousness. At death the skandhas fall apart, and that particular individual ceases to exist. This rejection of a self or soul necessitated a modification of the Hindu teaching of transmigration. In both the *Upanishads* and Buddhism the great goal is salvation from an endless succession of births and deaths. But whereas in the *Upanishads* there is a definite individual soul which persists until freed from the cycle by identifying itself with the Brahman, or Universal Soul, Buddhism knows no soul of any kind. Buddhism teaches that transmigration will continue wherever an individual at death is still burdened with desire. However,

¹*The Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XIII, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), p. 96.

it is only the person's predispositions, or the final results of past actions in his series of existences, which keep the Wheel of Life moving and start another existence. The Arhat, who at death has already eradicated all desire, finds in Nirvana complete release from the Wheel of Life.

The Hinayana Canon comes closer than any other set of Buddhist writings to a reliable presentation of Gautama's original teaching. At the First Council, which is said to have convened soon after Gautama's death, disciples recited from memory the teachings of their Master. These were finally recorded in the Pāli language about 80 B. C. under King Vattagāmani of Ceylon. The Canon was given the title of *Tripiṭaka*, or "Three Baskets." The *Vinaya-piṭaka*, or "Discipline-basket," contains the ordinances and regulations for members of the Buddhist Order. According to tradition, they were prepared by Gautama himself as the need arose. The *Sutta-piṭaka*, or "Discourse-basket," consists of discourses in prose and verse which were delivered either by Gautama or by one of his disciples. The *Abhidhamma-piṭaka*, or "Higher Doctrine-basket," contains seven books of dogmatic expositions and is presented as a higher doctrine of the mind.

The *Dhammapada*, or "Path of Virtue," from which the reprint following was taken, is a part of the *Sutta-piṭaka*. It is an anthology of Buddhist sayings in four hundred and twenty-three verses brought together some time after Gautama's death. The Third Council, which met under Asoka in 246 B. C., accepted the sayings as the utterances of Gautama himself. Many of them bear a close resemblance to passages in other Indian works, as for example, the *Mahābhārata*. Students of Buddhism will find it profitable to begin their study with this choice collection of ethical aphorisms. One can hardly expect to get any nearer to the Buddha and his personal teachings.

The three doctrines of *Dukkha*, *Anicca*, and *Anattā* are given due attention in the *Dhammapada*. For example, light is here thrown on Gautama's conception of Nirvana. Gautama had little to say about Nirvana: even when directly questioned on the subject, he usually remained silent. He seemed to fear lest questioners with little philosophic background might be tempted to turn from problems of right living to barren speculation.

Literally, Nirvana means "the blowing out" of the three fires of lust, ill-will, and dullness. Before death it brings to the Arhat a state of perfect peace and rest with no desire except for more of the same satisfaction. The concept of Nirvana after death is not so easily ascertained.

BUDDHISM

If one seeks for light from the involved *Abhidhamma-pitaka*, he finds there a conception of total annihilation. However, the two earlier pitakas present no such doctrine, and in the *Dhammapada* there are a number of passages which are in direct contradiction to that point of view. Immortality rather than destruction is indicated in verses 21 and 411. In verse 225 Nirvana is referred to as an "unchangeable place," and in verses 85, 348, 355, and 414 as "the other shore." The idea of something uncreated and eternal is presented in verses 97 and 383.

Gautama may have distinguished between an empirical self which ceases at death and an ultimate or transcendental self which endures outside *Samsāra*, the stream of becoming. While one could not attribute to such an ultimate self such categories as existence or consciousness, one could think of it in broad terms of enhanced spiritual being. This conception would be in harmony with the references in Gautama's Dialogues to previous existences of himself and his followers. On the other hand, it is possible that Gautama was thinking more in terms of absorption. The Arhat could at death achieve his final state of peace and spiritual perfection through absorption into ultimate reality, which for the Buddhist is an indefinable "Thusness" (*Tathatā*) devoid of all specific qualities.

Gautama made a significant contribution in the field of ethics. His Four Noble Truths reveal his chief ethical problem, that of finding a way of life which would put an end to suffering. When he counseled the crushing of desire, he had in mind the injurious cravings that cause suffering. There are, however, certain other joy-producing desires as set forth in the Noble Eightfold Path. These latter desires can be instrumental in conducting the individual toward the ultimate state of "no-desire." Gautama's famous Five Precepts, most of which were taken from Brāhmanic sources, were intended for monks and laymen alike. They forbid (1) the destruction of life, (2) theft, (3) unchastity, (4) falsehood, and (5) the use of intoxicating drinks. Laymen are to interpret the third precept as avoidance of adultery only.

While the layman cannot in this life hope to become fully enlightened and achieve Nirvana, he can, by his virtuous life, acquire sufficient merit to be reborn in one of the heavens and from there move on to complete enlightenment. Gautama's views on *Anicca* made him reject the idea of any First Cause or personal Creator. He did accept in a

¹Verses 30, 94, 95, 126, 177, 224, 236 and 417.

general way the Indian universe of his day with its many gods and demons dwelling in one of the heavens or hells. The selected readings from the *Dhammapada* contain a number of such references.¹ There is, of course, no use in looking to the gods for help, since they too are subject to the law of change. All the worlds of the gods, including the world of Brahman, must some day perish. Each person must work out his own salvation.

Buddhist ethics has both negative and positive features. The *Dhammapada*, with its emphasis upon sorrow, desire, and escape from existence is more concerned with the negative side. On the positive side, knowledge, self-control, and love are prominent.

Since Gautama believed that his chief mission was with the monks, it was natural that most of the discourses in the *Sutta-pitaka* should be addressed to them. Both knowledge and self-control are regarded as preliminary requirements for most of the other virtues. Knowledge must come at the very beginning of the moral life to overcome the evil of ignorance. Self-control is achieved through constant inner struggle. The one hundred and third verse of the *Dhammapada* states: "If one man conquer in battle a thousand times thousand men, and if another conquer himself, he is the greatest of conquerors." The last five of the Buddhist Ten Commandments, which were early accorded a place with the Five Precepts, were binding only on the monks. They forbid (6) eating at forbidden times, (7) attending worldly amusements, (8) using perfumes and ornaments, (9) sleeping on high beds, and (10) receiving money.

Gautama came closest to Christian ethical standards in his call for a disinterested love that would seek the welfare of all living beings. A person should not confine his love to those who love him. According to the fifth verse of the *Dhammapada*, ". . . hatred does not cease by hatred at any time: hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule." There is one outstanding difference between Gautama's emphasis and the Christian teaching of love. Christianity encourages the selfless love of one individual for another. This Gautama found undesirable because of the pain that inevitably accompanies all close human relationships. It is better to cultivate a general and impersonal love for all mankind. An Arhat can thus be benevolent and magnanimous and at the same time avoid needless suffering. More in harmony with the Christian point of view was the teaching of that influential Buddhist school of thought which came to be known as Mahayana.

Northern India witnessed a simultaneous development of the individualist Hinayana (small vehicle) school and a more universalistic Mahayana (great vehicle) school which departed farther from Gautama's original teachings. Hinayana doctrine traveled south and gained general acceptance in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, while Mahayana systems became predominant in Tibet, Mongolia, China, Korea, and Japan. The Mahayana scriptures were written chiefly in Sanskrit and reflect a theological and mystical point of view. The essential teachings of the school are found in *Saddharmapundarika*, or "The Lotus of the Good Law," *Vajracchedika*, or "The Diamond Cutter," the *Prajñā-pāramitāsūtras*, and the Land of Bliss Sūtras bearing the titles *Sukhāvativyūha*, or "A Complete Description of the Blessed Land," and *Amitāyurdhyāna*, or "The Meditation on Amitayus."

A comparison of the two schools at several points will make clear their chief differences. Hinayana has, in the first place, shown little interest in cosmic questions. It has raised Gautama to a position of preeminence but only to revere, not worship him. Mahayana, on the other hand, begins its speculation with an eternal Buddha essence of which Gautama is but one manifestation in human form. Many divine personalities are recognized and worshipped. In the second place, whereas Hinayana has always emphasized salvation for the few by self-effort, Mahayana offers salvation for all not only by knowledge but also by faith and devotion to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. The two schools hold equally divergent views on their ideal. We have noted that the Hinayana ideal is the self-centered Arhat who has achieved Nirvana. Mahayana prefers for its ideal self-sacrificing Bodhisattvas who, although emancipated and ready for Nirvana, postpone their entrance into the final state of Buddhahood in order that they may aid in the deliverance of all living creatures. Finally, Mahayana has something more to offer as a goal of existence than Nirvana. The northern school alone provides heavens and hells as places of future reward or punishment and worships Dhyani Buddhas as lords of various paradises. These future abodes, however, are not everlasting. Beyond them there still lies that final crowning goal, the indeterminate "Thusness" of Nirvana.

There are four major systems of Buddhist philosophy: *Sarvāstivāda*, *Satyasiddhi*, *Vijñaptimātra*, and *Mādhyamika*. Each one was developed by a dialectic of negation. The final product of the dialectic, the *Mādhyamika*, was, in point of time, the first system to be formulated. This is striking evidence of the Buddhist contention that truth is to be gained by

immediate apprehension and that the proper function of dialectic is merely to remove errors so that nothing will remain except the intuited truth.

The *Sarvāstivāda* was a Hinayanistic system of Realism formulated by Vasubandhu (420-500 A. D.). The Realism is apparent in the belief that external material objects are real. On the other hand, the principle of negation is applied to deny the reality of the persistent self.

The *Satyasiddhi* was a Hinayanistic system of Nihilism advocated by Harivarman (c. 250-350 A. D.). Here the principle of negation is advanced one step farther in a denial of the reality of both the persistent determinate self and the persistent determinate material object.

A second system to be formulated by Vasubandhu was the *Vijnaptimātra*, a Semi-Mahayanistic Idealism. This time Vasubandhu, in applying the principle of negation, came to the conclusion that only ideas are real. All particular things of the objective world are explained as content of the mind's *Ālaya-vijñāna*, or "receptacle consciousness," the highest or complete level of consciousness. It is through ignorance that man attributes independent reality to objects of the seven lower levels of consciousness. As time went on, there was a tendency to transform the *Ālaya-vijñāna* from an individual to a cosmic concept. In *The Awakening of Faith*, a work attributed to Asvaghosha (c. 100 A. D.), the ultimate cosmic principle is an Absolute known as *Bhūtataṭhātā*, or "Thusness." The Absolute *Bhūtataṭhātā* expresses itself in the form of the *Ālaya-vijñāna*. This idealistic emphasis did much to advance the Mahayana thesis that all things are partial manifestations of the one eternal Buddha essence.

It remained for the Mahayanist Nāgārjuna (c. 100-200 A. D.), the greatest of all Indian philosophers, to bring the dialectic of negation to its final conclusion in the Middle View of the *Mādhyamika*. As a means of overcoming ignorance and acquiring wisdom, Nāgārjuna advanced a theory of double truth: common-sense truth and higher truth. According to this theory, when a popular common-sense truth confronts a higher truth based on scientific investigation, the former truth absorbs the latter and becomes a new common-sense truth. This new common-sense truth then meets a still higher scientific truth and proceeds to merge with it. The process continues until all one-sided common-sense truths are denied and the highest truth of "Thusness" is reached. Nāgārjuna applied this theory of double truth to the problem of reality. Looking upon the Realistic *ens* ("All exists") as a common-sense truth and

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the Nihilistic *non-ens* ("nothing exists") as a higher truth, he proceeded to the highest truth by a denial of both. *Mādhyamika* takes the position that things neither exist nor do not exist. The *dharma*s, or elements that compose all things, are "empty" and hence represent only a relative reality. So long as one remains in a state of ignorance, appearances will be real. When, however, ignorance is dispelled, illusions vanish, and one is afforded an immediate experience of the ineffable reality that is behind appearances. This ultimate reality is *Sūnyatā*, a universal void, in the sense not of "nothingness" but of an "indeterminate" that is devoid of specific qualities. It was appropriate that *Nāgārjuna's* intellectual goal should be "O, to be nothing, nothing."

All the leading Buddhist systematizers had great respect for Gautama's original insight. Despite their differences, they gave common support to the three "seals" of Buddhism: "All is impermanence," "There is no soul," and "Nirvana is the only calm."

Another universally accepted tenet, the Principle of Causation,¹ requires some additional explanation. Buddhism rejects the idea of a single cause. All things in the universe are the result of two or more causes and are self-creating. Time is relative and assumes the form of a circle with no beginning and no end. Each life moves around the Wheel of Life in a series of Twelve Cycles of Causation. There is no such continuing entity as a soul: a living being is at all times in the process of change as it moves through the various cycles. Four types of causation are recognized: by Action-influence, by the Ideation-store, by "Thusness," and by the Universal Principle.

Action-influence is the force responsible for movement on the Wheel of Life. It is the stilled form of energy which remains after the action ceases. In explaining the operations of Action-influence, it is convenient to take a human being as an example and to begin with the cycles on the Wheel of Life called the Two Causes of the Past. The first of these cycles is Blindness. Following the death of an individual, the only thing that remains is the effects of the actions which that individual performed during the course of his life. This so-called Blindness produces blind activity, the effect of which appears in the next cycle known as Motive to Live.

¹A more detailed treatment is to be found in the chapter titled "Buddhism as a Philosophy of 'Thusness,'" by Junijirō Takakusu, in *Philosophy East and West*, edited by Charles A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 74-84.

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The Two Causes of the Past are followed by Five Effects of the Present when the individual, now in the process of taking form, is not completely responsible for his formation. The first of these five cycles is called Subconscious Mind and represents the first moment of the conception of a child. Cycle two, or Name-form, is the prenatal period when mind and body are united; cycle three, a third prenatal stage when the six organs of sense are developed; cycle four, the first two years after birth when the sense of touch predominates; and cycle five, the years three to five, when the child's individuality is recognized.

Next come the Three Causes of the Present, the cycles when the adult is responsible for self-creation. They are called Desire, Cleaving, and Formation of Being. The last of these cycles is the connecting link between the present and the future. Following death, a new round on the Wheel of Life begins at once and its quality is determined by the nature of the action on the preceding round.

Two additional cycles on the Wheel of Life are known as Two Effects of the Future: Birth and Old Age-Death. They refer, not to new progress of any kind, but merely to a repetition of life in the same order as already described. It is evident that past, present, and future must be regarded as relative terms. Actually, there is no past or future but only a present. In addition to the above mentioned Individual Action-influence by which individual beings are created, there is a Common Action-influence responsible for the production of various worlds.

Causation by Ideation-store explains the origin of action. According to Buddhist theory, the Ideation-store is that faculty of the mind where the seeds or ideas behind actions are stored. Whenever one of the seeds sprouts as an action, a new seed or idea is brought to the Ideation-store. Ideas and actions are mutually dependent and form the "Chain of Causation by Ideation." It is the Ideation-store which at death passes from one existence to another and determines the nature of the new life.

Causation by "Thusness" and Causation by the Universal Principle are closely related teachings. "Thusness" has already been considered in its static sense as the Ultimate indefinable reality. In its dynamic sense, "Thusness" manifests itself in the state of life and death and is thereby the origin of the Ideation-store. Causation by the Universal Principle is actually a philosophy of the totality of all existence in which "Thusness" is revealed in the interdependence of all things. In the ideal universe

that is to come, the "Lotus Store," all beings will be in a state of perfect harmony.

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CHAPTER II: On Earnestness¹

21. Earnestness is the path of immortality (Nirvâna), thoughtlessness the path of death. Those who are in earnest do not die, those who are thoughtless are as if dead already.

22. Those who are advanced in earnestness, having understood this clearly, delight in earnestness, and rejoice in the knowledge of the Ariyas (the elect)²

23. These wise people, meditative, steady, always possessed of strong powers, attain to Nirvâna, the highest happiness.

24. If an earnest person has roused himself, if he is not forgetful, if his deeds are pure, if he acts with consideration, if he restrains himself, and lives according to law,—then his glory will increase.

25. By rousing himself, by earnestness, by restraint and control, the wise man may make for himself an island which no flood can overwhelm.

26. Fools follow after vanity, men of evil wisdom. The wise man keeps earnestness as his best jewel.

27. Follow not after vanity, nor after the enjoyment of love and lust! He who is earnest and meditative, obtains ample joy.

28. When the learned man drives away vanity by earnestness, he, the wise, climbing the terraced heights of wisdom, looks down upon the fools, serene he looks upon the toiling crowd, as one that stands on a mountain looks down upon them that stand upon the plain.

29. Earnest among the thoughtless, awake among the sleepers, the wise man advances like a racer, leaving behind the hack.

30. By earnestness did Maghavan (Indra) rise to the lordship of

¹Reprinted from F. Max Müller, *The Dhammapada* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881).

²"The elect" has reference to Gautama and other teachers.

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the gods. People praise earnestness; thoughtlessness is always blamed.

31. A Bhikshu (mendicant) who delights in earnestness, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, moves about like fire, burning all his fetters, small or large.

32. A Bhikshu (mendicant) who delights in reflection, who looks with fear on thoughtlessness, cannot fall away (from his perfect state)—he is close upon Nirvāna.

CHAPTER VI: The Wise Man (Pandita)

76. If you see an intelligent man who tells you where true treasures are to be found, who shows what is to be avoided, and administers re-proofs, follow that wise man; it will be better, not worse, for those who follow him.

77. Let him admonish, let him teach, let him forbid what is improper!—he will be beloved of the good, by the bad he will be hated.

78. Do not have evil-doers for friends, do not have low people for friends: have virtuous people for friends, have for friends the best of men.

79. He who drinks in the law lives happily with a serene mind: the sage rejoices always in the law, as preached by the elect (Ariyas).

80. Well-makers lead the water (wherever they like); fletchers bend the arrow; carpenters bend a log of wood; wise people fashion themselves.

81. As a solid rock is not shaken by the wind, wise people falter not amidst blame and praise.

82. Wise people, after they have listened to the laws, become serene, like a deep, smooth, and still lake.

83. Good people walk on whatever befall, the good do not prattle, longing for pleasure; whether touched by happiness or sorrow wise people never appear elated or depressed.

84. If, whether for his own sake, or for the sake of others, a man wishes neither for a son, nor for the wealth, nor for lordship, and if he does not wish for his own success by unfair means, then he is good, wise, and virtuous.

85. Few are there among men who arrive at the other shore (become Arhats); the other people here run up and down the shore.

86. But those who, when the law has been well preached to them, follow the law, will pass across the dominion of death, however difficult to overcome.

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87, 88. A wise man should leave the dark state (of ordinary life), and follow the bright state (of the Bhikshu). After going from his home to a homeless state, he should in his retirement look for enjoyment where there seemed to be no enjoyment. Leaving all pleasures behind, and calling nothing his own, the wise man should purge himself from all the troubles of the mind.

89. Those whose mind is well grounded in the (seven) elements of knowledge, who without clinging to anything, rejoice in freedom from attachment, whose appetites have been conquered, and who are full of light, are free (even) in this world.

CHAPTER VII: The Venerable (Arhat)

90. There is no suffering for him who has finished his journey, and abandoned grief, who has freed himself on all sides, and thrown off all fetters.

91. They depart with their thoughts well-collected, they are not happy in their abode; like swans who have left their lake, they leave their house and home.

92. Men who have no riches, who live on recognised food, who have perceived void and unconditioned freedom (Nirvāna), their path is difficult to understand, like that of birds in the air.

93. He whose appetites are stilled, who is not absorbed in enjoyment, who has perceived void and unconditioned freedom (Nirvāna), his path is difficult to understand, like that of birds in the air.

94. The gods even envy him whose senses, like horses well broken in by the driver, have been subdued, who is free from pride, and free from appetites.

95. Such a one who does his duty is tolerant like the earth, like Indra's bolt; he is like a lake without mud; no new births are in store for him.

96. His thought is quiet, quiet are his word and deed, when he has obtained freedom by true knowledge, when he has thus become a quiet man.

97. The man who is free from credulity, but knows the uncreated, who has cut all ties, removed all temptations, renounced all desires, he is the greatest of men.

98. In a hamlet or in a forest, in the deep water or on the dry land, wherever venerable persons (Arahanta) dwell, that place is delightful.

99. Forests are delightful; where the world finds no delight, there

the passionless will find delight, for they look not for pleasures.

CHAPTER IX: Evil

116. If a man would hasten towards the good, he should keep his thought away from evil; if a man does what is good slothfully, his mind delights in evil.

117. If a man commits a sin, let him not do it again; let him not delight in sin; pain is the outcome of evil.

118. If a man does what is good, let him do it again; let him delight in it; happiness is the outcome of good.

119. Even an evil-doer sees happiness as long as his evil deed has not ripened; but when his evil deed has ripened, then does the evil-doer see evil.

120. Even a good man sees evil days, as long as his good deed has not ripened; but when his good deed has ripened, then does the good man see happy days.

121. Let no man think lightly of evil, saying in his heart, It will not come nigh unto me. Even by the falling of water-drops a water-pot is filled; the fool becomes full of evil, even if he gather it little by little.

122. Let no man think lightly of good, saying in his heart, It will not come nigh unto me. Even by the falling of water-drops a water-pot is filled; the wise man becomes full of good, even if he gather it little by little.

123. Let a man avoid evil deeds, as a merchant, if he has few companions and carries much wealth, avoids a dangerous road; as a man who loves life avoids poison.

124. He who has no wound on his hand, may touch poison with his hand; poison does not affect one who has no wound; nor is there evil for one who does not commit evil.

125. If a man offend a harmless, pure, and innocent person, the evil falls back upon that fool, like light dust thrown up against the wind.

126. Some people are born again; evil-doers go to hell; righteous people go to heaven; those who are free from all worldly desires attain Nirvâna.

127. Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed.

128. Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter

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into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where death could not overcome (the mortal).

CHAPTER XII: Self

157. If a man holds himself dear, let him watch himself carefully; during one at least out of the three watches¹ a wise man should be watchful.

158. Let each man direct himself first to what is proper, then let him teach others; thus a wise man will not suffer.

159. If a man make himself as he teaches others to be, then, being himself well subdued, he may subdue (others); one's own self is indeed difficult to subdue.

160. Self is the lord of self, who else could be the lord? With self well subdued, a man finds a lord such as few can find.

161. The evil done by oneself, self-begotten, self-bred, crushes the foolish, as a diamond breaks a precious stone.

162. He whose wickedness is very great brings himself down to that state where his enemy wishes him to be, as a creeper does with the tree which it surrounds.

163. Bad deeds, and deeds hurtful to ourselves, are easy to do; what is beneficial and good, that is very difficult to do.

164. The foolish man who scorns the rule of the venerable (Arahat), of the elect (Ariya), of the virtuous, and follows false doctrine, he bears fruit to his own destruction, like the fruits of the Karthaka reed.²

165. By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself, no one can purify another.

166. Let no one forget his own duty for the sake of another's, however great; let a man, after he has discerned his own duty, be always attentive to his duty.

CHAPTER XIII: The World

167. Do not follow the evil law! Do not live on in thoughtlessness! Do not follow false doctrine! Be not a friend of the world.

168. Rouse thyself! do not be idle! Follow the law of virtue! The virtuous rests in bliss in this world and in the next.

¹The three stages of life.

²This reed dies after it has borne fruit.

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169. Follow the law of virtue; do not follow that of sin. The virtuous rests in bliss in this world and in the next.

170. Look upon the world as a bubble, look upon it as a mirage; the king of death does not see him who thus looks down upon the world.

171. Come, look at this glittering world, like unto a royal chariot; the foolish are immersed in it, but the wise do not touch it.

172. He who formerly was reckless and afterwards became sober, brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from clouds.

173. He whose evil deeds are covered by good deeds, brightens up this world, like the moon when freed from clouds.

174. This world is dark, few only can see here; a few only go to heaven, like birds escaped from the net.

175. The swans go on the path of the sun, they go through the ether by means of their miraculous power; the wise are led out of this world, when they have conquered Māra¹ and his train.

176. If a man has transgressed one law, and speaks lies, and scoffs at another world, there is no evil he will not do.

177. The uncharitable do not go to the world of the gods; fools only do not praise liberality; a wise man rejoices in liberality, and through it becomes blessed in the other world.

CHAPTER XIV: The Budda (The Awakened)²

178. Better than sovereignty over the earth, better than going to heaven, better than lordship over all worlds, is the reward of the first step in holiness.

179. He whose conquest is not conquered again, into whose conquest no one in this world enters, by what track can you lead him, the Awakened, the Omniscient, the trackless?

180. He whom no desire with its snares and poisons can lead astray, by what track can you lead him, the Awakened, the Omniscient, the trackless?

181. Even the gods envy those who are awakened and not forgetful, who are given to meditation, who are wise, and who delight in the repose of retirement (from the world).

182. Difficult (to obtain) is the conception of men, difficult is the

¹The "tempter" or "evil spirit."

²The reference is to any one who has attained complete knowledge.

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life of mortals, difficult is the hearing of the True Law, difficult is the birth of the Awakened (the attainment of Buddhahood).

183. Not to commit any sin, to do good, and to purify one's mind, that is the teaching of (all) the Awakened.

184. The Awakened call patience the highest penance, long-suffering the highest Nirvāṇa; for he is not an anchorite (*pravragita*) who strikes others, he is not an ascetic (*sramana*) who insults others.

185. Not to blame, not to strike, to live restrained under the law, to be moderate in eating, to sleep and sit alone, and to dwell on the highest thoughts,—this is the teaching of the Awakened.

186. There is no satisfying lusts, even by a shower of gold pieces; he who knows that lusts have a short taste and cause pain, he is wise.

187. Even in heavenly pleasures he finds no satisfaction, the disciple who is fully awakened delights only in the destruction of all desires.

188. Men, driven by fear, go to many a refuge, to mountains and forests, to groves and sacred trees.

189. But that is not a safe refuge, that is not the best refuge; a man is not delivered from all pains after having gone to that refuge.

190. He who takes refuge with Buddha, the Law, and the Church; he who, with clear understanding, sees the four holy truths:—

191. Viz. pain, the origin of pain, the destruction of pain, and the eightfold holy way that leads to the quieting of pain;—

192. That is the safe refuge, that is the best refuge; having gone to that refuge, a man is delivered from all pain.

193. A supernatural person (a Buddha) is not easily found, he is not born everywhere. Wherever such a sage is born, that race prospers.

194. Happy is the arising of the awakened, happy is the teaching of the True Law, happy is peace in the church, happy is the devotion of those who are at peace.

195, 196. He who pays homage to those who deserve homage, whether the awakened (Buddha) or their disciples, those who have overcome the host (of evils), and crossed the flood of sorrow, he who pays homage to such as have found deliverance and know no fear, his merit can never be measured by anybody.

CHAPTER XV: Happiness

197. Let us live happily then, not hating those who hate us! among men who hate us let us dwell free from hatred!

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198. Let us live happily then, free from ailments among the ailing! among men who are ailing let us dwell free from ailments!

199. Let us live happily then, free from greed among the greedy! among men who are greedy let us dwell free from greed!

200. Let us live happily then, though we call nothing our own! We shall be like the bright gods, feeding on happiness!

201. Victory breeds hatred, for the conquered is unhappy. He who has given up both victory and defeat, he, the contented, is happy.

202. There is no fire like passion; there is no losing throw like hatred; there is no pain like this body; there is no happiness higher than rest.

203. Hunger is the worst of diseases, the body the greatest of pains; if one knows this truly, that is Nirvâna, the highest happiness.

204. Health is the greatest of gifts, contentedness the best riches; trust is the best of relationships, Nirvâna the highest happiness.

205. He who has tasted the sweetness of solitude and tranquillity, is free from fear and free from sin, while he tastes the sweetness of drinking in the law.

206. The sight of the elect (Arya) is good, to live with them is always happiness; if a man does not see fools, he will be truly happy.

207. He who walks in the company of fools suffers a long way; company with fools, as with an enemy, is always painful; company with the wise is pleasure, like meeting with kinsfolk.

208. Therefore, one ought to follow the wise, the intelligent, the learned, the much enduring, the dutiful, the elect; one ought to follow a good and wise man as the moon follows the path of the stars.

CHAPTER XVII: Anger

221. Let a man leave anger, let him forsake pride, let him overcome all bondage! No sufferings befall the man who is not attached to name and form, and who calls nothing his own.

222. He who holds back rising anger like a rolling chariot, him I call a real driver; other people are but holding the reins.

223. Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth!

224. Speak the truth, do not yield to anger; give, if thou art asked for little; by these three steps thou wilt go near the gods.

225. The sages who injure nobody, and who always control their body, they will go to the unchangeable place (Nirvâna), where, if they have gone, they will suffer no more.

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226. Those who are ever watchful, who study day and night, and who strive after Nirvâna, their passions will come to an end.

227. This is an old saying, O Atula, this is not only of to-day: "They blame him who sits silent, they blame him who speaks much, they also blame him who says little; there is no one on earth who is not blamed."

228. There never was, there never will be, nor is there now, a man who is always blamed, or a man who is always praised.

229, 230. But he whom those who discriminate praise continually day after day, as without blemish, wise, rich in knowledge and virtue, who would dare to blame him, like a coin made of gold from the Gambû river? Even the gods praise him, he is praised even by Brahman.

231. Beware of bodily anger, and control the body! Leave the sins of the body, and with thy body practise virtue!

232. Beware of the anger of the tongue, and control thy tongue! Leave the sins of the tongue, and practise virtue with thy tongue!

233. Beware of the anger of the mind, and control thy mind! Leave the sins of the mind, and practise virtue with thy mind!

234. The wise who control their body, who control their tongue, the wise who control their mind, are indeed well controlled.

273. The best of ways is the eightfold; the best of truths the four words; the best of virtues passionlessness; the best of men he who has eyes to see.

274. This is the way, there is no other that leads to the purifying of intelligence. Go on this way! Everything else is the deceit of Mâra (the tempter).

275. If you go on this way, you will make an end of pain! The way was preached by me, when I had understood the removal of the thorns (in the flesh).

276. You yourself must make an effort. The Tathâgatas (Buddhas) are only preachers. The thoughtful who enter the way are freed from the bondage of Mâra.

277. "All created things perish," he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain; this is the way to purity.

278. "All created things are grief and pain," he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain; this is the way that leads to purity.

279. "All forms are unreal," he who knows and sees this becomes passive in pain; this is the way that leads to purity.

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280. He who does not rouse himself when it is time to rise, who, though young and strong, is full of sloth, whose will and thought are weak, that lazy and idle man will never find the way to knowledge.

281. Watching his speech, well restrained in mind, let a man never commit any wrong with his body! Let a man but keep these three roads of action clear, and he will achieve the way which is taught by the wise.

282. Through zeal knowledge is gotten, through lack of zeal knowledge is lost; let a man who knows this double path of gain and loss thus place himself that knowledge may grow.

283. Cut down the whole forest (of lust), not a tree only! Danger comes out of the forest (of lust). When you have cut down both the forest (of lust) and its undergrowth, then, Bhikshus, you will be rid of the forest and free!

284. So long as the love of man towards women, even the smallest, is not destroyed, so long is his mind in bondage, as the calf that drinks milk is to its mother.

285. Cut out the love of self, like an autumn lotus, with thy hand! Cherish the road of peace. Nirvâna has been shown by Sugata (Buddha).

286. "Here I shall dwell in the rain, here in winter and summer," thus the fool meditates, and does not think of his death.

287. Death comes and carries off that man, praised for his children and flocks, his mind distracted, as a flood carries off a sleeping village.

288. Sons are no help, nor a father, nor relations; there is no help from kinsfolk for one whom death has seized.

289. A wise and good man who knows the meaning of this, should quickly clear the way that leads to Nirvâna.

CHAPTER XXIII: The Elephant¹

320. Silently shall I endure abuse as the elephant in battle endures the arrow sent from the bow: for the world is ill-natured.

321. They lead a tamed elephant to battle, the king mounts a tamed elephant; the tamed is the best among men, he who silently endures abuse.

322. Mules are good, if tamed, and noble Sindhu horses, and elephants with large tusks; but he who tames himself is better still.

323. For with these animals does no man reach the untrodden coun-

¹Buddhists see in the elephant a symbol of self-restraint and endurance. Gautama is sometimes referred to as "the Elephant".

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try (Nirvâna), where a tamed man goes on a tamed animal, viz. on his own well-tamed self.

324. The elephant called Dhanapâlaka, his temples running with sap, and difficult to hold, does not eat a morsel when bound; the elephant longs for the elephant grove.

325. If a man becomes fat and a great eater, if he is sleepy and rolls himself about, that fool, like a hog fed on wash, is born again and again.

326. This mind of mine went formerly wandering about as it liked, as it listed, as it pleased; but I shall now hold it in thoroughly, as the rider who holds the hook holds in the furious elephant.

327. Be not thoughtless, watch your thoughts! Draw yourself out of the evil way, like an elephant sunk in mud.

328. If a man finds a prudent companion who walks with him, is wise, and lives soberly, he may walk with him, overcoming all dangers, happy, but considerate.

329. If a man finds no prudent companion who walks with him, is wise, and lives soberly, let him walk alone, like a king who has left his conquered country behind,—like an elephant in the forest.

330. It is better to live alone, there is no companionship with a fool; let a man walk alone, let him commit no sin, with few wishes, like an elephant in the forest.

CHAPTER XXIV: Thirst

334. The thirst of a thoughtless man grows like a creeper; he runs from life to life, like a monkey seeking fruit in the forest.

335. Whomsoever this fierce thirst overcomes, full of poison, in this world, his sufferings increase like the abounding Birana grass.

336. He who overcomes this fierce thirst, difficult to be conquered in this world, sufferings fall off from him, like water-drops from a lotus leaf.

337. This salutary word I tell you, "Do ye, as many as are here assembled, dig up the root of thirst, as he who wants the sweet-scented Usîra root must dig up the Birana grass, that Mâra (the tempter) may not crush you again and again, as the stream crushes the reeds."

338. As a tree, even though it has been cut down, is firm so long as its root is safe, and grows again, thus, unless the feeders of thirst are destroyed, this pain (of life) will return again and again.

339. He whose thirst running towards pleasure is exceeding strong

in the thirty-six channels, the waves will carry away that misguided man, viz. his desires which are set on passion.

340. The channels run everywhere, the creeper (of passion) stands sprouting; if you see the creeper springing up, cut its root by means of knowledge.

341. A creature's pleasures are extravagant and luxurious; sunk in lust and looking for pleasure, men undergo (again and again) birth and decay.

342. Men, driven on by thirst, run about like a snared hare; held in fetters and bonds; they undergo pain for a long time, again and again.

343. Men, driven on by thirst, run about like a snared hare; let therefore the mendicant drive out thirst, by striving after passionlessness for himself.

344. He who having got rid of the forest (of lust) (i.e. after having reached Nirvâna) gives himself over to forest-life (i.e. to lust), and who, when removed from the forest (i.e. from lust), runs to the forest (i.e. to lust), look at that man! though free, he runs into bondage.

345. Wise people do not call that a strong fetter which is made of iron, wood, or hemp; far stronger is the care for precious stones and rings, for sons and a wife.

346. That fetter wise people call strong which drags down, yields, but is difficult to undo; after having cut this at last, people leave the world, free from cares, and leaving desires and pleasures behind.

347. Those who are slaves to passions, run down with the stream (of desires), as a spider runs down the web which he has made himself; when they have cut this at last, wise people leave the world, free from cares, leaving all affection behind.

348. Give up what is before, give up what is behind, give up what is in the middle, when thou goest to the other shore of existence; if thy mind is altogether free, thou wilt not again enter into birth and decay.

349. If a man is tossed about by doubts, full of strong passions, and yearning only for what is delightful, his thirst will grow more and more, and he will indeed make his fetters strong.

350. If a man delights in quieting doubts, and, always reflecting, dwells on what is not delightful (the impurity of the body, &c.), he certainly will remove, nay, he will cut the fetter of Mâra.

351. He who has reached the consummation, who does not tremble, who is without thirst and without sin, he has broken all the thorns of life: this will be his last body.

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352. He who is without thirst and without affection, who understands the words and their interpretation, who knows the order of letters (those which are before and which are after), he has received his last body, he is called the great sage, the great man.

353. "I have conquered all, I know all, in all conditions of life I am free from taint; I have left all, and through the destruction of thirst I am free; having learnt myself, whom shall I teach?"

354. The gift of the law exceeds all gifts; the sweetness of the law exceeds all sweetness; the delight in the law exceeds all delights; the extinction of thirst overcomes all pain.

355. Pleasures destroy the foolish, if they look not for the other shore; the foolish by his thirst for pleasures destroys himself, as if he were his own enemy.

CHAPTER XXVI: The Brâhmana (Arhat)

383. Stop the stream valiently, drive away the desires, O Brâhmana! When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you will understand that which was not made.

384. If the Brâhmana has reached the other shore in both laws (in restraint and contemplation), all bonds vanish from him who has obtained knowledge.

385. He for whom there is neither this nor that shore, nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brâhmana.

386. He who is thoughtful, blameless, settled, dutiful, without passions, and who has attained the highest end, him I call indeed a Brâhmana.

387. The sun is bright by day, the moon shines by night, the warrior is bright in his armour, the Brâhmana is bright in his meditation; but Buddha, the Awakened, is bright with splendour day and night. . . .

399. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who, though he has committed no offence, endures reproach, bonds, and stripes, who has endurance for his force, and strength for his army.

400. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who is free from anger, dutiful, virtuous, without appetite, who is subdued, and has received his last body.

401. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who does not cling to pleasures, like water on a lotus leaf, like a mustard seed on the point of a needle.

402. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who, even here, knows the end of his sufferings, has put down his burden and is unshackled.

403. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana whose knowledge is deep, who

possesses wisdom, who knows the right way and the wrong, and has attained the highest end.

404. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who keeps aloof both from laymen and from mendicants, who frequents no houses, and has but few desires.

405. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who finds no fault with other beings, whether feeble or strong, and does not kill nor cause slaughter.

406. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who is tolerant with the intolerant, mild with fault-finders, and free from passion among the passionate.

407. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana from whom anger and hatred, pride and envy have dropt like a mustard seed from the point of a needle.

408. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who utters true speech, instructive and free from harshness, so that he offend no one.

409. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who takes nothing in the world that is not given him, be it long or short, small or large, good or bad.

410. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who fosters no desires for this world or for the next, has no inclinations, and is unshackled.

411. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who has no interests, and when he has understood (the truth), does not say How, how? and who has reached the depth of the Immortal.

412. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who in this world is above good and evil, above the bondage of both, free from grief, from sin, and from impurity.

413. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who is bright like the moon, pure, serene, undisturbed, and in whom all gaiety is extinct.

414. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who has traversed this miry road, the impassable world and its vanity, who has gone through, and reached the other shore, is thoughtful, guileless, free from doubts, free from attachment, and content.

415. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who in this world, leaving all desires, travels about without a home, and in whom all concupiscence is extinct.

416. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who, leaving all longings, travels about without a home, and in whom all covetousness is extinct.

417. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who, after leaving all bondage to men, has risen above all bondage to the gods, and is free from all and every bondage.

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418. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who has left what gives pleasure and what gives pain, who is cold, and free from all germs (of renewed life), the hero who has conquered all the worlds.

419. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who knows the destruction and the return of beings everywhere, who is free from bondage, wellfaring (Sugata), and awakened (Buddha).

420. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana whose path the gods do not know, nor spirits (Gandharvas), nor men, whose passions are extinct, and who is an Arhat (venerable).

421. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who calls nothing his own, whether it be before, behind, or between, who is poor, and free from the love of the world.

422. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana, the manly, the noble, the hero, the great sage, the conqueror, the impassible, the accomplished, the awakened.

423. Him I call indeed a Brâhmana who knows his former abodes, who sees heaven and hell, has reached the end of births, is perfect in knowledge, a sage, and whose perfections are all perfect.

Tibetan Buddhism

Lest the reader should conclude that Buddhism, once it fell from power in India, found supporters only in China or in Japan, let it be said that Buddhism, of all the Asiatic faiths, has probably been the most international.

It is true that today there are only some 300,000 Buddhists in India, the land of origin of Buddhism. The spiritual descendants of the Buddha, however, are numbered in many lands, in Ceylon, Siam, Tibet, and Burma, as well as in China and Japan. Yale scholar John Clark Archer says in his *Faiths Men Live By*¹ that as compared with Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism are provincial!

While in the brief compass of this work it is entirely impossible to treat of Gautama's teachings as they spread to the various nations, a word will be said of Buddhism, or *Lamaism*, as it is found in Tibet.² In that little-known land, Lamaism includes the entire population.

Buddhism entered Tibet in the middle of the seventh century. A king, reigning at that time, married a Buddhist princess, and the royal marriage marks the earliest beginning of Buddhism as a religion there.

¹*Faiths Men Live By* (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1934)

²For a particularly concise and lucid treatment of Buddhism in Tibet see Chapter X, pp. 174-181, *Religion in Human Experience* by John R. Everett. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950).

King Thi-Srong-Detsan, a later ruler, encouraged the growth of this new thought by inviting Buddhist Scholars to come to Tibet and spread its teachings.

One of the most interesting of the ancient Tibetan documents is the Tibetan Book of the Dead, or Bardo Thödol. It was compiled by the early Buddhists in the first centuries of Lamaism and provides instruction on the science of death. It was written as a guide book for the dying and contains detailed instructions for their conduct during the forty-nine days before reincarnation and union with the divine. In accordance with the teachings of the Tibetan Buddhists, the Bardo Thödol is read to the dying man as he passes into the Unknown Land.

It is available in an excellent English translation by the learned Oxford scholar, Dr. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, who collaborated with the Lama Kazi Dawa-Samdup in rendering it into our language. The excerpts following, taken from the translation just mentioned, can provide but the slightest appreciation of this very remarkable book.

Tibetan Book of The Dead

Bardo Thödol¹

O nobly born, the time has now come for you to seek the Path of Reality. Your breathing is about to cease.

Your teacher has set you face to face with the Clear Light, and now you are about to experience it in its reality, wherein all things are like the void and cloudless sky, and the naked spotless intellect resembles a transparent vacuum without circumference or center.

At this moment know Yourself and abide in that state.

O nobly born, that which is called Death now being come to you, resolve thus:

"O, this is now the hour of death! By taking advantage of this death I will so act for the good of all sentient beings as to obtain the Perfect Awakening by resolving on love and compassion toward them

¹Reprinted from *The Tibetan Book of the Dead*, by Dr. W. Y. Evans-Wentz, (London: Oxford University Press, 1927) with the permission of the author and publishers.

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and by directing my effort to the Sole Perfection."

Reverend Sir, now that you are experiencing the Clear Light, try to abide in that state. Recognize it, O nobly born, listen!

Your present intellect is the Very Reality, the All Good. Recognize the voidness of your intellect, for that is Awakening, and so keep yourself in the Divine Mind of the Buddha.

Death comes to all. Do not cling in fondness or weakness to this life. There is no power in you to remain here. Be not attached to this world. Be not weak. Remember the Holy Trinity of the Buddha, the Law, and the Assembly. Bearing these words in heart, go forward.

When your body and mind were separating, you experienced a glimpse of the Pure Truth, subtle, sparkling, bright, glorious, and radiantly awful; in appearance like a mirage moving across a landscape in springtime, in one ceaseless flow of vibrations. Be not daunted, nor terrified, nor awed. That is the radiance of your own true nature. Realize it!

From the midst of that Radiance, roaring like a thousand thunders, Reality will come. That is the sound of your own True Self. Be not daunted.

Since you have no longer a material body, sounds, sights, and rays cannot hurt you, harm you. It is sufficient for you to know that all apparitions are but your own thought-forms.

O nobly born, if you do not now recognize your own thought-forms, the lights will daunt you, the sounds will awe you, the rays will terrify you. Should you not understand this you will have to wander in re-birth.

Chinese Philosophy and Confucius

There are a number of important schools in Chinese philosophy, the growth (and even decline) of which has taken place in three fairly discernible periods. We have first a period extending from the sixth to the second century B. C. characterized by the development of Confucianism, Taoism, and Mohism as well as the less prominent schools of Sophism, Neo-Mohism, Legalism and Interactionism.¹ A second historical period, roughly the millenium extending from the second century B. C. to the eleventh century A. D., witnessed first of all, and most significantly, the introduction and growth of Buddhism in China, as well as the interaction of the indigenous schools of thought. A final period, from the eleventh century to the present, is characterized by the development of Neo-Confucianism and in our own period by the growing influence of Western thought in forming and reforming the older Chinese philosophical thinking. Throughout the long history of Chinese philosophy, the thoughtful reader is able to discern a certain synthesis of old with new and of foreign thinking with China's own thought.²

¹These were of course not the only schools. From the 5th to the 3rd century B.C. there flourished the "Hundred Schools," each with a doctrine of its own and united, if at all, only in their common search for the good life.

²For a very brief summary of Chinese philosophy see the chapter titled "Story of Chinese Philosophy," by Chan Wing-tsit, in *Philosophy East*

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In the main, China stands in strange contrast to India. India is speculative, metaphysical, pessimistic, whereas China is practical, non-metaphysical and optimistic. India has concentrated on such concepts as Brahman, maya, nirvana. China has stressed instead man, his nature, problems, and virtue. Such humanism originated in a practical endeavor to bring back the "good old days" in order to rid the world of chaotic evil. It therefore presented itself as a traditional propriety and bequeathed itself to history as a fine way of life and morals. Even where metaphysical and mystical trends put in appearance in such rival schools as Taoism or Mohism there was no abandoning of humanism but a re-thinking of the significance of man in the light of other concepts such as Tao and God.

Humanism, as a movement in Chinese philosophy may be regarded as beginning historically with Confucius, and since the latter portion of this chapter will be concerned with an outline of Confucian philosophy, we will temporarily pass over this very significant part of the history of Chinese philosophy. Similarly, a separate chapter is devoted to Mencius and his contribution to the development of Chinese philosophy in providing a psychological foundation for Confucian humanism.

Hsün Tzū (c. 355-288 B. C.), no less a humanist, diverged from the teachings of Mencius in his doctrine of the initial evil nature of man (Mencius taught the innate goodness of man) and of the necessity therefore for the training of man in self-improvement. Hsün Tzū advocated an extreme humanism calling not merely for a reasoned interest in nature but for the very control of nature. If man's nature was bad, he reasoned, then it was necessary to control his nature if he were to be made good.

A metaphysical foundation for Confucian humanism was provided, or at least attempted, in the fourth century B. C. in the *Chung Yung* (The Doctrine of the Mean). This book teaches that the basis for existence and the origin of moral obligation are to be found in the self as moral being.

The development of humanism in China, through the teaching of Confucius and his followers, was not to the exclusion of the growth of naturalism. This naturalism found expression in the teaching of Taoism, and *Wen*, edited by Charles A. Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 38-68. A more detailed treatment is to be found in Fung Yu-lan: *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), edited by D. Bodde.

Some scholars credit Lao Tzū (c. 570 B. C.)¹ with the founding of Taoism while others reserve that distinction for Yang Chu (c. 440-366 B. C.). Be that as it may, separate chapters are given to both Lao Tzū and Chuang Tzū in the present work. The reader should recall that both Confucian and Taoist thought should quite naturally (because of their influence) be considered before tracing the development of Mohism and the other schools. Since these latter, as well as the vast body of medieval and later Chinese philosophy, receive here but the briefest mention, they are next considered, and the treatment of Confucianism and Taoism, certainly out of order in a chronological sense, is reserved for later consideration.

Mohism teaches the doctrine of universal love. In common with Confucianism, it has man as its point of central interest. It differs from the Confucian body of teaching in that it is a very definitely *utilitarian* humanism. It places great emphasis upon wealth and population as the highest social goals, and by its pragmatic and utilitarian means of attaining its aim is interpreted as critical of the less materialistic systems, particularly that of Confucius. Mo Tzū, who lived sometime during the period between 500 and 396 B. C. is regarded as the founder of the school. He took as his motto: "Promote general welfare and remove evil," and therein is the key to the entire movement.

Mohism's temporary popularity was probably based on its doctrine of universal love. In this it is often likened to Christianity, yet the resemblance is superficial, for Mohism is strictly utilitarian. You should love everyone in order to get everyone to love you. The chief motive is not God's love, but the belief that love pays. Love will prevent war, greed and disloyalty. It will improve economic conditions and increase the population. While the will of God is not the great motive, yet love still represents the will of God. Thus Mohism was theistic, using religion as a support for ethics. Mo Tzū was a practical reformer, bitterly protesting against war, opposing Confucian ceremonialism, in particular expensive funerals.

The development of the Mohist school following the death of Mo Tzū (*Neo-Mohism*), in at least one of its aspects, sought to place Mohism on a logical basis. This development was prominent during the third and fourth centuries B. C. Coincident with and opposed to the Neo-Mohists were the *Sophists*, among whom Hui Shih (390-305

¹There is also a difference of opinion on this date: some contemporary authorities place the dates for Lao Tzū much later.

B. C.) and Kung-sun Lung (c. 400-300 B.C.) were prominent. These Sophists were concerned with knowledge—knowledge for its own sake. They were not concerned with the aspects of everyday living that provided the major field of inquiry for the Taoists and Confucianists and as a result they drew the critical fire of the latter. Hui Shih was interested in investigating the space and time concepts, the ideas of motion, rest, substance, qualities, and similar cosmological and metaphysical principles. It is obvious that the primary interests of the Sophists were far removed from the humanism, moralism and naturalism of the other schools.

The Sophists did, indirectly, force the Neo-Mohists to formulate a logical defense for their utilitarian humanism, and in *The Works of Mo Tzu*¹ we can discern the development of that logic in the formulation of various methods of argumenation, of the classification of names and similar disciplines. Continual development did not materialize however, for on the one hand there was the supreme interest in moralistic humanism of the Confucian scholars, as opposed to this infant intellectualism, and on the other, a distinct anti-intellectualism arising as the result of the naturalistic philosophy of Chuang Tzū² and others of the later Taoists.

The Yin-Yang school (*interactionism*) assumed particular importance at about this time through the teaching of the third century Tso Yen.³ Ssü-ma T'an (died c. 110 B. C.), one of the authors of the *Shih Chi* (Historical Records, the first great dynastic history of China), classified the Yin-Yang school as that of the cosmologists. A later historian, Liu Hsin (c. 46 B. C.—23 A. D.) places the origin of the Yin-Yang school among the occultists. It is a very old school and in early Chinese philosophy exerted much influence. Later much of its philosophical influence was lost, but there remained still a broad sphere of interactionist thought whose boundaries touched the other schools of thought.

Interactionism teaches that the Ultimate in the universe (Tai Chi) moves, and in moving generates *yang*,⁴ the active principle; it rests, and

¹Mo Tzu, Ch. XL-XLV, Mei Yi-pao (translator), *The Ethical and Political Works of Motse*, London, 1929.

²It sometimes approaches an extreme primitivism.

³Tso Yen, who lived soon after Mencius, wrote in history and geography.

⁴According to Fung Yu-lan, in *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, the original meaning of *yang* was "sunshine," and *yin* meant "the absence of sunshine, i. e. shadow or darkness."

in resting, generates *yin*, the passive principle. Alternately moving and resting, the *T'ai Chi* thus formed the world of creation. It is not a dualistic school, since yin and yang are regarded as two aspects of the same thing. The Many are ultimately One, and the One is perceptible in the diversity of the Many.

Yin and yang principles were the points of departure for the earliest medieval philosophies in China. Yin yang concepts were added to Taoism by Huai-nan Tzū in his search for a system of cosmology. These and the teachings of Tung Chung-shu (177-104 B. C.), who was a follower of Confucius, pointed out a correspondence theory in which all things possessed an innate correspondence since they were but different expressions of the primordial yin and yang principles. Eventually, as we have already seen, everything was reducible to one or the other of these two principles. A reactionary spirit evidenced itself in the person of Wang Ch'ung (c. 27-100 A.D.), who opposed these ideas of correspondence. For him yin yang revealed the necessity for the revival of a thorough naturalism based on reason as reinforced by a fundamentally critical spirit. Late medieval philosophy is marked by the absence of any very significant development of either Taoism or Confucianism with the possible exception of the teaching of the Taoist Kuo Hsiang (in the third century A. D.) and of the Confucian scholar Han Yü (767-834 A.D.).

Legalism, which properly belongs to the first of the three great periods as they have been defined at the beginning of this chapter, sought the ordering of society by legalistic means. It accepted the basic principles of Confucianism and thus grew out of and is related to this school. It goes beyond it, however, in seeking to provide the "means" of enforcing the rules of conduct according to the orthodox view on the members of society. In a word, it aimed at making "laws" of "rules." In other words, the rules of conduct should not be the subject of mere ritual application, but should be enforced by legalistic means in actual everyday living. This school rejected intellectualism, asking of what value were speculative theories of the cosmos while man and his conduct were yet a mystery.

Buddhism came to China in the medieval period and through the years assumed a synthetic character compounded of various elements originally Indian but so welded together in the Chinese environment as to be unmistakably of that latter country and the unique product of Chinese thought.

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The *Meditation School* (Zen or Ch'an) and the *Pure Land School* (Jōdo or Ching-t'u) are especially significant as Chinese creations within the Buddhist tradition. The former is the most significant of all the Buddhist schools in China. This method of direct intuition into the self in the search for Buddha-nature imposed meditation and quietism as a necessary discipline on the essentially humanistic Chinese mind. This imposition was eventually rejected, and its rejection brought about a recession of Zen influence which marked the close of the medieval period in the philosophy of China.

During the period of its greatest growth in China, Buddhism was not without opposition. Particularly critical were the Confucianists. This Neo-Confucianism, as it is usually called, developed in three movements: Sung philosophy (the Reason School) 960-1279 A. D., Ming philosophy (the Mind School) 1368-1644, and Ch'ing philosophy (the Empirical School) 1644-1911.

The central principle in the Reason School is the "Great Ultimate" and this "Great Ultimate" is the causative factor in the creation of the active and passive principles, yang and yin. Since yang and yin, by their interaction, are at the basis of all things the fundamental unity of all things is at once apparent. Many is thus finally One and the One is given varied form in the Many. Neo-Confucianism, unlike Buddhism and its basic Void, confirmed the existence of the particular within the universal. In other terms, the great Ultimate is identified with Reason and this latter (li) is the keynote of Neo-Confucianism. As its vehicle, Reason has vital force (ch'i). While Reason is the One, its operation via the principle of vital force makes possible the yang yin interaction and subsequent differentiation of the One into Many.¹ Chu Hsi (1130-1200) defined the Great Ultimate as "the Reason of ultimate goodness." The exhibited characteristics of the universe were interpreted by these Sung period Neo-Confucianists as the Reason of the Universe, and they urged that all things be investigated to discover their Reason. The discovery of these underlying reasons reveals a basic universal harmony, which engenders the moral order and a corresponding social order. This interpretation of man as a social being formed the foundation for at least one Neo-Confucian criticism of Buddhist teaching—while the Buddhist might separate himself from the family relationship, common

¹See, in particular, the writings of the Ch'eng brothers (11th century) and Chu Hsi (12th century).

sense and logical thought alike militated against the possibility of the individual man divorcing himself from human relationships entirely, for did not the Buddhist pupil have a master? As the Neo-Confucianists, having evolved an ethics based on self-development through the development of love for others, turned more and more within in stressing the importance of seriousness and meditation in attaining *jên*, (self-development through love of others, i. e. benevolence or what the sources term "true manhood") a correspondingly greater emphasis was placed upon the significance of mind.

This direction culminated in the doctrines of the Mind School (Ming philosophy). Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193) taught the identity of mind and universe. This idealism, in Wang Yang-ming (1473-1529), was interpreted as a confirmation of the innate and original goodness of man and since the Universe was Reason, and mind is the vehicle of Reason, then ultimate truth is to be discovered by the examination and exercise of mind. To discover mind untarnished by changes from its originally pure state, it must be in a state of repose and utter tranquility (note that Zen Buddhism was not without some influence in this aspect of the teachings of the Mind School). In its pure state the mind knows, by its innate characteristics, what is good and what is true. Knowledge of the good is thus inborn and an innate characteristic of the pure mind.¹

As frequently has been the case in the history of philosophy, an extreme idealism encountered a reaction and in this case it was at the hands of the Empirical School during the Ch'ing period. This constituted the third epoch in Neo-Confucianism and has extended from the mid-seventeenth century to virtually our own day. Tai Tung-yüan (1723-1777) elevated vital force, which the earlier Reason School regarded as corporeal and inferior to Reason, to a position of equality with the latter. He regarded both Reason and vital force as Moral Law. Harmony was established as the keynote in this empirical school and this basic harmony was regarded as extending into human nature. The demand for practical application of this harmony has been evidenced and the movement has been away from the earlier speculative philosophy and abstract metaphysics.

¹Again, the reader will find a particularly lucid account of the precepts of this Mind School written by Chan Wing-tsit in his section on "The Mind School", Lu-Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming in *Philosophy East and West*, pp. 62-65.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

In our own day the pressing need for a better socio-political solution for Chinese problems together with improved means of communication and the accompanying broader contact with the West, have resulted in the introduction of powerful Western currents of thought in contemporary philosophy in China. Dr. Hu Shih and his contemporaries are bringing about great changes in Chinese thinking. Despite the terrific impact of the Western schools, the fundamental Chinese precepts have survived. It is likely that the synthetic nature of Chinese thinking will once again manifest itself, and Western ideas will lose some of their identity in the process of absorption into the philosophy of China. Similarly, it is likely, and has to a degree already been demonstrated, that Chinese thinking will be materially changed by the products of Western thinking. It is of course impossible to say at this time just what influence the recently established Communist control of China will have on the Chinese philosophy of the future.

Confucianism and Taoism have been the most influential of all of the Chinese schools. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter and the three following chapters have been devoted to a more detailed discussion of these two great intellectual developments in the philosophy of the Orient.

Confucius, (the Latinized form of K'ung Fu Tzû The Master K'ung) styled by a Manchu emperor as the "perfect Sage," was born in the province of Lu (present Shantung) in ancient China, in the year 557 B.C. (?). He descended from an old family noted for its wisdom and valor.

Although little is known of his youth, we know that Confucius dedicated himself, at twenty-two, to the acquisition of wisdom, and started along the path that he was to follow for half a century to become the most illustrious of the Chinese sages. He founded a great school in which he taught history, poetry, literature, the proprieties, government, science, music and ethical philosophy, but avoided the supernatural. For one to thus philosophize apart from official position was a radical departure. Therefore, as inaugurator of the popularization of culture, Confucius set a landmark.

In maturity Confucius entered political life, traveling from state to state to offer his services to the reigning princes. Despite his aspirations he held public office for a relatively short period.

Confucius instilled in his followers the virtues of justice, sincerity, courtesy, benevolence and respect. He sought to combine ability and

virtue with high public office, (how like Plato's doctrine of the philosopher-king), and hoped to bring humanity to the elevated plane of existence which an acceptance of the lofty ideals of his ethical system would provide. One commentator has remarked of the teachings of Confucius, that they provide instructions on how to live a life like a gentleman. The good life is typified by the scholar (ju), the virtual equivalent of Plato's philosopher, i. e. not a learned man but a lover of wisdom who knows how to make wisdom effective in practical ways. The accounts of the death of Confucius record as his last remark his regret that no prince had employed his services for the betterment of the people.

Discouraged by his failure to practically apply his doctrine in governmental office and virtually unhonored, Confucius passed away in 479 B. C. Time brought him fame as the greatest name in Chinese philosophy. It is probably due to his influence more than to any other cause that Chinese philosophy has tended to be humanistic, stressing the human as object of primary concern, and looking for the real within oneself with the supposition that it is akin to nature.

Ch'un Ch'iu (Spring and Autumn) is the only book generally accredited to Confucius as an author, since most of his scholarly efforts consisted of editing the old literature. Many other works, written by his disciples and commentators are filled with the sayings and wisdom of Confucius.¹ Most important of these are the *Lun Yü* (The Analects), a collection of conversations assembled by Confucius' followers after his death, *The Great Learning*, *The Doctrine of the Mean*, and *The Sayings of Mencius*, the great apostle of Confucianism who lived two centuries after the master.

Confucius can best be understood as the Socrates of China. Both had a sense of divine mission in bringing reconstruction after a period

¹The "Confucian" Classics consist of nine separate sacred writings: *Book of History* (*Ssu Ching*), from the period of 2000 to 700 B.C., the *Book of Poetry* (*Shih Ching*), composed between 1800 and 600 B.C. and consisting of a total of 305 odes, the *Book of Changes* (*I Ching*), perhaps the oldest of all, details a system of philosophy based on combinations of diagrams signifying forces of nature, the *Book of Rites* (*Lí Chí*), dates from Confucian times but did not take final form until early in the Christian era, *Spring and Autumn* (*Ch'un Ch'iu*), contains a history of the state of Lu from the seventh to the fifth century B.C., parts of which were probably composed by Confucius himself, the *Analects* (*Lun-Yü*), the *Great Learning* (*Tah Hsüeh*), largely political-moral philosophy; the *Doctrine of the Mean* (*Chung Yung*), and the *Book of Mencius*.

of turmoil. Both were disinterested in metaphysics, being primarily concerned with ethical matters. Confucius also showed some of Socrates' tendency toward monotheism, though in lesser degree. In seeking a sure foundation for virtue, both Socrates and Confucius proceeded by definition, particularly with definitions of virtue. This was no mere regard for dictionary usage but a quest for ultimate universals. Since Confucius appears less agnostic than Socrates and believed that ethical definitions are ultimately correct it may even be that he goes beyond Socrates and approaches Plato's doctrine of Ideas or universal and invariable truths.

"Rectification of names" is thus the central doctrine of Confucius. As Plato asks whether there is an absolute justice to which we can conform, some Idea or eternal norm, so too Confucius implies objective validity and fixity for moral truths. He is troubled by the fact that the name "gentleman" is falsely taken by proud aristocrats. Good order then would require that the king live up to his title, the nobles live up to their names, for fathers to merit the name of father and for sons to be true sons. This comes close to Aristotle who said that a person deserves a name only when he fulfills its meaning, and that the name of man really applies only to one who has richly lived in a cultured society. The moral optimism of Confucius rests partly in the conviction that evil hides behind confusion, as when the lustful man calls his debauchery realism. If wise and stupid, good and evil ways are plainly called by their right names then men will not be able to tolerate their own evil.

In addition to being somewhat more Platonic than Socrates, Confucius also shows some differences in personality from his Greek counterpart. Socrates was more individualistic, dying as a critic of the state. Confucius was more traditionalist, glorifying the accepted etiquette, morals and ceremonies.

Confucian philosophy is a humanism, a philosophy about man. It may be characterized as follows. (1) It is non-metaphysical, avoiding the speculation about the world, matter, and the gods which is so typical of Indian thought. (2) Yet human affairs are thought to reflect the order (Tao) of Heaven, which is mysteriously purposive and moral even though rather impersonal and fatalistic. (3) True wisdom is to have a philosophy of life, i. e. to understand the mysteries of the human spirit. (4) Humanness, when rightly comprehended, is found to be nature's way. Virtue is natural, not artificial as Hobbes has argued; yet

it is not automatically present as Rousseau once thought. To be human is to be subject to natural growth. And this growth is not hindered by any stain or sin or of mysterious self-contradiction as a Pascal or St. Paul might contend. The only real obstacle in the way of perfect virtue is not having proper guidance, particularly governmental leadership.

(5) Becoming human is to be reasonable or to follow a golden mean (cf. Aristotle), avoiding fanaticism, and taking a middle course. Thus Confucian virtue lacks the colorful qualities of the hero, the knight or martyr, but it glorifies normalcy, the reasonable middle path between extremes. (6) The standard of humanness or reasonableness one finds within himself. What is called for is to be genuinely yourself, rather than submit to some external moral code. Thus Confucius inclines toward the relativism and individualism of a Protagoras. (7) This standard of naturalness is variable. It does not require the same conduct of all men. Thus to testify of a crime one's father has committed would not be natural, human, nor good.

(8) The best meaning of human-heartedness or naturalness is love. Virtue (*jên*) is "humanness in relation to others," from which it appears that love is self-satisfaction in that love of one's neighbor is part of one's search for what he himself desires. Although love is self-satisfaction it may call for self-denial since self-interest is sometimes self-destructive. (9) Love is essentially sympathy with the desires of others and therefore it does not renounce pleasure. Confucius is no ascetic. Erotic love is selective and responsive to its objects. Confucius would not agree with Mo Tzu that it pays to love all men; instead we should sympathize with the deserving. Confucius would also reject Christian love which paradoxically holds that one should love sinners, not because of what they are but because of the creative devotion in one's own heart. The Confucian view is that love means simply to cherish the good or that which satisfies, and correspondingly that hatred is the proper response to evil. We should be straightforward with enemies, said Confucius, but no more than that. If one requite enmity with kindness, how would he requite kindness?

(10) The all-inclusive rule of life is reciprocity, the "silver rule" as it has been called, a negative version of the golden rule. It is not to do to others what one would not like to have them do to him. (11) Human-heartedness manifests itself in good breeding, for a good heart without good conduct is fruitless. (12) Goodness prevails by superior men leading inferior men. Given a true king, the nation will soon

be righteous. Virtue is like gravity; it should work down from leaders to followers. (13) Good conduct should crystallize ritual, the traditional rites and ceremonies which form the historical body of culture-mores, the good manners which have acquired the sanctity of age.

The following aphorisms, constituting about a tenth of the *Analects*, include many of the crucial texts for an understanding of the philosophy of Confucius. These disconnected sayings, collected almost without any principle of order, must be thoughtfully pondered by the reflective mind; they are likely to leave the immature and casual readers unimpressed. To make them more readable the aphorisms, taken from Dr. James Legge's translation, have been put in topical order.¹

The Analects

1. CONFUCIUS

The Master said, "At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of heaven. At sixty my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth." (II.IV)

The Master said, "A transmitter and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients, I venture to compare myself with our old P'ang." (VII.I)

The Master said, "With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow;—I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honours acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a floating cloud." (VII.XV)

The duke of She asked Tsze-loo about Confucius, and Tsze-loo did not answer him. The Master said, "Why did you not say to him,—He is simply a man, who in his eager pursuit of knowledge forgets his food, who in the joy of its attainment forgets his sorrow, and who does not perceive that old age is coming on?" (VII. XVIII)

The subjects on which the Master did not talk, were—extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings. (VII.XX)

The Master said, "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me. Hwan Tui — what can he do to me?" (VII.XXII)

¹Reprinted from James Legge, *The Chinese Classics*, Part 1 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1882).

There were four things which the Master taught,— letters, ethics, devotion of Soul, and truthfulness. (VII.XXIV)

There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, and no egoism. (IX.IV)

The Master said, "There may be those who act without knowing why. I do not do so. Hearing much and selecting what is good and following it, seeing much and keeping it in memory; this is the second style of knowledge. (VII.XXVII)

Although his food might be coarse rice and vegetable soup, he would offer a little of it in sacrifice with a grave respectful air. (X.VIII)

When the villagers were going through their ceremonies to drive away pestilential influences, he put on his court robes and stood on the eastern steps. (X.X)

When the prince sent him a gift of cooked meat, he would adjust his mat, first taste, and then give it away to others. When the prince sent him a gift of undressed meat, he would have it cooked and offer it to the spirits of his ancestors. When the prince sent him a gift of a living animal, he would keep it alive. (X.XIII)

To any person in mourning he bowed forward to the cross-bar of his carriage; he bowed in the same way to any one bearing the tables of population. (X.XVI)

II. *HUMAN NATURE*

The Master went out, and the other disciples asked, saying, "What do his words mean?" Tsang said, "The doctrine of our master is to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others,— this and nothing more." (IV.XV)

The Master said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune." (VI.XVII)

The Master said, "Is virtue a thing remote? I wish to be virtuous and lo! virtue is at hand." (VII.XXIX)

The Master said, "I have not seen one who loves virtue as he loves beauty." (IX.XVII)

The Master said, "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart." (XVII.II)

III. *LEARNING AND WISDOM*

The Master said, "If a man keeps cherishing his old knowledge, so as to continually to be acquiring new, he may be a teacher of others." (II.XI)

The Master said, "When a man is not in the habit of saying — 'What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this? I can indeed do nothing with him!' (XV.XV)

Tsze-loo asked saying, "What qualities must a man possess to entitle him to be called a scholar?" The Master said, "He must be thus,— earnest, urgent, and bland: — among his friends, earnest and urgent; among his brothers, bland." (XIII.XXVIII)

The Master said, "Learning without thought is labour lost; thought without learning is perilous." (II.XV)

The Master said, "Yew, shall I teach you what knowledge is? When you know a thing, to hold that you know it; and when you do not know a thing to allow that you do not know it; — this is knowledge." (II.XVII)

The Master said, "Learn as if you could not reach your object, and were always fearing lest you should lose it." (VIII.XVII)

The Master said, "Do not be desirous to have things done quickly; do not look at small advantages. Desire to have things done quickly prevents their being done thoroughly. Looking at small advantages prevents great affairs from being accomplished." (XIII.XVII)

The Master said, "If a man take no thought about what is distant, he will find sorrow near at hand." (XV.XI)

The Master said, "There are only the wise of the highest class, and the stupid of the lowest class, who cannot be changed." (XVII.III)

The Master said, "I have been the whole day without eating, and the whole night without sleeping: — occupied with thinking. It was of no use. The better plan is to learn." (XV.XXX)

IV. *THE ETHICAL LIFE*

The Master said, "It is only the truly virtuous man, who can love, or who can hate, others." (IV.III)

The Master said, "Fine words, an insinuating appearance, and excessive respect;—Tso-k'ew Ming was ashamed of them. I also am ashamed of them. To conceal resentment against a person, and appear friendly with him;—Tso-k'ew Ming was ashamed of such conduct. I also am ashamed of it." (V.XXIV)

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Tsze-loo said, "The prince of Wei has been waiting for you, in order with you to administer the government. What will you consider the first thing to be done?" The Master replied, "What is necessary is to rectify names." "So, indeed!" said Tsze-loo. "You are wide of the mark. Why must there be such rectification?" The Master said, "How uncultivated you are, Yew! A superior man, in regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve. If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires, is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect." (XIII.III)

The duke of She informed Confucius, saying, "Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact." Confucius said, "Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this." (XIII.XVIII)

The Master said, "For a man to sacrifice to a spirit which does not belong to him is flattery. To see what is right and not to do it is want of courage." (II.XXIV)

The Master said, "Those who are without virtue, cannot abide long either in a condition of poverty and hardship, or in a condition of enjoyment. The virtuous rest in virtue; the wise desire virtue." (IV.II)

The Master said, "When we see men of worth, we should think of equalling them; when we see men of a contrary nature, we should turn inwards and examine ourselves." (IV.XVII)

Tsze-kung said, "What I do not wish men to do to me, I also wish not to do to men." (V.XI)

The Master said, "Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. Have no friends not equal to yourself. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them." (IX.XXIV)

The Master said, "To subdue one's-self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. Is the practice of perfect virtue from a man himself, or is it from others?" (XII.I)

The Master said, "Superior men, and yet not always virtuous, there have been, alas! But there never has been a mean man, and at the same time, virtuous." (XIV.VII)

The Master said, "He who speaks without modesty will find it difficult to make his words good." (XIV.XXI)

Some one said, "What do you say concerning the principle that injury should be recompensed with kindness?" The Master said, "With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness." (XIV XXXVI)

V. THE SUPERIOR MAN

The Master said, "The Superior man, in the world, does not set his mind either for any thing, or against any thing; what is right he will follow." (IV.X)

The Master said, "The superior man thinks of virtue; the small man thinks of comfort. The superior man thinks of the sanctions of law; the small man thinks of favours which he may receive." (IV.XI)

The Master said, "The superior man is easy to serve and difficult to please. If you try to please him in any way which is not accordant with right, he will not be pleased. But in his employment of men, he uses them according to their capacity. The mean man is difficult to serve, and easy to please. If you try to please him, though it be in a way which is not accordant with right, he may be pleased. But in his employment of men, he wishes them to be equal to everything." (XIII. XXV)

The Master said, "They who know the truth are not equal to those who love it, and they who love it are not equal to those who find pleasure in it." (VLXVIII)

The Master said, "The superior man, extensively studying all learning and keeping himself under the restraint of the rules of propriety, may thus likewise not overstep what is right." (VLXXV)

The Master said, "The wise are free from perplexities; the virtuous from anxiety; and the bold from fear." (IX.XXVIII)

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The Master said, "The superior man seeks to perfect the admirable qualities of men, and does not seek to perfect their bad qualities. The mean man does the opposite of this." (XII.XVI)

The Master said, "The superior man is affable, but not adulatory; the mean is adulatory, but not affable. (XIII.XXIII)

The Master said, "The superior man has a dignified ease without pride. The mean man has pride without a dignified ease." (XIII.XXVI)

The Master said, "What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others." (XV.XX)

The Master said, "The superior man is correctly firm, and not firm merely." (XV.XXXVI)

Tsze-kung said, "Has the superior man his hatreds also?" The Master said, "He has his hatreds. He hates those who proclaim the evil of others. He hates the man who, being in a low station, slanders his superiors. He hates those who have valour merely, and are unobservant of propriety. He hates those who are forward and determined, and, at the same time, of contracted understanding." (XVII.XXIV)

When he was in Ch'in, their provisions were exhausted, and his followers became so ill that they were unable to rise. . . . The Master said, "The superior man may indeed have to endure want, but the mean man, when he is in want, gives way to unbridled license." (XVI)

VI. PROPRIETIES AND FILIAL PIETY

The Master said, "A youth, when at home, should be filial, and abroad, respectful to his elders. He should be earnest and truthful. He should overflow in love to all, and cultivate the friendship of the good. When he has time and opportunity, after the performance of these things, he should employ them in polite studies." (I.VI)

The philosopher Tsang said, "Let there be a careful attention to perform the funeral rites to parents, and let them be followed when long gone with the ceremonies of sacrifice;—then the virtue of the people will resume its proper excellence." (I.IX)

The Master said, "While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when a father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial." (I.XI)

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"In festive ceremonies, it is better to be sparing than extravagant. In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow than a minute attention to observances." (III.III)

The Master said, "Where the solid qualities are in excess of accomplishments, we have rusticity; where the accomplishments are in excess of the solid qualities, we have the manners of a clerk. When the accomplishments and solid qualities are equally blended we then have the man of complete virtue." (VI.XVI)

The Master said, "Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness." (VIII.II)

The Master said, "When rulers love to observe the rules of propriety, the people respond readily to the calls on them for service." (XIV.XLIV)

Yen Tuen asked how the government of a country should be administered. The Master said, "Follow the seasons of Hea. Ride in the state carriage of Yin. Wear the ceremonial cap of Chow. Let the music be the Shaou with its pantomimes. Banish the songs of Ch'ing and keep far from specious talkers. The songs of Ch'ing are licentious; specious talkers are dangerous. (XV.X)

VII. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The Master was wishing to go and live among the nine wild tribes of the east. Some one said, "They are rude. How can you do such a thing?" The master said, "If a superior man dwelt among them, what rudeness would there be?" (IX.XIII)

"If a superior man love propriety, the people will not dare not to be reverent. If he love righteousness, the people will not dare not to submit to his example. If he love good faith, the people will not dare not to be sincere. Now, when these things obtain, the people from all quarters will come to him, bearing their children on their backs. What need has he of a knowledge of husbandry?" (XIII.IV)

The Master said, "If a truly royal ruler were to arise, it would still require a generation, and then virtue would prevail." (XIII.XII)

Tsze-kung asked saying, "What do you say of a man who is loved by all the people of his village?" The Master replied, "We may not for that accord our approval of him." "And what do you say of him who is hated by all the people of his village?" The Master said, "We may not for that conclude that he is bad. It is better than

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either of these cases that the good in the village love him, and the bad hate him." (XIII.XXIV)

Tsze-kung asked about friendship. The Master said, "Faithfully admonish your friend, and kindly try to lead him. If you find him impracticable, stop. Do not disgrace yourself." (XII.XXIII)

Confucius said, "There are three friendships which are advantageous, and three which are injurious. Friendship with the upright; friendship with the sincere; and friendship with the man of much observation;—these are advantageous. Friendship with the man of specious airs; friendship with the insinuatingly soft; and friendship with the glib-tongued: — these are injurious." (XVI.IV)

The Master said, "Of all people, girls and servants are the most difficult to behave to. If you are familiar with them, they lose their humility. If you maintain a reserve towards them, they are discontented." (XVII.XXV)

The Master said, "He who requires much from himself and little from others, will keep himself from being the object of resentment." (XV.XIV).

Ke K'ang asked Confucius about government, saying, "What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?" Confucius replied, "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evidenced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors, is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across it." (XII.XIX).

"When a country is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of. When a country is ill governed, riches and honour are things to be ashamed of." (VIII.XIII)

Tsze-kung asked about government. The Master said, "The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler. Tsze-kung said, "If it cannot be helped, and one of these must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?" "The military equipment," said the Master. Tsze-kung again asked, "If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be foregone?" The Master answered, "Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no standing for the state." (XII.VII).

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The Master said, "Good government obtains, when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted." (XIII. XVI).

Confucius said, "When good government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions, proceed from the emperor. When bad government prevails in the empire, ceremonies, music, and punitive military expeditions proceed from the princes." (XVLI)

The Master said, "When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his government is effective without the issuing of orders. If his personal conduct is not correct, he may issue orders, but they will not be followed." (XIII.VI)

Ke K'ang distressed about the number of thieves in the state, inquired of Confucius about how to do away with them. Confucius said, "If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal." (XII.XVIII)

VIII. METAPHYSICS AND RELIGION

Fan Ch'e asked what constituted wisdom. The Master said, "To give one's-self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting spiritual beings, to keep aloof from them, may be called wisdom." (VI. XX)

The Master said, "Not so. He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray." (III.XIII)

The Master being very sick, Tsze-loo asked leave to pray for him. He said, "May such a thing be done?" Tsze-loo replied, "It may. In the Prayers it is said, 'Prayer has been made to the spirits of the upper and lower worlds.' " The Master said, "My praying has been for a long time." (VII.XXXIV)

Ke Loo asked about serving the spirits of the dead. The Master said, "While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?" Ke Loo added, "I venture to ask about death?" He was answered, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" (XIX)

When Yen Yuen died, the Master said, "Alas! Heaven is destroying me! Heaven is destroying me!" (XIV)

The Master said, "Alas! there is no one that knows me." Tsze-kung said, "What do you mean by saying — that no one knows you?" The Master replied, "I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble

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against men. My studies lie low, and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;— that knows me!" (XIV.XXXVII)

The Master said, "Without recognizing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior man. Without an acquaintance with the rules of Propriety, it is impossible for the character to be established. Without knowing the force of words, it is impossible to know men." (XX.III)

The Master said, "I would prefer not speaking. . . . Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?" (XVII. XIX)

Confucius said, "There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of sages." (XVI. VIII)

Mencius

The period of the Warring States (403-221 B.C.) was marked by a progressive decline of Chou power. The smaller principalities were being absorbed by the larger ones, while Ch'in in the west and Ch'u in the south were struggling for supremacy. The historian, Ssü-ma Ch'ien,¹ tells us that following the death of Confucius in 479 B. C. his seventy disciples traveled among the feudal lords. The more influential disciples became teachers and ministers of the lords. The others either served as advisers of officials or went into retirement. In two states only did learning continue to flourish, Ch'i and Lu. Here Mencius made a notable contribution.

Mencius, or Mêng Tzŭ, was in large measure responsible for the final triumph of Confucianism. His title of "Second Sage" indicates a reputation as moralist and philosopher that is second only to that of Confucius. He came from the governing class and was born in the state of Tsou (southern part of present Shantung province) about 371 B. C.

We know little about the career of Mencius until at the age of forty he entered public life. Yet the stories of his early life, though legendary, are significant because of the light they throw upon his character. We

¹Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-c.86 B.C.) was the chief compiler of the first general history of China, the *Shih Chi* or *Historical Records*.

are told that he lost his father at an early age and was reared by a remarkable mother whose maiden surname was Chang. One of these legends relates how the mother moved her residence a number of times in order to save her son from a dangerous environment. Their first home overlooked a burial place. Young Mencius imitated everything he saw there: the ceremonial and the formal grief. His mother objected and decided that this was no place for her son. Their next home was near a market. This was no improvement, however, as the boy now imitated the deceitful boasting of the traders. At last they moved to a house near a school where the pupils were being taught Confucian ceremonial ritual. This satisfied the mother, and they settled there. Mencius greatly revered his mother and when she died gave her a splendid funeral.

During his years of preparation Mencius studied the Five Ching, especially the *Shih Ching* and the *Shu Ching*, and was instructed by the disciples of Tzū Ssū, the grandson of Confucius. Like Confucius he attracted a number of disciples, and with them traveled from state to state seeking the support of the kings for his views on government. He spent most of his public life as counselor of King Hsüan of Ch'i, but made visits to Tang, Liang, and Lu. His last twenty years were passed in retirement in the company of his disciples. He died about 289.

It was during his period of retirement that Mencius, his disciple, Wan Chang, and others compiled the *Méng Tzū Shu* or *Book of Mencius*. The work consists of seven books divided into two hundred and sixty chapters with a total of about thirty-five thousand characters. Mencius is here engaged in a series of conversations with his disciples, the kings of various states, and others. As an "orthodox" Confucianist he developed the thought of the Master in a clear and lively fashion, frequently enlarging on the aphoristic statements of the *Analects*. Like most Chinese philosophers he made little attempt at systematic arrangement. The first book opens with Mencius giving instruction to King Hui of Liang although it is known that the former did not visit this court until about the middle of his career. The Book of Mencius occupies an honored place as one of the *Confucian Classics*. It was one of the "Four Books" which served as a basis for Confucian education.

Mencius's first great contribution was in laying a psychological foundation for Confucianism. Confucius had confined himself to the problem of *how* to do good. Mencius went further and concerned himself with the problem of *why* one should do good. His answer to this question was in direct opposition to the answer of Hsün Tzū (c. 298-c.

238 B.C.). Hsün Tzū, the outstanding philosopher of education in ancient China, replied that human nature is naturally evil and that goodness can be acquired only through training. Mencius, on the other hand, was attracted to the simple teaching of Confucius that human nature is naturally good and proceeded to develop the views of the Master into a well formulated doctrine.

In maintaining the goodness of human nature, Mencius had in mind ideal man, not actual man as he ought to be rather than as he is. Mencius found man constituted for the practice of what is good. When he does evil, he should blame, not his natural powers, but his own perverseness. As proof that human nature is naturally good, he pointed out that the four virtues of benevolence or human-heartedness (*jên*), righteousness (*i*), propriety (*li*), and knowledge or wisdom (*chih*) are not infused into man from without but are developed from certain of his inborn abilities. Man's nature consists of a lower and a higher part. The lower part, made up of emotions, desires, and appetites, is possessed by animals as well as by men. Only the higher part, the area of intellectual and moral powers, can strictly be called human. There is a close connection between the two parts, and both must be active if the individual is to be vigorous. However, the upper part must always take the lead and give direction to the lower part. It is by acting in accordance with reason and righteousness that one preserves that which makes him a man. If he lets his emotions, desires, and appetites dominate him, he will lose his human characteristics and sink to the level of a beast. Mencius saw clearly the part played by unfortunate circumstances and an unworthy example in obstructing man's proper development.

While all men are endowed with the beginnings of goodness, it is only the sage who has permitted these beginnings to reach their complete development. Even among the sages there are degrees of attainment. Yao, Shun, and possibly Confucius were in a state of perfection where the ideal had become actual. Other sages have achieved this perfection only through strenuous effort. However, all men are potentially capable of the ideal goal. With so much depending upon the individual's moral decisions, it was natural for Mencius to stress individual liberty.

The clue to the harmony of the universe lies within man's own nature. It is a mistake for man to look to nature to understand himself. He should rather look within himself to understand nature. There is a mystical suggestion in the statement of Mencius that by vigorously prac-

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ting benevolence we are able to reach a state where "all things are . . . complete in us."¹ In other words, man is part of a moral universe called Heaven and his nature exemplifies Heaven's principles. He can, through the full development of his nature, make himself one with Heaven.

In his support of Confucianism Mencius came into conflict with two competing systems, one represented by Yang Chu, the other by Mo Tzū. Yang Chu had championed the recluse with his negative attitude toward life. Mencius saw no possibility of harmonizing the recluse's selfish interest in himself with the Confucian principles of benevolence and righteousness. He was equally opposed to Mohist doctrine. Whereas Mo Tzū's teaching of universal love demanded complete equality in the loving of others, Mencius contended that there should be gradations of greater and lesser love. It is natural and right to have more love for parents than for the rest of mankind. Loyalty to parent is, indeed, the greatest of all virtues and the necessary foundation for the five basic human relationships. Mencius also rejected Mo Tzū's utilitarian conception of the virtues. According to the Mohists, one should practice the virtues because their development is beneficial to society. Mencius admitted that a practice of the virtues would automatically bring benefits to society, but he looked upon such benefits as something of a by-product. The real reason why man should practice the virtues is that through them he is truly human. Mencius had little difficulty in discrediting the anti-Confucian teachings of Yang Chu and Mo Tzū.

On this psychological foundation Mencius built his political and economic theories. Like Confucius he was a transmitter rather than a creator, but he advocated important modifications through his idealization of the ancient laws. Mencius, for example, continued to support the Chou system with its sovereign, feudal lords, and other high officials. He broke with the traditional view that political and economic institutions exist primarily for the benefit of the aristocrats. It was basic in Mencius' political philosophy that all such institutions are established in the interest of the people, who are more important for the nation than either the spirits of the land or the sovereign. The ideal ruler is benevolent. He seeks to make the people prosperous and educate them. He and his people enjoy a reciprocal relationship. "When the prince regards his ministers as his hands and feet, his ministers regard their

¹Bk. VII, Pt. I, Chap. IV, v. 1.

prince as their belly and heart; when he regards them as his dogs and horses, they regard him as any other man; when he regards them as the ground or as grass, they regard him as a robber and an enemy."¹ For that reason the right to revolt can be justified. When a ruler becomes unworthy and persistently refuses to heed the warnings of his chief ministers, they should not hesitate to depose him. The lasting influence of Mencius had much to do with making benevolent government the ideal of the Chinese scholars.

Under this ideal form of government the ruler of the realm is a sage. When he becomes old, he selects a younger sage to be his assistant. After the younger man has proved his ability, the ruler presents him to Heaven as his successor. Presenting him to Heaven is, in effect, presenting him to the people. If the people support the younger sage when he succeeds to the throne, they thereby indicate that he rules the land as a mandate from Heaven.

While Mencius sought in every way to promote the welfare of the common people, he had no thought of abandoning social distinctions between the rulers and peasant classes. During his stay in Tang he refuted the arguments of certain levelers who would return to a primitive state of society and have the princes cultivate the land along with the people. Mencius showed the need for a cooperative division of labor. No individual lives to himself alone but requires for his support the products of many other workers. The activities of ruler and peasant differ greatly but are mutually indispensable.

In the realm of economics Mencius accepted the existing "well-field" land system but gave it a new interpretation. In early days the "well-field" system was of benefit primarily to the noble class. All land was regarded as the private possession of the rulers and nobles, and the peasants who worked it had the status of serfs. In each set of nine square plots of ground, the central plot was reserved for the lord and the eight outer plots were cultivated in common by eight peasant families. Mencius regarded the land as public property of the state to be cultivated by the people in a condition of liberty. Under his ideal land system, the eight farming families would cultivate their private plots individually. The produce from the central "public field" which went to the state would be regarded as a tax rather than a gift of serfs to an overlord.

Mencius used the word *T'ien* or Heaven with various meanings. In some passages, as we have seen, Heaven is a moral principle, the

¹Bk. IV, Pt. II, Chap. III, v.1.

highest original principle of the universe. This furnished the metaphysical basis for a belief in the goodness of human nature. Mencius had this in mind when he declared that man's nature should be good because it is "what Heaven has given to us."¹ In other places Heaven is Fate, or the events in a man's life over which he has no control. This is the meaning intended in the statement, "As to the accomplishment of the great result, that is with Heaven."² In still other passages Mencius came close to the conception of a ruling or personal God. An outstanding example is the conversation between Mencius and Wan Chang on the bestowal of the throne³ which is included in the selected readings.

¹Bk. VI, Pt. I, Chap. XV, v. 2.

²Bk. I, Pt. II, Chap. XIV, v. 3.

³Bk. V, Pt. I, Chap. V.

The Book Of Mencius

HUMAN NATURE

Book VI, Part 1.

Chapter I, 1. The philosopher Kão said, "*Man's* nature is like the *ch'i*-willow, and righteousness is like a cup or a bowl. The fashioning benevolence and righteousness out of man's nature is like the making cups and bowls from the *ch'i*-willow."

2. Mencius replied, "Can you, leaving untouched the nature of the willow, make with it cups and bowls? You must do violence and injury to the willow, before you can make cups and bowls with it. If you must do violence and injury to the willow in order to make cups and bowls with it, *on your principles* you must in the same way do violence and injury to humanity in order to fashion from it benevolence and righteousness! Your words, alas! would certainly lead all men on to reckon benevolence and righteousness to be calamities."

Chapter II, 1. The philosopher Kão said, "*Man's* nature is like water whirling round *in a corner*. Open a passage for it to the east, and it will flow to the east; open a passage for it to the west, and it will flow to the West. Man's nature is indifferent to good and evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and west."

2. Mencius replied, "Water indeed *will* flow indifferently to the

east or west, but will it flow indifferently up or down? The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none but have this tendency to good, *just as* all water flows downwards.

3. "Now by striking water and causing it to leap up, you may make it go over your forehead, and, by damming and leading it, you may force it up a hill;—but are such movements according to the nature of water? It is the force applied which causes them. When men are made to do what is not good, their nature is dealt with in this way."

Book II, Part I.

Chapter VI, 1. Mencius said, "All men have a mind which cannot bear *to see the sufferings of others*."

2. "The ancient kings had this commiserating mind, and they, as a matter of course, had likewise a commiserating government. When with a commiserating mind was practised a commiserating government, to rule the kingdom was *as easy a matter as* to make anything go round in the palm.

3. "When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see *the sufferings of others*, my meaning may be illustrated thus:— even now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. *They will feel so*, not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of *having been unmoved by* such a thing.

4. "From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man, that the feeling of shame and dislike is essential to man, that the feeling of modesty and complaisance is essential to man, and that the feeling of approving and disapproving is essential to man.

5. "The feeling of commiseration is the principle of benevolence. The feeling of shame and dislike is the principle of righteousness. The feeling of modesty and complaisance is the principle of propriety. The feeling of approving and disapproving is the principle of knowledge.

6. "Men have these four principles just as they have their four limbs. When men, having these four principles, yet say of themselves that they cannot *develop them*, they play the thief with themselves, and he who says of his prince that he cannot *develop them* plays the thief with his prince.

7. "Since all men have these four principles in themselves, let them know to give them all their development and completion, and the issue will be like that of fire which has begun to burn, or that of a spring which has begun to find vent. Let them have their complete development, and they will suffice to love and protect all within the four seas. Let them be denied that development, and they will not suffice for a man to serve his parents with."

Book VI, Part I.

Chapter XV, 1. The disciple Kung-tū said, "All are equally men but some are great men, and some are little men;—how is this?" Mencius replied, "Those who follow that part of themselves which is great are great men; those who follow that part which is little are little men."

2. Kung-tū pursued, "All are equally men, but some follow that part of themselves which is great, and some follow that part which is little;—how is this?" Mencius answered, "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by *external* things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets *the right view of things*; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These—the senses and the mind—are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in *the supremacy* of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man."

Book IV, Part II.

Chapter XXVIII, 1. Mencius said, "That whereby the superior man is distinguished from other men is what he preserves in his heart;—namely, benevolence and propriety."

2. "The benevolent man loves others. The man of propriety shows respect to others."

3. "He who loves others is constantly loved by them. He who respects others is constantly respected by them."

4. "Here is a man, who treats me in a perverse and unreasonable manner. The superior man in such a case will turn round upon himself—'I must have been wanting in benevolence; I must have been wanting in propriety;—how should this have happened to me?'"

5. "He examines himself, and is *specially* benevolent. He turns round upon himself, and is *specially* observant of propriety. The perversity and unreasonableness of the other, *however*, are still the same. The superior man will *again* turn round on himself—'I must have been failing to do my utmost.'"

6. "He turns round upon himself, and proceeds to do his utmost, but still the perversity and unreasonableness of the other are repeated. *On this* the superior man says, 'This is a man utterly lost indeed! Since he conducts himself so, what is there to choose between him and a brute? Why should I go to contend with a brute?'

7. "Thus it is that the superior man has a life-long anxiety and not one morning's calamity. As to what is matter of anxiety to him, that *indeed* he has.—*He says*, 'Shun was a man, and I also am a man. *But* Shun became an example to all the kingdom, and *his conduct* was worthy to be handed down to after ages, while I am nothing better than a villager.' This indeed is the proper matter of anxiety to him. And in what way is he anxious about it? Just that he may be like Shun:—then only will he stop. As to what the superior man would feel to be a calamity, there is no such thing. He does nothing which is not according to propriety. If there should befall him one morning's calamity, the superior man does not account it a calamity."

Book VI, Part I.

Chapter VII, 1. Mencius said, "In good years the children of the people are most of them good, while in bad years the most of them abandon themselves to evil. It is not owing to any difference of their natural powers conferred by Heaven that they are thus different. The abandonment is owing to the circumstances through which they allow their minds to be ensnared and drowned *in evil*.

2. "There now is barley.—Let it be sown and covered up; the ground being the same, and the time of sowing likewise the same, it grows rapidly up, and, when the full time is come, it is all found to be ripe. Although there may be inequalities of *produce*, that is owing to the *difference of the soil*, as rich or poor, to the *unequal* nourishment afforded by the rains and dews, and to the different ways in which man has performed his business *in reference to it*.

3. "Thus all things which are the same in kind are like to one another;—why should we doubt in regard to man, as if he were a solitary exception to this? The sage and we are the same in kind.

4. "In accordance with this the scholar Lung said, 'If a man make hempen sandals without knowing *the size of people's feet*, yet I know that he will not make *them like baskets*.' Sandals are all like one another, because all men's feet are like one another.

5. "So with the mouth and flavours;—all mouths have the same relishes. Yī-yā' *only* apprehended before me what my mouth relishes.

¹A famous cook in the employ of Duke Hwan of Ch'i (684-642 B.C.).

Suppose that his mouth in its relish for flavours differed from that of other men, as is the case with dogs or horses which are not the same in kind with us, why should all men be found following Yi-yâ in their Yi-yâ; that is, the mouths of all men are like one another.

6. "And so also it is with the ear. In the matter of sounds, the whole people model themselves after the music-master K'wang; that is, the ears of all men are like one another.

7. "And so also it is with the eye. In the case of Tsze-tû, there is no man but would recognize that he was beautiful. Any one who would not recognize the beauty of Tsze-tû must have no eyes.

8. "Therefore I say,—*Men's* mouths agree in having the same relishes; their ears agree in enjoying the same sounds; their eyes agree in recognizing the same beauty:—shall their minds alone be without that which they similarly approve? What is it then of which they similarly approve? It is, I say, the principles of *our nature*, and the determinations of righteousness. The sages only apprehended before me that of which my mind approves along with other men. Therefore the principles of our nature and the determinations of righteousness are agreeable to my mind, just as the flesh of grass and grain-fed animals is agreeable to my mouth."

Chapter VIII, 1. Mencius said, "The trees of the Niû mountain were once beautiful. Being situated, however, in the borders of a large State, they were hewn down with axes and bills;—and could they retain their beauty? Still through the activity of the vegetative life day and night, and the nourishing influence of the rain and dew, they were not without buds and sprouts springing forth, but then came the cattle and goats and browsed upon them. To these things is owing the bare and stripped appearance of *the mountain*, and when people now see it, they think it was never finely wooded. But is this the nature of the mountain?

2. "And so *also* of what properly belongs to man;—shall it be said that the mind of *any man* was without benevolence and righteousness? The way in which a man loses his proper goodness of mind is like the way in which the trees are denuded by axes and bills. Hewn down day after day, can it—*the mind*—retain its beauty? But there is a development of its life day and night, and in the calm air of the morning, just between night and day, the mind feels in a degree those desires and aversions which are proper to humanity, but the feeling is not strong, and it is fettered and destroyed by what takes place during the day. This fettering taking place again and

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again, the restorative influence of the night is not sufficient to preserve *the proper goodness of the mind*; and when this proves insufficient for that purpose, the nature becomes not much different from that of the irrational animals and when people *now* see it, they think that it never had those powers *which I assert*. But does this condition represent the feelings proper to humanity?

3. "Therefore, if it receive its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not grow. If it lose its proper nourishment, there is nothing which will not decay away.

4. "Confucius said, 'Hold it fast, and it remains with you. Let it go, and you lose it. Its outgoing and incoming cannot be defined as to time or place.' It is the mind of which this is said!"

Chapter XI, 1. Mencius said, "Benevolence is man's mind, and righteousness is man's path.

2. "How lamentable is it to neglect the path and not pursue it, to lose this mind and not know to seek it again!

3. "When men's fowls and dogs are lost, they know to seek for them again, but they lose their mind, and do not know how to seek for it.

4. "The great end of learning is nothing else but to seek for the lost mind."

Chapter XII, 1. Mencius said, "Here is a *man whose* fourth finger is bent and cannot be stretched out straight. It is not painful, nor does it incommode his business, and yet if there be any one who can make it straight, he will not think the way from Ch'in to Ch'ü far *to go to him*; because his finger is not like the finger of other people.

2. "When a man's finger is not like those of other people, he knows to feel dissatisfied, but if his mind be not like that of other people he does not feel dissatisfaction. This is called—'Ignorance of the relative *importance of things*.'"

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Book VII, Part II.

Chapter XIV, 1. Mencius said, "The people are the most important element *in a nation*; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest.

2. "Therefore to gain the peasantry is the way to become sovereign; to gain the sovereign is the way to become a prince of a State; to gain the prince of a State is the way to become a great officer.

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3. "When a prince endangers the altars of the spirits of the land and grain, he is changed, and another appointed in his place.

4. "When the sacrificial victims have been perfect, the miller in its vessels all pure, and the sacrifices offered at their proper seasons, if yet there ensue drought, or the waters overflow, the spirits of the land and grain are changed, and others appointed in their place."
Book I, Part I

Chapter I, 1. Mencius *went to see* king Hûi of Liang.

2. The king said, "Venerable sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand *li*, may I presume that you are provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?"

3. Mencius replied, "Why must your Majesty use that word 'profit?' What I am provided with, are *counsels to benevolence and righteousness*, and these are my only topics.

4. "If your Majesty say, 'What is to be done to profit my kingdom?' the great officers will say, 'What is to be done to profit our families?' and the inferior officers and the common people will say, 'What is to be done to profit our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be *the chief of* a family of a thousand chariots. In a kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be *the chief of* a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand, and a hundred in a thousand, cannot be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness be put last, and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching *all*.

5. "There never has been a benevolent man who neglected his parents. There never has been a righteous man who made his sovereign an after consideration.

6. "Let your Majesty also say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and let these be your only themes.' Why must you use that word—'profit?'"
Book IV, Part I.

Chapter IX, 1. Mencius said, "Chien and Châu's losing the throne, arose from their losing the people, and to lose the people means to lose their hearts. There is a way to get the kingdom:—get the people, and the kingdom is got. There is a way to get the people:—get their hearts, and the people are got. There is a way to get their hearts:—it

is simply to collect for them what they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike.

2. "The people turn to a benevolent rule as water flows downwards, and as wild beasts fly to the wilderness.

3. "Accordingly, *as* the otter aids the deep waters, driving the fish into them, and the hawk aids the thickets, driving the little birds to them, *so* Chieh and Ch'au aided T'ang and Wü, driving the people to them.

4. "If among the present rulers of the kingdom, there were one who loved benevolence, all the *other* princes would aid him, by driving *the people to him*. Although he wished not to become sovereign, he could not avoid becoming so."

Book I, Part I.

Chapter VII, 3. The king¹ said, "What virtue must there be in order to attain to royal sway?" Mencius answered, "The love and protection of the people; with this there is no power which can prevent a ruler from attaining to it."

4. *The king* asked again, "Is such an one as I competent to love and protect the people?" *Mencius said*, "Yes." "How do you know that I am competent for that?" "I heard the following incident from Hû Ho: —"The king," said he, "was sitting aloft in the hall, when a man appeared, leading an ox past the lower part of it. The king saw him, and asked, Where is the ox going? The man replied, We are going to consecrate a bell with its blood. The king said, Let it go. I cannot bear its frightened appearance, as if it were an innocent person going to the place of death. The man answered, Shall we then omit the consecration of the bell? *The king* said, How can that be omitted? Change it for a sheep. I do not know whether this incident really occurred."

5. *The king* replied, "It did, and *then* Mencius said, "The heart seen in this is sufficient to carry you to the royal sway. The people all supposed that your Majesty grudged the animal, but your servant knows surely, that it was your Majesty's not being able to bear *the sight, which made you do as you did*."

6. *The king* said, "You are right. And yet there really was an appearance of what the people condemned. But though Ch'i be a small and narrow State, how should I grudge one ox? Indeed it was because I could not bear its frightened appearance, as if it were an

¹King Hsüan of Ch'i.

innocent person going to the place of death, that therefore I changed it for a sheep."

7. *Mencius* pursued, "Let not your Majesty deem it strange that the people should think you were grudging *the animal*. When you changed a large one for a small, how should they know *the true reason*? If you felt pained by its being led without guilt to the place of death, what was there to choose between an ox and a sheep?" The king laughed and said, "What really was my mind in the matter? I did not grudge the expense of it, and changed it for a sheep!—There was reason in the people's saying that I grudged it."

8. "There is no harm *in their saying so*," said *Mencius*. "Your conduct was an artifice of benevolence. You saw the ox and had not seen the sheep. So is the superior man affected towards animals, that, having seen them alive, he cannot bear to see them die; having heard their dying cries, he cannot bear to eat their flesh. Therefore he keeps away from his slaughter-house and cook-room."

9. The king was pleased, and said, "It is said in the Book of Poetry, 'The minds of others, I am able by reflection to measure;—this is verified, my Master, in your discovery of my motive. I indeed did the thing, but when I turned my thoughts inward, and examined into it, I could not discover my own mind. When you, Master, spoke those words, the movements of compassion began to work in my mind. How is it that this heart has in it what is equal to the royal sway?'"

10. *Mencius* replied, "Suppose a man were to make this statement to your Majesty:—'My strength is sufficient to lift three thousand catties, but it is not sufficient to lift one feather;—my eyesight is sharp enough to examine the point of an autumn hair, but I do not see a waggon-load of faggots;—would your Majesty allow what he said?' "No," *was the answer, on which Mencius proceeded*, "Now here is kindness sufficient to reach to animals, and no benefits are extended from it to the people.—How is this? Is an exception to be made here? The truth is, the feather is not lifted, because strength is not used; the waggon-load of firewood is not seen, because the eyesight is not used; and the people are not loved and protected, because kindness is not employed. Therefore your Majesty's not exercising the royal sway, is because you do not do it, not because you are not able to do it."

11. *The king* asked, "How may the difference between the not doing a thing, and the not being able to do it, be represented?" *Mencius* replied, "In such a thing as taking the T'ai mountain under your arm, and leaping over the north sea with it, if you say to people—

'I am not able to do it,' that is a real case of not being able. In such a matter as breaking off a branch from a tree at the order of a superior, if you say to people—'I am not able to do it,' that is a case of not doing it, it is not a case of not being able to do it. Therefore your Majesty's not exercising the royal sway, is not such a case as that of taking the T'ai mountain under your arm, and leaping over the north sea with it. Your Majesty's not exercising the royal sway is a case like that of breaking off a branch from a tree.

12. "Treat with the reverence due to age the elders in your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; treat with the kindness due to youth the young in your own family, so that the young in the families of others shall be similarly treated:—do this, and the kingdom may be made to go round in your palm. It is said in the Book of Poetry, 'His example affected his wife. It reached to his brothers, and his family of the State was governed by it.'—The language shows how *king W'an* simply took his *kindly* heart, and exercised it towards those parties. Therefore the carrying out his kindness of heart *by a prince* will suffice for the love and protection of all within the four seas, and if he do not carry it out, he will not be able to protect his wife and children. The way in which the ancients came greatly to surpass other men, was no other but this:—simply that they knew well how to carry out, so as to affect others, what they themselves did. Now your kindness is sufficient to reach to animals, and no benefits are extended from it to reach the people.—How is this? Is an exception to be made here? . . .

18. "Now, if your Majesty will institute a government whose action shall be benevolent, this will cause all the officers in the kingdom to wish to stand in your Majesty's court, and all the farmers to wish to plough in your Majesty's fields, and all the merchants, both travelling and stationary, to wish to store their goods in your Majesty's market-places, and all travelling strangers to wish to make their tours on your Majesty's roads, and all throughout the kingdom who feel aggrieved by their rulers to wish to come and complain to your Majesty. And when they are so bent, who will be able to keep them back?"

19. The king said, "I am stupid, and not able to advance to this. I wish you, my Master, to assist my intentions. Teach me clearly; although I am deficient in intelligence and vigour, I will essay and try to carry your instructions into effect."

20. *Mencius* replied, "They are only men of education, who, without a certain livelihood, are able to maintain a fixed heart. As to the

people, if they have not a certain livelihood, it follows that they will not have a fixed heart. And if they have not a fixed heart, there is nothing which they will not do, in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity and of wild license. When they thus have been involved in crime, to follow them up and punish them;—this is to entrap the people. How can such a thing as entrapping the people be done under the rule of a benevolent man?

21. "Therefore an intelligent ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people, so as to make sure that, for those above them, they shall have sufficient wherewith to serve their parents, and, for those below them, sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children; that in good years they shall always be abundantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall escape the danger of perishing. After this he may urge them, and they will proceed to what is good, for in this case the people will follow after it with ease.

22. "Now, the livelihood of the people is so regulated, that, above, they have not sufficient wherewith to serve their parents, and, below, they have not sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children. Notwithstanding good years, their lives are continually embittered, and, in bad years, they do not escape perishing. In such circumstances they only try to save themselves from death, and are afraid they will not succeed. What leisure have they to cultivate propriety and righteousness?

23. "If your Majesty wishes to effect this *regulation of the livelihood of the people*, why not turn to that which is the essential step to it?

24. "Let mulberry-trees be planted about the homesteads with their five *máu*, and persons of fifty years may be clothed with silk. In keeping fowls, pigs, dogs, and swine, let not their times of breeding be neglected, and persons of seventy years may eat flesh. Let there not be taken away the time that is proper for the cultivation of the farm with its hundred *máu*, and the family of eight mouths that is supported by it shall not suffer from hunger. Let careful attention be paid to education in schools,—the inculcation in it especially of the filial and fraternal duties, and grey-haired men will not be seen upon the roads, carrying burdens on their backs or on their heads. It never has been that the ruler of a State where such results were seen,—the old wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired people suffering neither from hunger nor cold,—did not attain to the royal dignity."

Book V, Part I.

Chapter V, 1. Wan Chang said, "Was it the case that Yáo gave the throne to Shun?" Mencius said "No. The sovereign cannot give the throne to another."

2. "Yes;—but Shun had the throne. Who gave it to him?" "Heaven gave it to him," was the answer.

3. " 'Heaven gave it to him:'—did *Heaven* confer its appointment on him with specific injunctions?"

4. *Mencius* replied, "No. Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs."

5. " 'It showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs:'—how was this?" Mencius's answer was, "The sovereign can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the throne. A prince can present a man to the sovereign, but he cannot cause the sovereign to make that man a prince. A great officer can present a man to his prince, but he cannot cause the prince to make that man a great officer. Yáo presented Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted him. He presented him to the people, and the people accepted him. Therefore I say, 'Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.' "

6. *Chang* said, "I presume to ask how it was that Yáo presented Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted him; and that he exhibited him to the people, and the people accepted him." *Mencius* replied, "He caused him to preside over the sacrifices, and all the spirits were well pleased with them;—thus Heaven accepted him. He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs were well administered, so that the people reposed under him;—thus the people accepted him. Heaven gave *the throne* to him. The people gave it to him. Therefore I said, 'The sovereign cannot give the throne to another.'

7. "Shun assisted Yáo *in the government* for twenty and eight years;—this was more than man could have done, and was from Heaven. After the death of Yáo, when the three years' mourning was completed, Shun withdrew from the son of Yáo to the south of South river. The princes of the kingdom, however, repairing to court, went not to the son of Yáo, but they went to Shun. Litigants went not to the son of Yáo, but they went to Shun. Singers sang not the son of Yáo, but they sang Shun. Therefore I said, 'Heaven gave him *the throne*.' It was after these things that he went to the Middle Kingdom, and occupied the seat of the Son of Heaven. If he had, *before these things*,

taken up his residence in the palace of Yáo, and had applied pressure to the son of Yáo, it would have been an act of usurpation, and not the gift of Heaven.

8. "This sentiment is expressed in the words of The Great Declaration,—'Heaven sees according as my people see; Heaven hears according as my people hear.' "

Book V, Part II.

Chapter IX, 1. The king Hsüan of Ch'i asked about *the office of high ministers*. Mencius said, "Which high ministers is your Majesty asking about?" "Are there differences among them?" inquired the king. "There are," was the reply. "There are the high ministers who are noble and relatives of *the prince*, and there are those who are of a different surname." The king said, "I beg to ask about the high ministers who are noble and relatives of the prince." Mencius answered, "If the prince have great faults, they ought to remonstrate with him, and if he do not listen to them after they have done so again and again, they ought to dethrone him."

2. The king on this looked moved, and changed countenance.

3. Mencius said, "Let not your Majesty be offended. You asked me, and I dare not answer but according to truth."

Book III, Part I.

Chapter IV, 3. When Ch'ân Hsiang saw Hsü Hsing, he was greatly pleased with him, and, abandoning entirely whatever he had learned, became his disciple. Having an interview with Mencius, he related to him *with approbation* the words of Hsü Hsing to the following effect:—"The prince of T'ang is indeed a worthy prince. He has not yet heard, however, the *real doctrines of antiquity*. Now, wise and able princes should cultivate the ground equally along with their people, and eat *the fruit of their labour*. They should prepare their own meals, morning and evening, while at the same time they carry on their government. But now, *the prince of T'ang* has his granaries, treasuries, and arsenals, which is an oppressing of the people to nourish himself. How can he be deemed a *real* worthy prince?"

4. Mencius said, "I suppose that Hsü Hsing sows grain and eats the produce. Is it not so?" "It is so," was the answer. "I suppose *also* he weaves cloth, and wears his own manufacture. Is it not so?" "No. Hsü wears clothes of haircloth." "Does he wear a cap?" "He wears a cap." "What kind of cap?" "A plain cap." "Is it woven by himself?"

"No. He gets it in exchange for grain." "Why does Hsü not weave it himself?" "That would injure his husbandry." Does Hsü cook his food in boilers and earthenware pans, and does he plough with an iron share?" "Yes" "Does he make those articles himself?" "No. He gets them in exchange for grain."

5. *Mencius then said*, "The getting those various articles in exchange for grain, is not oppressive to the potter and the founder, and the potter and the founder in their turn, in exchanging their various articles for grain, are not oppressive to the husbandman. How should such a thing be supposed? And moreover, why does not Hsü act the potter and founder, supplying himself with the articles which he uses solely from his own establishment? Why does he go confusedly dealing and exchanging with the handicraftsmen? Why does he not spare himself so much trouble?" *Ch'an Hsiang replied*, "The business of the handicraftsman can by no means be carried on along with the business of husbandry."

6. *Mencius resumed*, "Then, is it the government of the kingdom which alone can be carried on along with the practice of husbandry? Great men have their proper business, and little men have their proper business. Moreover, in the case of any single individual, *whatever articles he can require* are ready to his hand, being produced by the various handicraftsmen:—if he must first make them for his own use, this way of doing would keep all the people running about upon the roads. Hence, there is the saying, 'Some labour with their minds, and some labour with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others; those who labour with their strength are governed by others. Those who are governed by others support them; those who govern others are supported by them.' This is a principle universally recognised." . . .

18. *Mencius replied*, "It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality. Some are twice, some five times, some ten times, some a hundred times, some a thousand times, some ten thousand times as valuable as others. If you reduce them all to the same standard, that must throw the kingdom into confusion. If large shoes and small shoes were of the same price, who would make them? For people to follow the doctrine of Hsü, would be for them to lead one another on to practise deceit. How can they avail for the government of a State?"¹

¹Reprinted from James Legge, *The Chinese Classics: The Works of Mencius*, Vol. II. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895).

Lao Tzu and Taoist Quietism

The *Lao-tzû*, or as it is popularly known the *Tao Tê Ching*, was long regarded as the work of a sixth century B. C. writer. According to Ssü-ma Ch'ien, it was written by Lao Tzû (born 604 B. C.) an older contemporary of Confucius who was keeper of the archives of the Chou court at Loyang. We are told that Lao Tzû resigned his office and went into exile because the Chou state was showing signs of decay. When he reached the western frontier, Yin Hsi, the gate-keeper of the pass, begged him to write a book before going into retirement. He complied and presented Yin Hsi with a book on *Tao* and *Tê*. Despite the fact that Ssü-ma Ch'ien never saw this work, tradition early identified it with the *Tao Tê Ching*.

Today leading scholars have good reason for rejecting the traditional view that Lao Tzû was the author of the *Tao Tê Ching*, since all the evidence of style and doctrine in the work itself points to a much later period for its composition. The facts that the book shows a familiarity with the teaching of the School of Names indicates that it could hardly have been written before the latter part of the Warring States period (403-221 B. C.). This does not rule out the possibility that some of the passages have preserved sayings of the original Lao Tzû. However, our knowledge of this shadowy figure is so limited that there is a question as to whether he ever existed. It seems likely that early Taoism represented Yangtze Valley culture even as Con-

fucianism was representative of culture in the older northern centers. It has also been suggested that early Taoism may have come as a protest of rural sections against the more advanced civilization of the towns. Some of the teachings of the *Tao Tê Ching* can be traced to older Chinese classics, especially the *I Ching*. Others bear a close resemblance to Indian thought, some knowledge of which may possibly have found its way to China.

During the Han period (206 B. C. — 220 A. D.), the *Tao Tê Ching* underwent changes as scholars edited and rearranged it. In its present form, therefore, it is a composite work and cannot be ascribed to any one author. Han scholars were the first to use the term "Taoist" as the name for a school that was opposed to orthodox Confucian thought. Under the Emperor Ching Ti (156-140 B. C.), the *Tao Tê Ching* was given official recognition as a classic, and throughout the entire period of the national competitive examinations it was included in the course of study. Lao Tzû was early paid divine honors and in 666 A. D. was canonized as "Emperor."

The *Tao Tê Ching* is a relatively small book of about five thousand characters arranged in eighty-one chapters. Its two large divisions bear the titles *Tao* and *Tê*. *Tao*, the first part, is concerned chiefly with metaphysics; *Tê*, the second part, gives more attention to ethics and politics. The author followed no logical plan but used a poetic and concise style. His obscurity can be explained in part by the difficulty of finding words that would adequately express his speculative mysticism. He delighted in epigram, paradox, and cryptic allusion. Many of the chapters open with a paradox which is developed by a parallel line of thought introduced with the word "therefore." The work makes a valuable contribution in explaining characteristic Chinese behavior. Its creative quietism is a reminder to all ages and lands that spiritual values which are often neglected as of little consequence may in reality prove most significant and enduring.

Confucius had been willing to take the world as he found it without speculating on the origin of the universe or the nature of being. The author of the *Tao Tê Ching* went deeper and based his teaching on ultimate reality. Both *Tao* and *Tê* are important concepts in Taoist metaphysics. *Tao*, literally "way" or "path," is the self-existent first principle through which all things are produced and supported. One cannot know or define the *Tao* in itself. To define a thing is to indicate both what it is and what it is not. The *Tao*, however, is all-

embracing and has no namable attributes. The *Tao Tê Ching* opens with the words: "The Way that can be told of is not an Unvarying Way; The names that can be named are not unvarying names." Even to give the "Nameless" the term *Tao* is in a sense forcing a name upon it. It is an eternal, simple, "Uncarved Block." Names appear only when the block is carved.¹ The *Tao* is both Non-being and Being. In so far as it is not an object, it is Non-being. Yet it is Being in the sense that it has brought the universe into being. Chapter forty-two contains a well known passage on cosmogony: "TAO GAVE birth to the One; the One gave birth successively to two things, three things, up to ten thousand." Here the *Tao* represents Non-being and the One represents Being. In other words, Non-being produced Being and Being gave rise to all things.

Tê, which is probably best translated "latent power" or "efficacy inherent in a thing," is what individual objects secure from the *Tao* to make them what they are. *Tê* is, therefore, *Tao* in an object, or the principle which underlies each object. In the reprint that follows, Waley has translated *Tê* as "power." The *Tao Tê Ching* is literally "Classic of the Way and Power."

There is no place in this work for popular religious beliefs and practices. Correct forms of worship can have no influence on the course of nature. *T'ien*, or Heaven, is merely part of nature and takes its law from the *Tao*.² In the one reference to *Ti*, the Yellow Ancestor divinity who separated Earth from Heaven, the statement is made that the *Tao* existed before *Ti*.³ There is, nevertheless, positive religious feeling in the mystic emotion which is experienced by one who contemplates the *Tao*.

Although one cannot know the *Tao* as Absolute, one can come to a knowledge of its operations and be guided by them. This knowledge comes, not by study or reason, but by intuition. Since the *Tao* enjoys universality and eternity, it may be called an Invariable. All general laws are invariably true. The greatest of all these laws is "reversion," according to which any movement to an extreme in one direction is always followed by a movement in the opposite direction. In other words, there is a law of nature whereby things that develop extreme qualities of any kind revert to the opposite qualities.

¹The indefinable *Tao* has much in common with the indeterminate "Thusness" of Buddhism.

²Chapter XXV.

³Chapter IV.

"In Tao the only motion is returning."¹ "Truly, 'things are often increased by seeking to diminish them and diminished by seeking to increase them.'"²

The law of "reversion" throws light on the strange doctrine of *wu wei*, or "inaction." The Taoists were impressed with the passive processes of nature, its tranquility and freedom from effort. This points to a *Tao* that does all things without doing anything. It is a case of "reversion" from non-action to a condition where everything is done. It should be noted, however, that this so-called "inaction" is to be interpreted, not as a complete absence of activity, but rather as a less amount of activity or as an avoidance of the error of overdoing which defeats its own purpose. The *Tao* acts, not arbitrarily or in an artificial manner, but naturally and spontaneously. It permits all things to do whatever they can.

The principles of "reversion" and "inaction" are basic in Taoist ethics and politics. The way to accomplish something is to begin with its opposite, and the way to retain something is to accept a measure of its opposite. Accordingly,

"To remain whole, be twisted!"

To become straight, let yourself be bent."³

The *Tao Tê Ching* rejects the Confucian virtues of benevolence and righteousness as representing a decline of morals. According to the law of "reversion," they exist because the opposite vices exist. In a state of nature there would be no place for any of these virtues or vices.

The sage who "Clasps the Primal Unity" and becomes one with the *Tao* conforms to nature and lives a simple life. All his activities are natural and necessary. They are natural in that they follow the *Tê* and necessary in realizing a purpose. To follow nature is to live like water. "The goodness of water is that it benefits the ten thousand creatures; yet itself does not scramble, but is content with the places that all men disdain."⁴ So the Taoist practices quietism and is silent even about the *Tao*. Strength is really weakness and weakness is strength. Infancy is the ideal state of being and the female principle is fundamental for life. In chapter sixty-seven, three virtues are praised as treasurers: pity,

¹Chapter XL.

²Chapter XLII.

³Chapter XXII.

⁴Chapter VIII.

frugality, and humility. They inevitably lead to their opposites. Pity bears fruit in braveness, frugality in liberality, and humility in honor.

Taoism, like Buddhism, has much in common with Christian ethical teaching. Chapter sixty-three of the *Tao Tê Ching* anticipates the Christian teaching of returning good for evil, a distinct advance over the Confucian principle of "reciprocity." One significant difference can be noted in comparing the Taoist principle of "reversion" with the Christian principle of "inversion." Whereas Taoism praises the extremes of weakness, infancy, and the female principle because they are sure to lead to the other extremes, Christianity holds that the meek and those who feel poor in spirit are, in their present state, fortunate and happy.¹

While the Taoist cannot expect to eradicate all desires, it is evident that the fewer they are, the easier it will be to satisfy them. All too frequently the pursuit of a multiplicity of desires ends in unhappiness. Chapter twelve reminds us that while the five colors are pleasing to the eye, an excess of them blinds the eye. The lessening of desire makes it also advisable to discard knowledge. The common knowledge of the schools is a stumbling-block to the wisdom of simple development in conformity with the *Tao*. One should not confuse the sage's ignorance with the ignorance of the child or of the common man. The former is an acquisition of the spirit and a higher achievement than knowledge.

Both Confucianists and Legalists had contributed notably to political theory. Confucianists commended the benevolent ruler who was active in promoting the welfare of his people. Legalists put their trust in authority and advocated an impartial administration of a fixed body of law. The *Tao Tê Ching* opposes all such policies as harmful governmental interference and makes a plea for *laissez faire*. A government modeled on the *Tao* would encourage the natural development of its people and operate unobserved even as does nature. Laws and taxes would be at a minimum. Capital punishment and War would be avoided. The people would be well off with empty minds and full stomachs. The ideal society is not exactly a primitive society but rather a civilization that would include primitiveness. Boats, carriages, and weapons of war would be in existence but would not be used.

¹See Matthew 5:1-12.

Tao e Ching

Tao Tê Ching¹

THE TAO

Chapter I

The Way that can be told of is not an Unvarying Way;
The names that can be named are not unvarying names.
It was from the Nameless that Heaven and Earth sprang;
The named is but the mother that rears the ten thousand
creatures, each after its kind.

Truly, "Only he that rids himself forever of desire can see
the Secret Essences;"

He that has never rid himself of desire can see only the
Outcomes.

These two things issued from the same mould, but never-
theless are different in name.

This "same mould" we can but call the Mystery,
Or rather the "Darker than any Mystery,"
The Doorway whence issued all Secret Essences.

Chapter IV

The Way is like an empty vessel
That yet may be drawn from
Without ever needing to be filled.
It is bottomless; the very progenitor of all things in the world.
In it all sharpness is blunted,
All tangles untied,
All glare tempered,
All dust smoothed.
It is like a deep pool that never dries.
Was it too the child of something else? We cannot tell.
But as a substanceless image it existed before the Ancestor.

Chapter VI

The Valley Spirit¹ never dies.
It is named the Mysterious Female.
And the Doorway of the Mysterious Female.
Is the base from which Heaven and Earth sprang.
It is there within us all the while;

¹The Valley is a symbol of emptiness.

TAO TE CHING AND TAOIST QUIETISM

Draw upon it as you will, it never runs dry.

Chapter XI

We put thirty spokes together and call it a wheel;
But it is on the space where there is nothing that the
utility of the wheel depends.

We turn clay to make a vessel;
But it is on the space where there is nothing that the
utility of the vessel depends.

We pierce doors and windows to make a house;
And it is on these spaces where there is nothing that the
utility of the house depends.

Therefore just as we take advantage of what is, we should
recognize the utility of what is not.

Chapter XIV

Because the eye gazes but can catch no glimpse of it,
It is called elusive.

Because the ear listens but cannot hear it,
It is called the rarefied.

Because the hand feels for it but cannot find it,
It is called the infinitesimal.

These three, because they cannot be further scrutinized,
Blend into one.

Its rising brings no light;

Its sinking, no darkness.

Endless the series of things without name

On the way back to where there is nothing.

They are called shapeless shapes;

Forms without form;

Are called vague semblances.

Go towards them and you can see no front;

Go after them, and you see no rear.

Yet by seizing on the Way that was

You can ride the things that are now.

For to know what once there was, in the Beginning,

This is called the essence of the Way.

Chapter XXI

Such the scope of the All-pervading Power

That it alone can act through the Way.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

For the Way is a thing impalpable, incommensurable.
Incommensurable, impalpable.
Yet latent in it are forms;
Impalpable, incommensurable
Yet within it are entities.
Shadowy it is and dim;
Yet within it there is a force,
A force that though rarefied
Is none the less efficacious.
From the time of old till now
Its charge has not departed
But cheers onward the many warriors.
How do I know that the many warriors are so?
Through this.

Chapter XXV

There was something formless yet complete,
That existed before heaven and earth;
Without sound, without substance,
Dependent on nothing, unchanging,
All pervading, unailing.
One may think of it as the mother of all things under
 heaven.
Its true name we do not know;
"Way" is the by-name that we give it.
Were I forced to say to what class of things it belongs I
 should call it Great (*ta*).
Now *ta* also means passing on,
And passing on means going Far Away,
And going far away means returning.
Thus just as Tao has "this greatness" and as earth has it
and as heaven has it, so may the ruler also have it. Thus
"within the realm there are four portions of greatness,"
and one belongs to the king. The ways of men are con-
ditioned by those of earth. The ways of earth, by those
of heaven. The ways of heaven by those of Tao, and the
ways of Tao by the Self-so.

Chapter XXXII

Tao is eternal, but has no fame (name);

³This is a symbol of the original unity which underlies all multiplicity.

TAO TE CHING

The Uncarved Block,¹ though seemingly of small account,
Is greater than anything that is under heaven.
If kings and barons would but possess themselves of it,
The ten thousand creatures would flock to do them homage;
Heaven-and-earth would conspire
To send Sweet Dew,
Without law or compulsion, men would dwell in harmony.
Once the block is carved, there will be names,
And so soon as there are names
Know that it is time to stop.
Only by knowing when it is time to stop can danger be avoided.
To Tao all under heaven will come
As streams and torrents flow into a great river or sea.
Great Tao is like a boat that drifts;
It can go this way; it can go that.
The ten thousand creatures owe their existence to it and it does
not disown them;
Yet having produced them, it does not take possession of them.
Tao, though it covers the ten thousand things like a garment,
Makes no claim to be master over them,
And asks for nothing from them.
Therefore it may be called the Lowly.
The ten thousand creatures obey it,
Though they know not that they have a master;
Therefore it is called the Great.
So too the Sage just because he never at any time makes a show
of greatness in fact achieves greatness.

Chapter XXXIX

As for the things that from of old have understood the Whole-
The sky through such understanding remains limpid,
Earth remains steady,
The spirits keep their holiness,
The abyss is replenished,
The ten thousand creatures bear their kind,
Barons and princes direct their people.
It is the Whole that causes it.
Were it not so limpid, the sky would soon get torn,
Were it not for its steadiness, the earth would soon tip over,
Were it not for their holiness, the spirits would soon wither
away.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Were it not for this replenishment, the abyss would soon go dry,
Were it not that the ten thousand creatures can bear their kind,
They would soon become extinct.

Were the barons and princes no longer directors of their people
and for that reason honoured and exalted, they would soon
be overthrown.

Truly "the humble is the stem upon which the mighty grows,
The low is the foundation upon which the high is laid."
That is why barons and princes refer to themselves as "The
Orphan," "The Needy," "The Ill-provided." Is this not indeed a
case of might rooting itself upon humility?

Chapter XL

In Tao the only motion is returning;

The only useful quality, weakness.

For though all creatures under heaven are the products of Being,
Being itself is the product of Not-being.

Chapter XLII

TAO GAVE birth to the One; the One gave birth success-
sively to two things, three things, up to ten thousand.

These ten thousand creatures cannot turn their backs to
the shade¹ without having the sun² on their bellies and it is
on this blending of the breaths that their harmony de-
pends. To be orphaned, needy, ill-provided is what men
most hate; yet princes and dukes style themselves so.

Truly, "things are often increased by seeking to diminish
them and diminished by seeking to increase them." The
maxims that others use in their teaching I too will use in
mine. Show me a man of violence that came to a good
end, and I will take him for my teacher.

Chapter LI

Tao gave them birth;

The "power" of Tao reared them,

Shaped them according to their kinds,

Perfected them, giving to each its strength.

Therefore of the ten thousand things there is not one that
does not worship Tao and do homage to its "power." No
mandate even went forth that accorded to Tao the right to

¹The *yin* or passive principle.

²The *yang* or active principle.

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be worshipped, nor to its "power" the right to receive homage.

It was always and of itself so.

Therefore as Tao bore them and the "power" of Tao reared them, made them grow, fostered them, harboured them, brewed for them, so you must

"Rear them, but not lay claim to them,

Control them, but never lean upon them,

Be chief among them, but not manage them.

This is called the mysterious power."

Chapter II

It is because every one under Heaven recognizes beauty as beauty, that the idea of ugliness exists.

And equally if every one recognized virtue as virtue, this would merely create fresh conceptions of wickedness.

For truly "Being and Not-being grow out of one another;

Difficult and easy complete one another.

Long and short test one another;

High and low determine one another.

The sounds of instrument and voice give harmony to one another.

Front and back give sequence to one another."

Therefore the Sage relies on actionless activity,

Carries on wordless teaching,

But the myriad creatures are worked upon by him; he does not disown them.

He rears them, but does not lay claim to them,

Controls them, but does not lean upon them,

Achieves his aim, but does not call attention to what he does;

And for the very reason that he does not call attention to what he does

He is not ejected from fruition of what he has done.

Chapter VII

Heaven is eternal, the Earth everlasting.

How come they to be so? It is because they do not foster their own lives;

That is why they live so long.

Therefore the Sage

Puts himself in the background; but is always to the fore.

Remains outside; but is always there.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Is it not just because he does not strive for any personal end
That all his personal ends are fulfilled?

Chapter VIII

THE HIGHEST good is like that of water. The goodness of
water is that it benefits the ten thousand creatures; yet
itself does not scramble, but is content with the places
that all men disdain. It is this that makes water so near
to the Way.

And if men think the ground the best place for building a
house upon,

If among thoughts they value those that are profound,

If in friendship they value gentleness,

In words, truth; in government, good order;

In deeds, effectiveness; in actions, timeliness—

In each case it is because they prefer what does not lead
to strife,

And therefore does not go amiss.

Chapter IX

Stretch a bow to the very full,

And you will wish you had stopped in time;

Temper a sword-edge to its very sharpest,

And you will find it soon grows dull.

When bronze and jade fill your hall

It can no longer be guarded.

Wealth and place breed insolence

That brings ruin in its train.

When your work is done, then withdraw!

Such is Heaven's Way.

Chapter X

Can you keep the unquiet physical-soul from straying,
hold fast to the Unity, and never quit it?

Can you, when concentrating your breath, make it soft
like that of a little child?

Can you wipe and cleanse your vision of the Mystery till
all is without blur?

Can you love the people and rule the land, yet remain
unknown?

always the female part?

*This has reference to the opening and shutting of the mouth and nostrils.

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Can you in opening and shutting the heavenly gates¹ play
Can your mind penetrate every corner of the land, but you
yourself never interfere?

Rear them, then, feed them,
Rear them, but do not lay claim to them.
Control them, but never lean upon them;
Be chief among them, but do not manage them.
This is called the Mysterious Power.

Chapter XII

The five colours confuse the eye,
The five sounds dull the ear,
The five tastes spoil the palate.
Excess of hunting and chasing
Makes minds go mad.
Products that are hard to get
Impede their owner's movements.
Therefore the Sage
Considers the belly not the eye.¹
Truly, he rejects that but takes this."

Chapter XVI

Push far enough towards the Void,
Hold fast enough to Quietness,
And of the ten thousand things none but can be worked on by
you.

I have beheld them, whither they go back.
See, all things howsoever they flourish
Return to the root from which they grew.
This return to the root is called Quietness;
Quietness is called submission to Fate;
What has submitted to Fate has become part of the always-so.
To know the always-so is to be Illumined;
Not to know it means to go blindly to disaster.
He who knows the always-so has room in him for everything;
He who has room in him for everything is without prejudice.
To be without prejudice is to be kingly;
To be kingly is to be of heaven;
To be of heaven is to be in Tao.

¹The sage provides for his instinctive powers and does not seek to gratify the senses.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Tao is forever and he that possesses it,
Though his body ceases, is not destroyed.

Chapter XVIII

It was when the Great Way declined
That human kindness and morality arose;
It was when intelligence and knowledge appeared
That the Great Artifice began.
It was when the six near ones were no longer at peace
That there was talk of "duriful sons;"
Nor till fatherland was dark with strife
Did we hear of "loyal slaves."

Chapter XXII

"To remain whole, be twisted!"
To become straight, let yourself be bent.
To become full, be hollow.
Be tattered, that you may be renewed.
Those that have little, may get more,
Those that have much, are but perplexed.
Therefore the Sage
Clasps the Primal Unity,
Testing by it everything under heaven.
He does not show himself; therefore he is seen everywhere.
He does not define himself, therefore he is distinct.
He does not boast of what he will do, therefore he
succeeds.
He is not proud of his work, and therefore it endures.
He does not contend,
And for that very reason no one under heaven can contend
with him.
So then we see that the ancient saying "To remain whole,
be twisted!" was the idle word; for true wholeness can only
be achieved by return.

Chapter XXVIII

"He who knows the male, yet cleaves to what is female
Becomes like a ravine,¹ receiving all things under heaven,"
And being such a ravine
He knows all the time a power that he never calls upon in vain.
This is returning to the state of infancy.

¹The ravine is a symbol of the passive female principle.

TAO TE CHING

He who knows the white, yet cleaves to the black
Becomes the standard by which all things are tested;
And being such a standard
He has all the time a power that never errs,
He returns to the Limitless.
He who knows glory, yet cleaves to ignominy
Becomes like a valley that receives into it all things under
heaven,
And being such a valley
He has all the time a power that suffices;
He returns to the state of the Uncarved Block.
Now when a block is sawed up it is made into implements;
But when the Sages uses it, it becomes Chief of all Ministers.
Truly, "The greatest carver does the least cutting."

Chapter XLVII

Without leaving his door
He knows everything under Heaven.
Without looking out of his window
He knows all the ways of heaven.
For the further one travels
The less one knows.
Therefore the Sage arrives without going.
Sees all without looking,
Does nothing, yet achieves everything.

Chapter XLIX

The Sage has no heart of his own;
He uses the heart of the people as his heart.
Of the good man I approve,
But of the bad I also approve,
And thus he gets goodness.
The truthful man I believe, but the liar I also believe,
And thus he gets truthfulness.
The Sage, in his dealings with the world, seems like one
dazed with fright;
For the world's sake he dulls his wits.
The Hundred Families all the time strain their eyes and
ears,
The Sage all the time sees and hears no more than an in-
fant sees and hears.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Chapter LVI

Those who know do not speak;
Those who speak do not know.
Block the passages,
Shut the doors,
Let all sharpness be blunted,
All tangles untied,
All glare tempered.
All dust smoothed.
This is called the mysterious levelling.
He who has achieved it cannot either be drawn into
friendship or repelled,
Cannot be benefited, cannot be harmed,
Cannot either be raised or humbled,
And for that very reason is highest of all creatures under
heaven.

Chapter LXIII

It acts without action, does without doing, finds flavour in
what is flavourless,
Can make the small great and the few many,
"Requites injuries with good deeds,
Deals with the hard while it is still easy,
With the great while it is still small."
In the governance of empire everything difficult must be
dealt with while it is still easy,
Everything great must be dealt with while it is still small.
Therefore the Sage never has to deal with the great; and
so achieves greatness.
But again "Light assent inspires little confidence
And 'many easies' means many a hard."
Therefore the Sage knows too how to make the easy diffi-
cult, and by doing so avoid all difficulties

Chapter LXVII

EVERY ONE under heaven says that our Way is greatly like
folly. But it is just because it is great, that it seems like
folly. As for things that do not seem like folly—well,
there can be no question about *their* smallness!
Here are my three treasures. Guard and keep them! The
first is pity; the second, frugality; the third: refusal to be
"foremost of all things under heaven."

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For only he that pities is truly able to be brave;
Only he that is frugal is truly able to be profuse.
Only he that refuses to be foremost of all things
Is truly able to become chief of all Ministers.
At present your bravery is not based on pity, nor your
profusion on frugality, nor your vanguard on your rear;
and this is death. But pity cannot fight without conquer-
ing or guard without saving. Heaven arms with pity
those whom it would not see destroyed.

Chapter LXXVI

WHEN HE is born, man is soft and weak; in death he be-
comes stiff and hard. The ten thousand creatures and all
plants and trees while they are alive are supple and soft,
but when they are dead they become brittle and dry.
Truly, what is stiff and hard is a "companion of death;"
what is soft and weak is a "companion of life." Therefore
"the weapon that is too hard will be broken, the tree that
has the hardest wood will be cut down." Truly, the hard
and mighty are cast down; the soft and weak set on high.

Chapter LXXXI

True words are not fine-sounding;
Fine-sounding words are not true.
The good man does not prove by argument;
And he who proves by argument is not good.
True wisdom is different from much learning;
Much learning means little wisdom.
The Sage has no need to hoard;
When his own last scrap has been used up on behalf of others,
Lo, he has more than before!
When his own last scrap has been used up in giving to others,
Lo, his stock is even greater than before!
For Heaven's way is to sharpen without cutting,
And the Sage's way is to act without striving.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Chapter III

IF WE stop looking for "persons of superior morality"
(hsien) to put in power, there will be no more jealousies
among the people. If we cease to set store by products

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that are hard to get, there will be no more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their hearts will remain placid and undisturbed. Therefore the Sage rules.

By emptying their hearts
And filling their bellies,
Weakening their intelligence
And toughening their sinews
Ever striving to make the people knowledgeable and
desireless.

Indeed he sees to it that if there be any who have knowledge, they dare not interfere. Yet through his actionless activity all things are duly regulated.

CHAPTER XIX

Banish wisdom, discard knowledge,
And the people will be benefited a hundredfold.
Banish human kindness, discard morality,
And the people will be dutiful and compassionate.
Banish skill, discard profit,
And thieves and robbers will disappear.
If when these three things are done they find life too
plain and unadorned,
Then let them have accessories;
Give them Simplicity to look at, the Uncarved Block to
hold,
Give them selflessness and fewness of desires.

Chapter XXX

He who by Tao purposes to help a ruler of men
Will oppose all conquest by force of arms;
For such things are wont to rebound.
Where armies are, thorns and brambles grow.
The raising of a great host
Is followed by a year of dearth.
Therefore a good general effects his purpose and then
stops: he does not take further advantage of his victory.
Fulfils his purpose and does not glory in what he has done;
Fulfils his purpose and does not boast of what he has done;
Fulfils his purpose, but takes no pride in what he has done;
Fulfils his purpose, but only as a step that could not be
avoided.

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Fulfils his purpose, but without violence;
For what has a time of vigour also has a time of decay.
This is against Tao,
And what is against Tao will soon perish.

Chapter XXXI

FINE WEAPONS are none the less ill-omened things. That is why, among people of good birth, in peace the left-hand side is the place of honour, but in war this is reversed and the right-hand side is the place of honour.¹ The Quietist even, when he conquers, does not regard weapons as lovely things. For to think them lovely means to delight in them, and to delight in them means to delight in the slaughter of men. And he who delights in the slaughter of men will never get what he looks for out of those who dwell under heaven. The slaying of multitudes is a matter for grief and tears; he that has conquered in battle is received with rites of mourning.

Chapter XXXVII

Tao never does;
Yet through it all things are done.
If the barons and kings would but possess themselves of it,
The ten thousand creatures would at once be transformed.
And if having been transformed they should desire to act,
We must restrain them by the blankness of the Unnamed.
The blankness of the Unnamed
Brings dispassion;
To be dispassionate is to be still.
And so, of itself, the whole empire will be at rest.

Chapter LIII

HE WHO has the least scrap of sense, once he has got started on the great highway has nothing to fear so long as he avoids turning. For great highways are safe and easy. But men love by-paths.
So long as the Court is in order
They are content to let their fields run to weed
And their granaries stand empty.
They wear patterns and embroideries,

¹In civil ceremonies, movement was to the left; in ceremonies of war, to the right.

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Carry sharp swords, glut themselves with drink and food,
have more possessions than they can use.
These are the riotous ways of brigandage; they are not the
Highway.

Chapter LVII

"Kingdoms can only be governed if rules are kept;
Battles can only be won if rules are broken."

But the adherence of all under heaven can only be won by
letting-alone.

How do I know that it is so?

By this.

The more prohibitions there are, the more ritual avoidances,
The poorer the people will be.

The more "sharp weapons" there are,
The more benighted will the whole land grow.

The more cunning craftsmen there are,
The more pernicious contrivances will be invented.

The more laws are promulgated,
The more thieves and bandits there will be.

Therefore a sage has said:

So long as I "do nothing" the people will of themselves be trans-
formed.

So long as I love quietude, the people will of themselves go
straight.

So long as I act only by inactivity the people will of themselves
become prosperous.

So long as I have no wants the people will of themselves return
to the "state of the Uncarved Block."

Chapter LXI

A LARGE kingdom must be like the low ground towards
which all streams flow down. It must be a point towards
which all things under heaven converge. Its part must be
that of the female in its dealings with all things under
heaven. The female by quiescence conquers the male; by
quiescence gets underneath. If a large kingdom can in
the same way succeed in getting underneath a small king-
dom then it will win the adherence of the small kingdom;
and it is because small kingdoms are by nature in this way
underneath large kingdoms that they win the adherence

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of large kingdoms. The one must get underneath in order to do it; the other is underneath and therefore does it. What large countries really need is more inhabitants; and what small countries need is some place where their surplus inhabitants can go and get employment. Thus each gets what it needs. That is why I say the large kingdom must "get underneath."

Chapter LXV

IN THE days of old those who practised Tao with success did not, by means of it, enlighten the people, but on the contrary sought to make them ignorant.

The more knowledge people have, the harder they are to rule.

Those who seek to rule by giving knowledge
Are like bandits preying on the land.

Those who rule without giving knowledge
Bring a stock of good fortune to the land.

To have understood the difference between these two
things is to have a test and standard.

To be always able to apply this test and standard
Is called the mysterious "power,"

The mysterious "power," so deep-penetrating,
So far-reaching,

That can follow things back—

All the way back to the Great Concordance.

Chapter LXVI

How did the great rivers and seas get their kingship over
the hundred lesser streams?

Through the merit of being lower than they; that was how
they got their kingship.

Therefore the Sage

In order to be above the people

Must speak as though he were lower than the people.

In order to guide them

He must put himself behind them.

Only thus can the Sage be on top and the people not be
crushed by his weight.

Only thus can he guide, and the people not be led into
harm.

Indeed in this way everything under heaven will be glad to be pushed by him and will not find his guidance irksome. This he does by not striving; and because he does not strive, none can contend with him.

Chapter LXXIV

THE PEOPLE are not frightened of death. What then is the use of trying to intimidate them with the death-penalty? And even supposing people were generally frightened of death and did not regard it as an everyday thing, which of us would dare to seize them and slay them? There is the Lord of Slaughter¹ always ready for this task, and to do it in his stead is like thrusting oneself into the master-carpenter's place and doing his chipping for him. Now "he who tries to do the master-carpenter's chipping for him is lucky if he does not cut his hand."

Chapter LXXV

THE PEOPLE starve because those above them eat too much tax-grain. That is the only reason why they starve. The people are difficult to keep in order because those above them interfere. That is the only reason why they are so difficult to keep in order. The people attach no importance to death, because those above them are too grossly absorbed in the pursuit of life. That is why they attach no importance to death. And indeed, in that their hearts are so little set on life they are superior to those who set store by life.

Chapter LXXX

GIVEN A small country with few inhabitants, he could bring it about that though there should be among the people contrivances requiring ten times, a hundred times less labour, they would not use them. He could bring it about that the people would be ready to lay down their lives and lay them down again in defence of their homes, rather than emigrate. There might still be boats and carriages, but no one would go in them; there might still be weapons of war but no one would drill with them. He could bring it about that "the people should have no use for any form of writing save knotted ropes,"² should be

¹Heaven has control over death.

²Ropes were knotted to aid one's memory.

TAO TE CHING

contented with their food, pleased with their clothing, satisfied with their homes, should take pleasure in their rustic tasks. The next place might be so near at hand that one could hear the cocks crowing in it, the dogs barking; but the people would grow old and die without ever having been there."¹

¹Reprinted from Arthur Waley, *The Way and Its Power* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1934).

Chuang Tzu

Chuang Tzŭ

Chuang Tzŭ (c. 369 — c. 286 B. C.) was the most brilliant of the Taoist writers and the first who fully developed the principles found in early Taoist epigrams. We are indebted to Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien for a brief biography. Chuang Tzŭ was born at Mêng, in the state of Sung, and was given the personal name of Chou. While holding a small official post at Ch'i-yüan, he kept in close touch with the leading scholars of his day. High office did not appeal to him. When King Wei of Ch'u offered him the office of Prime Minister, he declined with the remark that in holding such an office he would be like an ox that is fed well before being sacrificed on the altar.

The *Chuang-tzŭ*,¹ in its present form, was probably compiled by the commentator, Kuo Hsiang, in the third century A. D. It is a collection of Taoist essays in thirty-three chapters representing three different phases of development. Only those chapters which reflect the third and final phase of early Taoism can be ascribed to Chuang Tzŭ himself, and even they, no doubt, contain interpolations by later writers. The first seven chapters are called "inner" because their titles are taken from the subject matter of the chapters. Chapters eight to twenty-two, inclusive, are called "outer" from the fact that the titles are derived from words that appear at the beginning or outside of the chapter. Chapters twenty-

¹Chuang Tzu refers to the man, and the *Chuang-tzu* refers to his book.

three to thirty-three, inclusive, are designated "miscellaneous." These are more obscure and are concerned with the development of a number of ideas rather than with a single principle.

Chuang Tzū wrote as a defender of his master, Lao Tzū. At the same time he entered new fields and produced passages that are noted for both originality of thought and literary beauty. They reflect a rich imagination, cool cynicism, and keen sense of humor. Numerous anecdotes are presented in the form of conversations between real or imaginary persons. Chuang Tzū reacted strongly against all traditional thought, especially against Confucianism. Where Confucius himself is introduced in the first seven chapters, he is made to serve as the mouth-piece of the writer's own doctrines. It is strange that, although Chuang Tzū and Mencius were contemporaries representing opposing schools of thought, neither one so much as mentioned the other in his writings.

Chuang Tzū's teaching takes the form of a pantheistic mysticism. As in the *Tao Tê Ching*, the central concept is that of the *Tao*. It is through the *Tao*, the self-existent first principle, that the universe has come into being. Equally significant is the fact that everything in the universe spontaneously produces itself. The *Tao*, therefore, can best be defined as the total spontaneity of all things. It can do all things by doing nothing. It follows that the *Tê* is the spontaneity which each individual thing receives from the *Tao*.

Reality is both one and ever changing. Contraries that seem to be directly opposed to each other are actually identical since they are merged in an all-inclusive unity. The identity of contraries makes all things equal. "Therefore it is that, viewed from the standpoint of *TAO*, a beam and a pillar are identical. So are ugliness and beauty, greatness, wickedness, perverseness, and strangeness."¹ All things are likewise in a constant state of flux. "The life of man passes by like a galloping horse, changing at every turn, at every hour."² To know the *Tao* truly is to achieve a mystical immediate perception of its pure unity and spontaneous transformations.

These spontaneous transformations take the form of an evolutionary development. As stages in the process, the *Chuang-tzū* mentions among others duckweed, lichen, dog-tooth violet, insect, bird, leopard, horse, and man. All life has its origin in germs and at death returns to its original state.

¹H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1926), pp. 19-20.

²*Ibid.*, p. 209.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHIES

Each thing achieves a relative happiness when it conforms to the *Tao* by following its own spontaneous nature. As an illustration, Chuang Tzū drew a comparison between the large mythical *rukbb* bird and a small cicada. The two are very unlike, especially in the distances they can cover in flight. Yet in so far as both act according to their own nature, their happiness is the same. Man, too, will find in the principle of spontaneous living his only path to happiness.

This teaching was the basis for Chuang Tzū's condemnation of political and social institutions. Men by nature differ greatly, and it is unwise forcibly to attempt to make them identical. The Confucianists no doubt had the interests of the people at heart when they set up uniform standards of conduct. They could not foresee that in enforcing these standards they would be injuring the very people they were seeking to help. The way to provide good order is to rule through non-ruling. Where things are let alone, good order will result spontaneously, since people who differ greatly in many other respects have the same strong desire for orderly living. The *Chuang-tzū* is thus in harmony with the *Tao Tê Ching* in advocating a policy of *laissez faire*. However, the reasons advanced for taking this position are not the same in the two works. It has been noted that the *Tao Tê Ching* finds its support in the principle of "reversion." The less a ruler governs, the more acceptable the result will be. The *Chuang-tzū*, on the other hand, is impressed with the superiority of nature over man. Laws and institutions are man's inventions and much inferior to nature's ways.

Wherever there is liberty, there must be a recognition of complete equality. Since from the standpoint of the *Tao* all things are equal, even moral distinctions must be rejected as invalid. Where there is a conflict of opinions, who can determine which one is right? The fact is that all opinions are equally right, and each individual is justified in maintaining his own. Different opinions are like different noises of the wind, all equally good. The sage transcends distinctions of right and wrong when he conforms to nature's ways of "following two courses at once." It can be said in defense of all the greater Taoists that, despite this questionable ethical theory, their own lives were above reproach.

The principle of equality can also be applied to life and death. These two are but different forms of existence, and each is equally good. Death is the natural result of life and, therefore, should cause no sorrow. When the emotions are brought under the control of reason, an individual is affected by neither joy nor sorrow. Chapter eighteen

tells how Chuang Tzū, on the occasion of his wife's death, was found singing and beating time on a bowl. One need not be lost at death even though there is no personal immortality. The way to become eternal is to identify oneself with the eternal universe. Chapter three likens existence to fire. When the present fuel is consumed, the fire is transmitted elsewhere.

In becoming identified with the universe, one enters into a state of pure experience. This is a mystical state of immediate presentation. Intellectual knowledge which makes distinctions must be discarded. The individual who has emptied his mind and attained perfect union with the universe is not even conscious of the state he has reached. All distinction between subject and object is lost and only the one remains. Chapter seven states: "For the perfect man employs his mind as a mirror. It grasps nothing; it refuses nothing. It receives, but does not keep."¹

The earliest of the Taoists had been much concerned with ways and means of preserving life and avoiding danger. Chuang Tzū, bent on identifying himself with the universe, rises above such mundane considerations. He finds the state of pure experience to be one of absolute happiness, a far higher achievement than ordinary happiness. Finite things achieve a limited happiness at best. In following their own spontaneous nature, they continue dependent on other things. He who finds happiness in health, wealth, and life will lose it in sickness, poverty, and death. But he who is one with the infinite finds absolute freedom in a "fasting of the heart" or emptiness.

This emphasis, like that of the *Tao Tê Ching*, reveals a possible Indian influence. The writers of the *Chuang-tzū* apparently were acquainted with *yoga*-technique. In several passages they describe a form of self-induced trance that reminds one of the Buddhist *dhyāna*. Much emphasis seems to have been placed upon breath-control.

The Taoist religion was established in the second century A. D. by Chang Tao-ling, the "Heaven Master." By this time the inspiring mysticism of the *Tao Tê Ching* and the *Chuang-tzū* had degenerated into a religion of magic and superstition. The common people were unable to understand the philosophy or experience the mysticism of the higher Taoists. They were more interested in alchemy and the search for longevity. Chang-Tao-ling founded a priesthood and became the first of a hereditary line of popes who until recently made their home on Dragon

¹*Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

Tiger Mountain in the province of Kiangsi. Their religion has more in common with Chinese Buddhism than with the teachings of the higher Taoists.

Chuang-tzu

The Chuang-tzũ

THE TAO

Chapter VI: The Great Supreme

TAO has its laws, and its evidences. It is devoid both of action and of form. It may be transmitted, but cannot be received. It may be obtained, but cannot be seen. Before heaven and earth were, TAO was. It has existed without change from all time. Spiritual beings drew their spirituality therefrom, while the universe become what we can see it now. To TAO, the zenith is not high, nor the nadir low; no point in time is long ago, nor by lapse of ages has it grown old (p. 76).

Chapter XII: The Universe

At the beginning of beginning, even Nothing did not exist. Then came the period of the Nameless.

When ONE came into existence, there was ONE, but it was formless. When things got that by which they came into existence, it was called their *virtue*.

That which was formless, but divided, though without interstice, was called *destiny*.

Then came the movement which gave life, and things produced in accordance with the principles of life had what is called form. When form encloses the spiritual part, each with its own characteristics, that is its *nature*. By cultivating this nature, we are carried back to virtue; and if this is perfected, we become as all things were in the beginning. We become unconditioned, and the unconditioned is great. As birds join their beaks in chirping, and beaks to chirp must be joined,—to be thus joined with the universe without being more conscious of it than an idiot, this is *divine virtue*, this is accordance with the eternal fitness of things (pp. 143-144).

Chapter XVII: Autumn Floods

It was the time of autumn floods. Every stream poured into the

river, which swelled in its turbid course. The banks receded so far from one another that it was impossible to tell a cow from a horse.

Then the Spirit of the River laughed for joy that all the beauty of the earth was gathered to himself. Down with the stream he journeyed east, until he reached the ocean. There, looking eastwards and seeing no limit to its waves, his countenance changed. And as he gazed over the expanse, he sighed and said to the Spirit of the Ocean, "A vulgar proverb says that he who has heard but part of the truth thinks no one equal to himself. And such a one am I.

"When formerly I heard people detracting from the learning of Confucius or underrating the heroism of Poh I, I did not believe. But now that I have looked upon your inexhaustibility—alas for me had I not reached your abode, I should have been for ever a laughing-stock to those of comprehensive enlightenment!"

To which the Spirit of the Ocean replied, "You cannot speak of ocean to a well-frog,—the creature of a narrower sphere.

You cannot speak of ice to a summer insect,—the creature of a season. You cannot speak of TAO to a pedagogue: his scope is too restricted. But now that you have emerged from your narrow sphere and have seen the great ocean, you know your own insignificance, and I can speak to you of great principles" (pp. 200-201).

Chapter XXII: Knowledge Travels North

Tung Kuo Tzŭ asked Chuang Tzŭ, saying, "What you call TAO,—where is it?"

"There is nowhere," replied Chuang Tzŭ, "where it is not."

"Tell me one place at any rate where it is," said Tung Kuo Tzŭ.

"It is in the ant," replied Chuang Tzŭ.

"Why go so low down?" asked Tung Kuo Tzŭ.

"It is in a tare," said Chuang Tzŭ.

"Still lower," objected Tung Kuo Tzŭ.

"It is in a potsherd," said Chuang Tzŭ.

"Worse still!" cried Tung Kuo Tzŭ.

"It is in ordure," said Chuang Tzŭ. And Tung Kuo Tzŭ made no reply.

"Sir," continued Chuang Tzŭ, "your question does not touch the essential. When Huo, inspector of markets, asked the managing director about the fatness of pigs, the test was always made in parts least likely to be fat. Do not therefore insist in any particular direction; for there is nothing which escapes. Such is perfect TAO; and such also is

ideal speech. *Whole, entire, all*, are three words which sound differently but mean the same. Their purport is ONE.

"Try to reach with me the palace of Nowhere, and there, amidst the identity of all things, carry your discussions into the infinite. Try to practise with me inaction, wherein you may rest motionless, without care, and be happy. For thus my mind becomes an abstraction. It wanders not, and yet is not conscious of being at rest. It goes and comes and is not conscious of stoppages. Backwards and forwards without being conscious of any goal. Up and down the realms of Infinity, wherein even the greatest intellect would fail to find an end.

"That which makes things the things they are, is not limited to such things. The limits of things are their own limits in so far as they are things. The limits of the limitless, the limitlessness of the limited,—these are called fulness and emptiness, renovation and decay. TAO causes fulness and emptiness, but it is not either. It causes renovation and decay, but it is not either. It causes beginning and end, but it is not either. It causes accumulation and dispersion, but it is not either" (pp. 285-287).

Chapter II: The Identity of Contraries

"Speech is not mere breath. It is differentiated by meaning. Take away that, and you cannot say whether it is speech or not. Can you even distinguish it from the chirping of young birds?

"But how can TAO be so obscured that we speak of it as true and false? And how can speech be so obscured that it admits the idea of contraries? How can TAO go away and yet not remain? How can speech exist and yet be impossible?

"TAO is obscured by our want of grasp. Speech is obscured by the gloss of this world. Hence the affirmatives and negatives of the Confucian and Mohist schools, each denying what the other affirmed and affirming what the other denied. But he who would reconcile affirmative with negative and negative with affirmative, must do so by the light of nature.

"There is nothing which is not objective: there is nothing which is not subjective. But it is impossible to start from the objective. Only from subjective knowledge is it possible to proceed to objective knowledge. Hence it has been said, 'The objective emanates from the subjective; the subjective is consequent upon the objective. This is the *Alternation Theory*.' Nevertheless, when one is born, the other dies. When one is possible, the other is impossible. When one is affirmative the other is negative. Which being the case, the true sage rejects all

distinctions of this and that. He takes his refuge in GOD¹, and places himself in subjective relation with all things.

"And inasmuch as the subjective is also objective, and the objective also subjective, and as the contraries under each are indistinguishably blended, does it not become impossible for us to say whether subjective and objective really exist at all?

"When subjective and objective are both without their correlates, that is the very axis of TAO. And when that axis passes through the centre at which all Infinities converge, positive and negative alike blend into an infinite ONE. Hence it has been said that there is nothing like the light of nature" (pp. 16-19).

"Now I would ask you this. If a man sleeps in a damp place, he gets lumbago and dies. But how about an eel? And living up in a tree is precarious and trying to the nerves;—but how about monkeys? Of the man, the eel, and the monkey, whose habitat is the right one, absolutely? Human beings feed on flesh, deer on grass, centipedes on snakes' brains, owls and crows on mice. Of these four, whose is the right taste, absolutely? Monkey mates with monkey, the buck with the doe; eels consort with fishes, while men admire Mao Ch'iang and Li Chi, at the sight of whom fishes plunge deep down in the water, birds soar high in the air, and deer hurry away. Yet who shall say which is the correct standard of beauty? In my opinion, the standard of human virtue, and of positive and negative is so obscured that it is impossible to actually know it as such" (p. 27).

Once upon a time, I, Chuang Tzŭ, dreamt I was a butterfly, fluttering hither and thither, to all intents and purposes a butterfly. I was conscious only of following my fancies as a butterfly, and was unconscious of my individuality as a man. Suddenly, I awaked and there I lay myself again. Now I do not know whether I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am not a butterfly, dreaming I am a man. Between a man and a butterfly there is necessarily a barrier. The transition is called *Metempsychosis* (p. 32).

Chapter XVII: Autumn Floods

"From the point of view of TAO," replied the Spirit of the Ocean "there are no such extremes of value or worthlessness. Men

¹For a more accurate rendering, substitute "Heaven" or "Nature" for God. Where Giles introduces the term "God" in the translation he means "a principle which exists by virtue of its own intrinsicity, and operates spontaneously, without self manifestation."

individually value themselves and hold others cheap. The world collectively withholds from the individual the right of appraising himself,

"If we say that anything is good or evil because it is either good or small, then there is nothing in all creation which is not great, nothing which is not small. To know that the universe is but as a tare-seed, and that the tip of a hair is a mountain, —this is the expression of relativity.

"If we say that something exists or does not exist, in deference to the function it fulfils or does not fulfil, then there is nothing which does not exist nothing which does exist. To know that east and west are convertible and yet necessary terms,—this is the due adjustment of functions.

If we say that anything is good or evil because it is good or evil in our eyes, then there is nothing which is not good, nothing which is not evil. To know that Yao and Chieh were both good and both evil from their opposite points of view,—this is the expression of a standard" (pp. 205-206).

RELATIVE HAPPINESS

Chapter 1: Transcendental Bliss

In the northern ocean there is a fish, called the Leviathan, many thousand *li* in size. This leviathan changes into a bird, called the Rukh, whose back is many thousand *li* in breadth. With a mighty effort it rises, and its wings obscure the sky like clouds.

At the equinox this bird prepares to start for the southern ocean, the Celestial Lake. And in the *Record of Marvels* we read that when the rukh flies southwards the water is smitten for a space of three thousand *li* around, while the bird itself mounts upon a typhoon to a height of ninety thousand *li* for a flight of six months' duration.

Just so are the motes in a sunbeam, blown aloft by God. For whether the blue of the sky is its real colour, or only the result of distance without end, the effect to the bird looking down would be just the same as to the motes.

If there is not sufficient depth, water will not float large ships. Upset a cupful into a small hole, and a mustard-seed will be your boat. Try to float the cup, and it will stick, from the disproportion between water and vessel.

So with air. If there is not a sufficient depth, it cannot support large birds. And for this bird a depth of ninety thousand *li* is neces-

sary; and then, with nothing save the clear sky above, and no obstacle in the way, it starts upon its journey to the south.

A cicada laughed, and said to a young dove, "Now when I fly with all my might, 'tis as much as I can do to get from tree to tree. And sometimes I do not reach, but fall to the ground midway. What then can be the use of going up ninety thousand *li* in order to start for the south?"

He who goes to Mang-ts'ang, taking three meals with him, comes back with his stomach as full as when he started. But he who travels a hundred *li* must grind flour enough for a night's halt. And he who travels a thousand *li* must supply himself with provisions for three months. Those two little creatures,—what should they know? Small knowledge has not the compass of great knowledge any more than a short year has the length of a long year.

How can we tell that this is so? The mushroom of a morning knows not the alternation of day and night. The chrysalis knows not the alternation of spring and autumn. Theirs are short years.

But in the State of Ch'u there is a tortoise whose spring and autumn are each of five hundred years duration. And in former days there was a large tree which had a spring and autumn each of eight thousand years' duration. Yet, P'êng Tsu¹ is still, alas! an object of envy to all.

It was on this very subject that the Emperor T'ang spoke to Chi, as follows:—"At the barren north there is a great sea, the Celestial Lake. In it there is a fish, several thousand *li* in breadth, and I know not how many in length. It is called the Leviathan. There is also a bird called the Rukh, with a back like Mount T'ai, and wings like clouds across the sky. Upon a typhoon it soars up to a height of ninety thousand *li*, beyond the clouds and atmosphere, with only the clear sky above it. And then it directs its flight towards the south pole.

"A quail laughed, and said: Pray, what may that creature be going to do? I rise but a few yards in the air and settle again after flying around among the reeds. That is the most I can manage. Now, where ever can this creature be going to?"

Such indeed, is the difference between small and great. Take, for instance, a man who creditably fills some small office, or who is a pattern of virtue in his neighbourhood or who influences his prince to right government of the State,—his opinion of himself will be much

¹According to tradition this man lived at least eight hundred years.

the same as that quail's. The philosopher Yung laughs at such a one. He, if the whole world flattered him, would not be affected thereby, nor if the whole world blamed him would he lose his faith in himself. For Yung can distinguish between the intrinsic and the extrinsic, between honour and shame,—and such men are rare in their generation. But even he has not established himself (pp. 1-4).

Chapter IX: Horses' Hoofs

Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.

One day Poh Loh appeared, saying, "I understand the management of horses."

So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs and put halters on them, trying them up by the head and shackling them by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming and trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them were dead.

The potter says, "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it round I use compasses; if rectangular, a square."

The carpenter says, "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line."

But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and line? Nevertheless, every age extols Poh Loh for his skill in managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who *govern* the empire make the same mistake.

Now I regard government of the empire from quite a different point of view.

The people have certain natural instincts;—to weave and clothe themselves, to till and feed themselves. These are common to all humanity, and all are agreed thereon. Such instincts are called "Heaven-sent."

And so in the days when natural instincts prevailed, men moved quietly and gazed steadily. At that time, there were no roads over mountains, nor boats, nor bridges over water. All things were produced, each for its own proper sphere. Birds and beasts multiplied; trees and shrubs grew up. The former might be led by the hand; you could

climb up and peep into the raven's nest. For then man dwelt with birds and beasts, and all creation was one. There were no distinctions of good and bad men. Being all equally without knowledge, their virtue could not go astray. Being all equally without evil desires, they were in a state of natural integrity, the perfection of human existence.

But when Sages appeared, tripping people over charity and fettering with duty to one's neighbour, doubt found its way into the world. And then with their gushing over music and fussing over ceremony, the empire became divided against itself (pp. 106-108).

Chapter XVII: Autumn Floods

Chuang Tzŭ was fishing in the P'u when the prince of Ch'u sent two high officials to ask him to take charge of the administration of the Ch'u State.

Chuang Tzŭ went on fishing and without turning his head said, "I have heard that in Ch'u there is a sacred tortoise which has been dead now some three thousand years. And that the prince keeps this tortoise carefully enclosed in a chest on the altar of his ancestral temple. Now would this tortoise rather be dead and have its remains venerated, or be alive and wagging its tail in the mud?"

"It would rather be alive," replied the two officials, "and wagging its tail in the mud."

"Begone!" cried Chuang Tzŭ. "I too will wag my tail in the mud" (p. 217).

Chapter XVIII: Perfect Happiness

"Besides, have you not heard that of old when a sea-bird alighted outside the capital of Lu, the prince went out to receive it, and gave it wine in the temple, and had the *Chiu Shao*¹ played to amuse it, and a bullock slaughtered to feed it? But the bird was dazed and too timid to eat or drink anything; and in three days it was dead. This was treating the bird like oneself, and not as a bird would treat a bird. Had he treated it as a bird would have treated a bird, he would have put it to roost in a deep forest, to wander over a plain, to swim in a river or lake, to feed upon fish, to fly in order, and to settle leisurely. When the bird was already terrified at human voices, fancy adding music! Play the *Hsien Ch'ib*² or the *Chiu Shao* in the wilds of Tung-r'ing and birds will fly away, beasts will take themselves off, and fishes will dive down below. But men will collect to hear.

¹Music of the legendary Emperor Shun.

²Music of the legendary Yellow Emperor.

"Water, which is life to fishes, is death to man. Being differently constituted their likes and dislikes are different. Therefore the Sages of the past favoured not uniformity of skill or of occupation. Reputation was commensurate with reality; means were adapted to the end. This was called a due relationship with others coupled with advantage to oneself" (pp. 226-227).

IMMORTALITY

Chapter II: The Identity of Contraries

"How do I know that love of life is not a delusion after all? How do I know but that he who dreads to die is not as a child who has lost the way and cannot find his home?

"The lady Li Chi was the daughter of Ai Fêng. When the Duke of Chin first got her, she wept until the bosom of her dress was drenched with tears. But when she came to the royal residence, and lived with the Duke, and ate rich food, she repented of having wept. How then do I know but that the dead repent of having previously clung to life?

"Those who dream of the banquet, wake to lamentation and sorrow. Those who dream of lamentation and sorrow wake to join the hunt. While they dream, they do not know that they dream. Some will even interpret the very dream they are dreaming; and only when they awake do they know it was a dream.

By and by comes the Great Awakening, and then we find out that this life is really a great dream" (pp. 29-30).

Chapter VI: The Great Supreme

A boat may be hidden in a creek, or in a bog, safe enough. But at midnight a strong man may come and carry away the boat on his back. The dull of vision do not perceive that however you conceal things, small ones in larger ones, there will always be a chance of losing them. But if you conceal the whole universe in the whole universe, there will be no place left wherein it may be lost. The laws of matter make this to be so.

To have attained to the human form must be always a source of joy. And then, to undergo countless transitions, with only the infinite to look forward to,—what incomparable bliss is that! Therefore it is that the truly wise rejoice in that which can never be lost, but endures always. For if we can accept early death, old age, a beginning, and an end, why not that which informs all creation and is of all phenomena the Ultimate Cause? (pp. 75-76).

Chapter XVIII: Perfect Happiness

When Chuang Tzū's wife died, Hui Tzū went to condole. He found the widower sitting on the ground, singing, with his legs spread out at a right angle, and beating time on a bowl.

"To live with your wife," exclaimed Hui Tzū, "and see your eldest son grow up to be a man, and then not to shed a tear over her corpse, this would be bad enough. But to drum on a bowl, and sing; surely this is going too far."

"Not at all," replied Chuang Tzū. "When she died, I could not help being affected by her death. Soon, however, I remembered that she had already existed in a previous state before birth, without form, or even substance; that while in that unconditioned condition, substance was added to spirit; that this substance then assumed form; and that the next stage was birth. And now by virtue of a further change, she is dead, passing from one phase to another like the sequence of spring, summer, autumn, and winter. And while she is thus lying asleep in Eternity, for me to go about weeping and wailing would be to proclaim myself ignorant of these natural laws. Therefore I refrain." . . .

Chuang Tzū one day saw an empty skull, bleached, but still preserving its shape. Striking it with his riding whip, he said, "Wert thou once some ambitious citizen whose inordinate yearnings brought him to this pass?—Some satesman who plunged his country in ruin and perished in the fray?—Some wretch who left behind him a legacy of shame?—Some beggar who died in the pangs of hunger and cold? Or didst thou reach this state by the natural course of old age?"

When he had finished speaking, he took the skull, and placing it under his head as a pillow, went to sleep. In the night, he dreamt that the skull appeared to him and said, "You speak well, Sir; but all you say has reference to the life of mortals and to mortal troubles. In death there are none of these. Would you like to hear about death?"

Chuang Tzū having replied in the affirmative the skull began:—"In death, there is no sovereign above, and no subject below. The workings of the four seasons are unknown. Our existences are bounded only by eternity. The happiness of a king among men cannot exceed that which we enjoy."

Chuang Tzū, however, was not convinced, and said, "Were I to prevail upon God to allow your body to be born again, and your bones and flesh to be renewed, so that you could return to your parents, to your wife, and to the friends of your youth,—would you be willing?"

At this, the skull opened its eyes wide and knitted its brows and

said, "How should I cast aside happiness greater than that of a king, and mingle once again in the toils and troubles of mortality?" (pp. 223-225).

ABSOLUTE HAPPINESS

Chapter II: The Identity of Contraries

Tzŭ Ch'i of Nan-kuo sat leaning on a table. Looking up to heaven, he sighed and became absent, as though soul and body had parted.

Yen Ch'êng Tzŭ Yu, who was standing by him, exclaimed, "What are you thinking about that your body should become thus like dry wood, your mind like dead ashes? Surely the man now leaning on the table is not he who was here just now."

"My friend," replied Tzŭ Ch'i, "your question is apposite. *Today-I have buried myself*" (p. 12).

Chapter VI: The Great Supreme

"I am getting on," observed Yen Hui to Confucius.

"How so?" asked the latter.

"I have got rid of charity and duty," replied the former.

"Very good," replied Confucius and said, "I am getting on."

Another day Yen Hui met Confucius and said, "I am getting on."

"How so?" asked Confucius.

"How so?" "I have got rid of ceremonial and music," answered Yen Hui.

"Very good," said Confucius, "but not perfect."

On a third occasion Yen Hui met Confucius and said, "I am getting on."

"How so?" asked the Sage.

"I have got rid of everything," replied Yen Hui.

"Got rid of everything-" said Confucius eagerly. "What do you mean by that?"

"I have freed myself from my body," answered Yen Hui. "I have discarded my reasoning powers. And by thus getting rid of body and mind. I have become ONE with the Infinite. This is what I mean by getting rid of everything."

"If you have become ONE," cried Confucius, "there can be no room for bias. If you have passed into space you are indeed without beginning or end. And if you have really attained to this, I trust to be allowed to follow in your steps" (pp. 89-90).

Chapter XI: On Letting Alone

"Come, and I will speak to you of perfect TAO.

"The essence of perfect TAO is profoundly mysterious; its extent is lost in obscurity.

"See nothing; hear nothing; let your soul be wrapped in quiet; and your body will begin to take proper form. Let there be absolute repose and absolute purity; do not weary your body nor disturb your vitality,—and you will live for ever. For if the eye sees nothing, and the ear hears nothing, and the mind thinks nothing, the soul will preserve the body and the body will live for ever.

"Cherish that which is within you and shut off that which is without; for much knowledge is a curse. Then I will place you upon that abode of Great Light which is the source of the positive Power and escort you through the gate of Profound Mystery which is the source of the negative Power.

These Powers are the controllers of heaven and earth, and each contains the other" (p. 127).

Chapter XX: Mountain Trees

Chuang Tzu was travelling over a mountain when he saw a huge tree well covered with foliage. A woodsman had stopped near by, not caring to take it; and on Chuang Tzu enquiring the reason, he was told that it was of no use.

"This tree," cried Chuang Tzu, "by virtue of being good for nothing succeeds in completing its allotted span."

When Chuang Tzu left the mountain, he put up at the house of an old friend. The latter was delighted and ordered a servant to kill a goose and cook it.

"Which shall I kill?" enquired the servant; "the one that cackles or the one that doesn't?"

His master told him to kill the one which did not cackle. And accordingly, the next day, a disciple asked Chuang Tzu, saying, "Yesterday, that tree on the mountain, because good for nothing, was to succeed in completing its allotted span. But now our host's goose which is good for nothing, has to die. Upon which horn of the dilemma will you rest?"

"I rest," replied Chuang Tzu with a smile, "halfway between the two. In that position, appearing to be what I am not, it is impossible to avoid the troubles of mortality; though, if charioted upon TAO and floating far above mortality, this would not be so. No praise, no

blame; both great and small; changing with the change of time, but ever without special effort; both above and below; making for harmony with surroundings; reaching creation's First Cause; swaying all things and swayed by none;—how then shall such troubles come? This was the method of Shên Nung and Huang Ti.

"But amidst the mundane passions and relationships of man, such would not be the case. For where there is union there is also separation; where there is completion, there is also destruction; where there is purity there is also oppression; where there is honour, there is also disparagement; where there is doing, there is also undoing; where there is openness there is also underhandedness; and where there is no semblance, there is also deceit. How then can there be any fixed point? Alas indeed! Take note my disciples, that such is to be found only in the domain of TAO" (pp. 245-247).¹

¹Reprinted from H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer* (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1926).

Japanese Philosophy

A helpful key in understanding the history and spirit of Japanese philosophy is embodied in the concept of *Kokutai* which signifies "the spirit of Japan." In centuries past, the Japanese people migrated from an earlier South Sea home and, in the course of time unified the 150,000 square miles of islands composing their present habitat. As the spirit of the land took form it found expression in Japanese *Shintō*. At once a religion and a philosophy, *Shintō* is the "system of *Kokutai*, and as such reflects the inherent quality of the land and its people. All Japanese are *Shintōists*, in a sense, by virtue of their Japanese birth. The influence of foreign beliefs and philosophies has always been tempered by the *Kokutai*, just as it, in turn has been modified by foreign elements. This spirit has enabled the Japanese to maintain an imperial dynasty so old that in the popular mind, at least, it is descendant from the ancient Sun Goddess. *Kokutai*, more than government, religion, or philosophical outlook has made for the long-standing solidarity of the nation.

Excepting *Shintō*, whatever is ancient in the philosophy of Japan is derived from her continental neighbors, particularly India. Japanese philosophy has represented a unique combination of elements to be found originally in Buddhism Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism and

the native Shintō and Bushidō.¹ Of great influence even today is the Buddhist philosophy, which came to the islands from India via China and Korea. The teachings of Confucius have likewise tempered the thought and conduct of the people, and in the modern philosophical schools there are roots extending deep into both the old Chinese philosophies and the modern Western systems. The union of these imported formative elements with indigenous thought has resulted in the formulation of a distinctive Japanese sentiment of loyalty to land and sovereign as chief of the virtues.

Two major traditional philosophies, Shintō and Buddhism, are also the source of teachings of the two great religions. To these, in modern Japan, we must add Christianity and the Confucian elements. Each has made its distinctive contributions to the spiritual life of the Japanese, and it is not at all uncommon to find Shintōists who are Buddhists and Confucian scholars as well.

Shintō in Japan is a state creed, a personal religion, and to some extent a philosophy. The word itself is Chinese (*shên-tao*) and means "way of the spirits". In Japanese it is called *Kami no Michi*. *Kami* are the indwelling spirits and the term has a wide meaning. It may, for example, signify a natural object or its spirit, one of the gods, including the Sun Goddess herself, or it may mean the "original spirit" itself.

Shintō is based in myth and nature worship, and its origins are lost in obscurity. It was handed down for generations by word of mouth and tradition, since the Japanese did not learn to write until the fifth century A. D., when this art was borrowed from the Chinese. The oldest book of Shintō was composed in 712 A.D., probably under Chinese influence. This *Kojiki* or *ancient time chronicle* as it is called, is a storehouse of myth. Next in antiquity, among the early books of Shintō is the *Nihongi*, from which the selections at the end of this chapter have been taken. It was begun in 681 and finished about 720. This *Japan chronicle* makes evident the early foundations of the Shintō beliefs. It is the bible that fostered a faith and spirit known only to these particular islands. There is little of strictly philosophical importance in it for us today, except as it was a determining influence in the development of later Japanese thought and philosophy. The *Engi-shiki* or *origin of rites* was composed in the 10th century, and the *Manyō-shū*, a collection of poems, was written in the 9th century. These are two other important Shintō scriptures.

¹An attitude developed during the feudal ages signifying the way of the warrior. It elevates loyalty, personal honor, courage etc. as supreme.

JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY

The primitive "philosophy" to be discerned in early Shintō, as it is recorded in the *Nihongi*, portrays the divine in the natural. There is no deity apart from the human mind. It is naturalism rather than spiritualism, humanism rather than spiritism.

Ethically, the *kami no michi* was the natural way. Men, who were descendants of the gods could, by their very divinity do no wrong. Shintō has no written code of ethics. There is an implied practice of morality, however, as evidenced by the Shintō rite of national "purification." The *Kojiki* mentions "heavenly" and "divine" offenses, although it required the tenets of Buddhism and Confucian thought to provide strict meaning and definition for these vague notions of virtue and vice. The evil of wrong-doing, in Shintō, is based on the physical and spiritual impurity of a wrong in the sight of the deities. It ignores the damaging spiritual results to be so incurred by the offender.

There is a political philosophy in Shintō worth noting. With its extreme emphasis on loyalty to state, patriotism, courage, and the divine origin of the emperor, it is immediately obvious that such a "philosophy" might be very useful to the state. And so it has been. The divine foundations of the imperial sovereignty were carefully recorded in both the *Kojiki* and the *Nihongi*. The state cult of Shintō in contemporary times represents little more than the refined admixture of politics and religion.¹

The other Shintō virtues include purity, cleanliness, filial piety, duty to parents and elders, sincerity and simplicity.

Shintō is not only a national belief and philosophy it is also practiced as a religion. Various *kami* are nationally known and widely worshipped. There are many gods. Each shrine has its own particular deity, and there are also gods of the sea; rivers mountains and a host of others. There is little individual prayer in the Shintō religion. Traditionally prayer has been employed in supplication and thanksgiving to the food deity. Deep honor is paid to departed ancestors, perhaps reflective of

¹In a recent article ("Japanese Sinto", *The Hibbert Journal*, XLVII, 3, April 1949, pp. 272-278), T. Bary shows quite clearly that Shinto has its beginnings as a worship of Nature and that its militaristic and political cast is as recent in origin as the Revolution of 1868. It was then employed as a useful weapon, by virtue of its teaching a supreme reverence for the Emperor as representative on earth of the Sun-Goddess, in overthrowing the Tokugawa who had for more than two centuries exercised the real power in Japan, and restoring this power to the Emperor himself.

Confucian influences. The Gods have souls dwelling in the temples, according to the popular belief, and through them man is able to commune with heaven. These god souls are called *mitama*, and each is represented by some material object or *shintai*. Through ignorance, many unlearned worshippers pay their respects mistakenly to the *shintai*—the outward symbol of the god—rather than to the *mitama*, or the god itself. The religion consistently elevates patriotism and loyalty as prime virtues. The Shintō deities have little to do with death, since it is regarded as impure, and consequently outside their realm.

As recently as 1871, the state enacted a law divorcing the Shintō shrines from the religious organizations. This act fostered rather than discouraged, the development of purely religious sects. Thus, the shrine at Isé, one of the most important in all of Japan is that of the state cult. It is dedicated to *Amaterasu*, the Sun Goddess. Her symbol is that of a highly polished metal mirror, the origins of which extend deep into Shintō mythology. There are as well hundreds of religious shrines established and maintained by the various sects, and many householders possess domestic shrines as the site of family worship.

Buddhism, unlike Shintō in that it is a foreign importation, came to Japan in the 6th century of our Christian era, via China and in particular through embassies sent by the kingdom of Petchke, in south-west Korea. At first rejected, these Buddhist embassies finally found imperial favor and support in the person of Prince Shotoku (born 574). By his first official act of government, this imperial regent made Buddhism the state religion. By this measure and by the establishment of a center at Horyuji, Buddhism was introduced into Japan.

It was welcomed and this is not at all surprising. The teachings of Lao Tzū, Chuang Tzū, and Confucius, which were already known to the island kingdom, offered the prescription for a good life on earth but went no further. Buddhism, as it was tempered by the native Japanese spirit and moulded by existing attitudes was more adapted to satisfy the common appetite for a belief and a body of teachings able to incorporate the material and the spiritual. With a little modification and adornment, it could even offer a glimpse of the other world.

Not only did Buddhism give a new richness and a spiritual significance to the teachings of Confucius and the others, but it also had a profound influence upon art. When Buddhism arrived it engendered a popular passion for understanding. This passion found outlet in part in forms of graphic representation. The six great canons of oriental art were formulated in the 6th century and they remain even today of

great interest to the student of aesthetics. The artist, with his new-found Buddhism, discarded objectivity for subjectivity in the practice of his art. In painting an object, whether it was man, animal, tree or landscape, he sought to portray with his brush something more than objective appearance. He aimed for a view of the indwelling spirit of things, and when he found it, created works of great meaning and beauty.

Japanese Buddhism, in common with the Chinese form is mainly *Mahayanist*. It will be recalled that the *Hinayana* retains the teaching of Buddha at its face value, emphasizing salvation for the few through self-effort, and exalting the ideal of the seeker in quest of Nirvana. It regards external objects as real, existing in a time relationship. Consciousness is a continuing current, and evolution as such is denied. The self exists only in name, the individual being an impermanent phenomenon. Fundamentally, the approach to problems is through realism.

Mahayana (the greater vehicle), on the other hand, with its greater powers of absorbing local beliefs and customs, was more suited to satisfy the needs of a spiritually hungry people. It holds that body is suffused with mind; matter does not exist in a realistic sense, but becomes sensible only by virtue of mind. It is an idealistic, monistic view. Its rich precept, that the Buddha-nature persists in all things, uniting diversities and contradictions, and retaining the doctrine of impermanence, by its very idealism took the stronger hold, of the two forms, on the Japanese and was so accepted. This arrival of Buddhism (6th century) was not without influence upon the indigenous Shintō. The two were at first opposed in untempered difference. Within a few centuries, however, Buddhist priests had evolved a "single-verity Shintō (Ichijitsu Shintō) which was able to trace the Shintō gods to an ultimate single source, namely the one Reality of Buddha. The two doctrines came even closer together when Shingon sect Buddhists developed "Dual Shinto" which allowed for a parallel interpretation of Shintō metaphysics in Buddhist terms. Shintō *kami* could thus be viewed as Buddhist divinities and inherent difficulties between the two doctrines were minimized or disappeared altogether.

Several Neo-Shintō movements arose in medieval times to discredit the fashion of native and Buddhist thought. The "One-only" school (Yui-itsu Shintō) attained prominence around 1500. It sought to reverse earlier Buddhist teaching and interpreted the Buddhist deities not as the primordial powers, but rather as avatars of the Shintō *kami*. "Return-to-antiquity" Shintō (Fukko Shintō) found

prominence in the 18th century through the vigorous teachings of such men as Kamo-no-Mabuchi, Motoōri Norinaga, and Hirata Atsutane. These thinkers, in urging the return to pure Shintō, emphasized the divine ancestry of sovereign and nation and the superior nature of the Japanese in knowing and practicing natural right. Such fundamentally ethnocentric teachings were not without influence in bringing about the collapse of the shogunate and the restoration of the imperial dignity in the latter half of the last century (1868). These Neo-Shinto doctrines, as is intimated elsewhere, have had the official blessing of national imperial leaders for obvious reasons.

To return now to the development of Buddhism in Japan, we must consider the significance of the doctrine of *Zen*. This doctrine pointed out a more rigorous way of finding the secrets of the universe, namely, by concentration, contemplation and realization. *Zen* (*Cb'an* in Chinese) came to China around 520 A.D., from India, in the message of the Indian patriarch *Bodhidharma*. He taught the pure Yoga of the Upanishads in its strictest form. The ultimate thing, he believed, was not Buddha, but the causes and relations at the base of his teachings. He denied individual personality in the universe and substituted the One of whom each is a phenomenon or reflection. The absolute was in every man's heart and was to be discovered by the way of contemplation. His was a system of idealistic monism. By means of *Zen*, one was able to behold his own fundamental nature, and in so beholding was able to unlock the mysteries of the world.

Although it was austere in its teaching, and as a result did not appeal to the masses, it found the few who were to make it, by study and example, a power in both China and Japan. In Japan, it was the philosophy of men of high understanding, fitting well, as it did, in the code of the warrior class where discipline, duty and loyalty were the important virtues. For the masses, *Zen* gave system to the knowledge of experience. It brought vague beliefs into focus. It expelled belief in individuality and taught that by contact with nature, man recovers his lost unity with the forces of nature.

In providing a "practical" philosophy, Buddhism has often taken a religious form in Japan. Presently there are six major Buddhist sects. These forms of Buddhism originated from the 9th to the 13th centuries, and include the *Tendai*, *Shingon*, *Jojo*, *Shin*, *Zen*, and *Nichiren*. Differences in their interpretation of fundamental Buddhist doctrine are of interest to the student of comparative religions, rather than to the philosopher.

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In part at least, a new direction has been taken by the development of philosophy in "modern" Japan. Here we must take into account the impact of western schools of thought and its subtle relationship to the traditional philosophies. Historically, modern Japanese philosophy begins with the year 1868 and the revolution of Meiji. Recognize, of course, the full part played by earlier thought in preparing the Japanese for the teachings of western philosophy. As is always the case in human history, there was no real and abrupt change in the intellectual history of the nation, rather it has been a matter of perhaps a deviation in direction of movement and shifting of emphasis.

The Japanese, despite earlier systems of idealism, are much inclined to the attractions of realism. They have not always understood why western minds could become engrossed in the "impractical" study of questions which bear no immediate "real" fruit. Thus, when Japan was opened to western influence by the revolution of 1868, it was the mechanical arts and military skills, rather than philosophies, which were first adopted and utilized.

Purely as an aid to the study of Japanese philosophy, we may regard its development in four phases. There was the preliminary stage of old Japanese thought, generally indicated in the preceeding pages. For two decades following the revolution, (ca. 1868-1886), French and English thought usurped the field of philosophic speculation in Japan. Then, for twenty years, ending with the period immediately following the turn of the century, German influence predominated. A fourth stage, centered around the years just preceeding the first world war, was marked by a period of subjectivism, national self-consciousness, and the substituting of an intuitionism in keeping with the background of the national character for the previously accepted rationalism. We are perhaps too close to the period between the two world wars to be positive of the trend in the developments during that period. There was an obvious emphasis on nationalism, however, giving greater power and significance to the warrior classes, and terminating finally in a war and the atomic bomb at Hiroshima.

Confucian thought came to Japan in the beginning of the Christian period. It was, as we have seen elsewhere, a philosophy of conduct, a humanism—and it ruled Japanese thought for centuries. One of the most eminent of these early philosophers was the Chinese Shushi.

Shushi lived about 1130—1200 A. D., and provided the first great

impulse to philosophic speculation in many years. He was an historian and statesman as well as a philosopher. Educated in Buddhism and Taoism, he rejected both to form a new system based primarily on the teachings of the brothers Ch'eng, who lived late in the 11th century. Their criticism of the classics opened a new era in Chinese philosophy and helped to give the unsystematic Confucian ethics form as an ontological system. Shushi refined this system, and his studies later found their way to Japan (in the 17th century), where they partially displaced Buddhism. A Japanese scholar, Fujiwara Seigwa (1565-1619), was particularly instrumental in bringing the teachings of this classical proponent of the doctrines of Chinese antiquity to the islands.

Shushi's teachings are based on the Yang and Yin principles in Chinese philosophy. This basic dualism was fused by Shushi into a monistic interpretation according to which nature is viewed as a living, breathing, organism representing a chain of spiritual life running through every form of existence, binding diversities and contradictions into a unified whole. This view teaches that in the beginning there was one abstract principle, or monad, called the *great absolute*. This abstract principle is the primordial cause of all things existent. When it moved, its energy condensed and formed the great male principle. When it rested, by so resting, it produced the female principle. It moved again to produce heaven, and rested to produce earth. In its alternate periods of activity and inactivity, it produced the universal range of men, animals, plants, and all other forms. The same energy persists through the male and female principles and is termed *Chi*, or the breath of nature. It follows fixed laws, *Li*, which constitute the order of nature; and, these laws are in strict accord with mathematical relationships which may be set forth graphically. These principles, *Chi*, *Li*, and their mathematical formulation, are not cognizable to the senses, but are hidden inexorably in the forms of physical nature.

Following Shushi and Seigwa came Kakae Toju (1608-1678), another early philosophical Titan. He followed the Chinese teachings, and had as his preceptor Oyomei. The latter attempted to reconcile Buddhism and Confucianism much as Aquinas set out to show the comparability of a faith and a philosophy in quite another era. Toju had many distinguished followers, and his school of thought was influential not only in his own day, but also in forming the thought to come.

A third school of early Japanese philosophy was that formulated of Shintōism. His philosophy follows the general lines of Shintō. The

by Yamazaki Ansai (1618-1682). He spiritualized the native religion world, he taught, is a great visible realization of the fundamental Yang and Yin principles. It is not a direct product of a creator, but is as it is by necessity. It will exist for forever and is without beginning and end. It recognizes constant new formation and continuous development. The early physical science of the western world found and formulated the principle of the conservation of energy. Avsai found the same law, but without experimental verification, when he stated simply that when a thing is destroyed, another thing is automatically created. The principle of Avsai's school was the natural law by which all live without knowing it.

Ito Jinsai (1625-1706) found primitive energy, as it is interpreted ideally and materially, as the fundamental principle of the world. He was a monist, and more of a materialist than an idealist. He taught that idealistic manifestations of energy are contained in its material manifestations, although the converse is not true. Ethically, he began with the idea that man's nature is originally good, and that it changes only through the individual's own manner of living. Man's innate goodness, he taught, is to be developed through humanity and justice.

Kaibara Yekken carried Jinsai's thought somewhat further in denying the existence of anything more in the world than energy (*Chi*), which he regarded as in a continual state of transformation. Idealism and realism, were, according to him, only different points of view.

Bursu Sorai (1666-1728), another of the early Japanese philosophers, was concerned primarily with the problem of mortality. He taught that its origin lies neither in the heart nor in some vast principle of nature, but is a creation of the wise men themselves. He has little to say concerning metaphysical issues.

Ashiwo Chusai (1794-1837), last of the pre-modern philosophers, returned to the school of Oyomei for his foundations, and found the principle of heaven in every man, beast and stone. He taught that if the heart is free of base desires, then heaven resides in the heart undefiled and there is spiritual purity.

Thus far, in the history of Japanese thought, we can note that there has been little emphasis on purely metaphysical speculation, that Confucian thought has a prominent part in the formulation of the philosophical schools, and finally, that Japanese philosophy has drawn heavily from the thought of both Shushi and Oyomei.

In the modern era, during the period of French and English influ-

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ence following the Meiji revolution, Japan experienced her intellectual enlightenment. Traditional authorities and powers faded and with the new light of western culture, machines, and science, rationalism was elevated to supreme heights. Western philosophy trickled in, and, in the early '70's, a formal course in philosophy was offered at the old Imperial University in Tokyo. In 1876, a chair of philosophy was established and *utilitarianism* and the teachings of Bentham and Mill gained wide acceptance among the students. Coincidentally, the Japanese learned to know the leaders of the French enlightenment, Voltaire and Rousseau. Following an earlier western resolve, Japan set out to find truth through reason.

Then this phase ended; Shintō asserted itself. Reaction set in. The national consciousness recalled centuries-old development and the glory of the national beliefs. The cosmopolitan tendencies waned. German thought came to the fore. This was logical since Japan's returned students had found, during studies in Germany, many similar institutions, militarism, etc. By 1880, philosophical emphasis had settled upon Kant's philosophical teachings, and the trend toward rationalism was supplanted by the romantic movement. Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and Nietzsche found willing ears and exercised great influence. Nationalism and historicism opposed individualism and the revolutionary spirit during this phase.

After the turn of the century and until about the time of the first world war, Japanese thought embraced an attitude of subjectivism marked by a national self-consciousness. Rationalism had gone, and in its place there stood a path toward ultimate truth by instinctive means. During this period, wider vistas of western thought were opened through the translation of the philosophies of Plato, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Eucken, Höfding and James.

Between the two world wars, the national spirit moved on. The hold of the warrior classes reasserted itself, and Shintō purists recalled the people to "Japanese" virtues. With the second world war and its far reaching effects, the future course of thought seems uncertain. Certainly the basic fabric of Japanese thinking has been shaken by a first hand experience of atomic bombing, by the Emperor's denial of a divine origin, and by the continuing allied occupation. What mark these events will leave on Japanese thought, only the future can tell.

As we have traced, even in outline, the long and sometimes slender line of Japanese philosophy, the influence of Shintō and the Japanese spirit has always been visible. While Shintō contributed to

the development of the ethical system in Japanese philosophy, it was also not without influence in determining the development of Buddhism in Japan. And Buddhism, in particular, has been closely connected with each stage of development in Japanese philosophy.

In view of the importance and influence of Shintō, the following excerpts have been taken from the *Nihongi* to show some of the primitive beliefs and mythology from whence sprang the "way of the spirit." The verses were taken from the beginning portions of the book which recount the age of the gods.

Nihongi

Of old, Heaven and Earth were not yet separated, and the In and Yo (the Yin and Yan, or male and female, principles in Chinese philosophy) not yet divided. They formed a chaotic mass like an egg which was of obscurely defined limits and contained germs.

The purer and clearer part was thinly drawn out, and formed Heaven, while the heavier and grosser element settled down and became earth.

The finer element easily became a united body, but the consolidation of the heavy and gross element was accomplished with difficulty.

Heaven was therefore formed first, and earth was established subsequently.

Thereafter Divine Beings were produced between them.

Hence it is said that when the world began to be created, the soil, of which lands were composed, floated about in a manner which might be compared to the floating of a fish sporting on the surface of the water.

At this time a certain thing was produced between Heaven and Earth. It was in form like a reed-shoot. Now this became transformed into a God . . .

In one writing it is said: "The Gods that were produced in pairs, male and female, were first of all Uhiji no no Mikoto and Suhiji ni no Mikoto. Next there were Tsuno-guhi no Mikoto and Iku-guhi no Mikoto, next Omo-taru no Mikoto and Kashiko-ne no Mikoto, and next Izanagi no Mikoto and Izanami no Mikoto."

Izanagi no Mikoto and Izanami no Mikoto stood on the floating bridge of Heaven, and held counsel together, saying, "Is there not a country beneath?"

Thereupon they thrust down the jewel-spear of Heaven, and groping about therewith found the ocean. The brine which dripped from the point of the spear coagulated and became an island which received the name Ono-goro-jima.

The two Deities thereupon descended and dwelt in this island. Accordingly they wished to become husband and wife together, and to produce countries. . . .

The female Deity spoke first and said, "How pretty! a lovely youth!" She forthwith took the hand of the male Deity, and they at length became husband and wife. There was born to them the island of Ahaji, and next the leech-child.

They next produced the sea, then the rivers, and then the mountains. They they produced Ku-ku-no-chi, the ancestor of the trees, and next the ancestor of herbs, Kaya no hime.

After this Izanagi no Mikoto and Izanami no Mikoto consulted together, saying, "We have now produced the great eight island country with the mountains, rivers, herbs, and trees. Why should we not produce someone who shall be lord of the universe?" They then produced the Sun-goddess, who was called Oho-hiru-me no muchi (Amaterasu).

The resplendent lustre of this child shone throughout all the six quarters. Therefore the two Deities rejoiced, saying, "We have had many children but none of them have been equal to this wondrous infant. She ought not to be kept long in this land, but we ought of our own accord to send her at once to Heaven, and entrust to her the affairs of Heaven."

At this time Heaven and Earth were still not far separated, and therefore they sent her up to Heaven by the ladder of Heaven.

They next produced the Moon-god.

Called in one writing Tsuki-yumi no Mikoto, or Tsuki-yomi no Mikoto.

His radiance was next to that of the Sun in splendour. This God was to be the consort of the Sun-goddess, and to share in her government. They therefore sent him also to Heaven.

Next they produced the leech-child, which even at the age of three years could not stand upright. They therefore placed it in the rock-camphor-wood boat of Heaven, and abandoned it to the winds.

Their next child was Soso no wo no Mikoto.

This God had a fierce temper and was given to cruel acts. Moreover, he made a practice of continually weeping and wailing. So he brought many of the people of the land to an untimely end. Again he caused green mountains to become withered. Therefore, the two Gods, his parents, addressed Sosa no wo no Mikoto, saying, "Thou art exceedingly wicked, and it is not meet that thou shouldest reign over the world. Certainly thou must depart far away to the Nether-Land." So they at length expelled him. . . .¹

(This first chapter of the *Nihongi* from which the above excerpts were taken continues with the story of Izanami's death. She is burned and dies while giving birth to fire, and descends to the kingdom of the dead. Izanagi's grief turns to anger, and he destroys fire. He goes to seek his wife in the kingdom of the dead, and hearing her voice in the underworld, he urges her to return to him. She promises that she will seek the permission of the rulers of the land of the dead, and entreats him not to look at her. He lights a torch and finds only her maggot-ridden corpse. The horror of death fills him. The Goddess is furious with him for disobeying her wish, and she sends the Female Fury of Hades to pursue her husband. He finally eludes his pursuer. The story, as it unravels, holds little of value to ordinary studies in philosophy, but provides fascinating reading for those interested in mythology.)

¹From *Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society, London*, Supplement 1, *Nihongi*, translated by W. G. Aston, London, 1896. Published for the society by Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co. Ltd. Reprinted with the permission of the London Japan Society.

Conclusion

While we have limited our examination of Oriental philosophy to the best known schools, even this brief record should contain some mention of the thought of the nearer East. *Islam*, *Persian Sufism*, *Zoroastrianism* and *Mithraism* are primarily religions rather than philosophies, but perhaps they should be mentioned here so that the reader has at least some notion of their general nature.

Islam may be treated summarily not only because it is first of all a religion, rather than a philosophy, but also because by its geographical distribution it does not truly come within the purview of this volume. Islam is based on the teaching of Mohammed (?570-632 A.D.), its founder and prophet. From obscure beginnings, it rolled across Asia and Africa, conquering and converting huge segments of mankind almost upon contact. It became the religion of Arabia, and of countless thousands in Persia, India, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. In the west it conquered North and West Africa, and although it retains little influence there now, it was once firmly entrenched in Spain. The *Koran* is the sacred book of Mohammed's teaching. While it holds much of significance for the student of comparative religion, it is not particularly important for our present study.

The Sufism of Persia, on the other hand, while it is of Islamic origin, does have a certain importance in rounding out the picture of Oriental philosophy. Islam invaded Persia soon after the lifetime

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of Mohammed. In 1058 A.D., the Persian theologian and philosopher Ghazali was born, and it was through him that Islam in Persia took on a new aspect. The Persians were a branch of the same ancient family from which the Aryan people of India descended. While they were not, by nature, prone to accept the soaring flight of Vedic thought neither were they anxious to accept the auster concept of Allah as it was preached by the Moslem world. The Persians by their geographical location, as well as by these racial tendencies, were poised between the Vedic influences on the East and the Islamic influences on the West. The compromise was affected by Ghazali and consisted in large measure of the combining of a mystic and intuitional theology with basic Islamic doctrine. He is without a doubt the most original thinker produced by Islam. Sufism actually began in Syria around 750 A. D., and since Ghazali traveled there he may have gained his early appreciation of its teachings in that country.

Fundamentally it teaches that God alone exists; all else is illusion. God is reason (*aql*) but is unknowable-in-himself. Ultimate knowledge is attainable through intuition. Only the good exists; evil is not real, but is rather a "negative-good". Life's goal, say the Sufists, is union with God, i. e. identity with reality, reason and the good.

It is not a heterodox Islamic system. It was not after Ghazali, at least, for he gave unity to the earlier *sufi* theories in their relationship to orthodox Islamic thought and in so doing gave new significance and importance to the latter in Persia.¹

Zoroastrianism originated in ancient Persia. It is a strongly ethical dualism and teaches the continuous struggle between the Good Spirit of the cosmos (Ahura Mazda) and the Evil Spirit (Angra Mainyu). In our own day, most of the followers of Zoroaster (the Parsis) are to be found on the west coast of India.²

Zoroaster lived between 660 and 583 B. C., according to contemporary scholarship. He was of noble family and early in life dedicated himself to the religious life. He spent many years in study and teach-

¹L. Adams Beck has an entertaining chapter on Sufism in her popular volume *The Story of Oriental Philosophy*. John Clark Archer has a particularly keen analysis of the early growth of Sufism in Persia in his chapter on the Moslem religion in his volume *Faiths Men Live By*. See also George W. Davis: "Sufism: From Its Origins to Al-Ghazzali" *The Muslim World*, pp. 241-256, Vol. XXXVIII No. 4, October 1948, for suggestive comments concerning the relation of Sufism to Islamic history.

²There remain a few thousand Parsis, or Gabars, in modern Iran.

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ing and attracted both great and obscure by his zeal and message. He elevated the Aryan god *Mazda* (called *Varuna* in India) to supreme heights and called upon all to worship *Mazda* as the true and only supreme being. Opposed to *Mazda*, who was the essence of goodness, was *Angra Mainyu* (or *Ahriman*).¹ The other gods popularly worshipped in *Zoroaster's* day were relegated by him to the status of demons. They were anti-god, and as such had no place in his pantheon. *Zoroaster* was himself a monotheist. The dualistic doctrines of the teachings now bearing his name came by later development. Involved in a religious war with the *Turanians*, *Zoroaster* lost his life in his seventy-eighth year. The original sacred writings of this faith are the *Gathas*, or songs, written or edited by *Zoroaster* himself. There are seventeen now existent, although their original number may have been greater.

The *Yasna* (which includes the *Gathas*), the *Visperad* (Book of Liturgy), and the *Vendidad* (Book of Priestly Law) compose the *Avesta* (Book of Knowledge). The later books of the *Avesta* include the *Yashts* (Book of Hymns), the *Khorda-Avesta* (Book of Common Prayer) and several other *Pahlevi* and non-classical works as well as numerous vernacular translations of the *Avesta*.

Mithraism is least of all deserving of mention here since it is a Persian "mystery religion" along with the *Phrygian* cult of *Cybele* and *Attis* and the *Egyptian* mystery of *Isis* and *Osiris*, and as such may not properly be regarded as a philosophy at all. Its predominating religious motive stemmed from the universal desire of man to be free from sinfulness and in his purity gain oneness with the divine. It was widely accepted by the *Roman* soldiery in its later development and attained great popularity and influence in the first centuries of the *Christian* era.

With this brief introduction to the philosophical thought of the Orient, a final effort will be to formulate some generalizations concerning this vast reservoir of learning and to determine in some measure its significance for us.

It is not only extremely difficult, but also unwise, to make a hasty

¹*Angra Mainyu* was originally the evil spirit of *Ahura Mazda*. This monotheism later gave way to an ethical dualism in which *Ahriman* was accepted as the opponent of and separate from *Ahura Mazda*. *Ahriman* was thus the evil one or devil.

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general statement of the spirit of Oriental philosophy. Oriental philosophy is knowable only in terms of its constituent philosophies. These are as frequently as not in disagreement on a given point. Just as there is great variety and change in our own Western philosophy, so there is variety and change in Eastern philosophy. There are many schools and viewpoints to be considered, and one cannot go too slowly in attributing to all Oriental philosophy what may be true only of certain of the Eastern philosophies. Thus, the philosophy of Confucius is concerned primarily with man and his practical conduct. The Chinese Sophists, on the other hand, were concerned with knowledge concepts and had little interest in man or his conduct as such. Again, we find one attitude in early Buddhism as to what is the proper field of philosophical enquiry, and another attitude, quite divergent, in the orthodox systems of the Hindus. The same school has often held different attitudes at different times: a view held in the ancient period may be quite different from the one held in medieval times, and so on. Differences are sometimes accompanied by similarities, however, and upon the latter we must depend for any general conclusions which may be drawn.

First of all let us recognize that the major emphases in Oriental philosophy do not always coincide with the emphases found in Western philosophy. In Indian and Chinese philosophy, we find above all that philosophy is regarded as a human problem. This may account, in part at least, for the close relationship between religion and philosophy in Asia. Indian philosophy tends toward spirituality, a deep interest in the subjective, idealism, monism, intuitive knowledge, the control of one's passions and avoidance of injury to living beings. Of course there are exceptions in the cases of individual schools (e. g. the Charvaka) where this generalization will not apply, but these are the broad outlines. Chinese philosophy is frequently unconcerned with problems of epistemology, and little concerned with investigating knowledge for its own sake; metaphysics has taken a second place to the study of man himself, i. e., ethical studies; too, systems of logic have never been developed to the extent found in typical Western philosophies.

As a whole, Oriental philosophy finds no place for the Western conception of individual immortality. Man is regarded as a drop in the universal ocean (in the West we would be likely to use the term "undifferentiated continuum") and as losing his identity finally by absorption or through some other form of union. The individual, as might be suspected, is sometimes not accorded a very great measure of

reality, and this in no way detracts from man's being the primary concern of much of Eastern philosophy. The real is the *ultimate*, and man has reality only in that he forms a part of the *ultimate*. Materialism is accorded little importance in the East. Intuitive means of knowledge are prominent in the schools of Oriental thought, but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Oriental sage has not been critical in his reasoning. Intuition, as found in Eastern thought, does not contradict reason, but supplements, or transcends it. An exceptionally cogent and lucid account of the import of intuitive reasoning as we see it in the East and are able to compare it with Western "scientific" philosophy is to be found in the chapter by F. S. C. Northrup, "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy" in *Philosophy — East and West* edited by Charles A. Moore. Oriental philosophy possesses a logic, perhaps not the methodological logic of the West, but none the less clear and distinct. By comparison, however, it is deficient in its ability to analyze. On the other side of the scale, Eastern philosophy has progressed as far, perhaps going beyond the West, in the direction of synthesis. There is a tendency toward discovering similarities rather than differences.

Chan Wing-tsit, in his chapter on the "Spirit of Oriental Philosophy" in the volume just mentioned, has made a careful and detailed analysis of the broad attitudes adopted by Oriental philosophy in dealing with basic problems, and the reader can do little better than to read the material for himself.

The key to the value of Oriental philosophy for the Western world may well be found in the adoption of an eclectic method—perhaps we should take that in Oriental philosophy which fulfils the deficiencies of our own systems. The adoption of what is best in both East and West should certainly work in two directions. If we in the West have found a better system of logic than the five-membered syllogism of the Buddhists and Hindus or the doctrine of "may-be" of the Jains, for example, then the Orient may well benefit from the West. On the other hand, if the struggles of Western philosophy with ethical and other problems is to be aided by Oriental teachings, then we need to become familiar with such thought. Perhaps the West should begin by examining for its own benefit the Oriental concept of the close relationship between the realization of human nature, or self, and the realization of reality.

The task of choosing and selecting what is best will be no easy one. It is none the less necessary if philosophy is to continue along

CONCLUSION

that long slender line of progress that has been the golden thread of human thought for time immemorial.

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